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TRADE UNION MILITANCY: CASE STUDIES IN TRANSPORT

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CONTENTS

Page

Abbreviations

Acknowledgements

CHAPTER 1	Introduction	1.
CHAPTER 2	The origins and beginnings of the relationship as they are institutionalized and have come to have a continuing effect on the parties; together with the particular axes or directions along which the relationship between the parties has grown.	
	Part I: The Queensland Railway Service.	35.
	Part II: The Australian Railways Union (Queensland Branch).	68.
	Part III: The Airline Industry.	100.
	Part IV: The Australian Federation of Air Pilots.	118.
CHAPTER 3	The union and management organisations and their respective internal procedures for decision making.	
	Part I: The Railway Department and the A.R.U.	134.
	Part II: The Airline Operators and the Federation.	166.
CHAPTER 4	The technological and physical conditions of the work community.	180.

CONTENTS (Contd.)

	<u>Page</u>
CHAPTER 5 The ideas, beliefs and value judgments of the decision makers in Union and in Management and in the community and in the industry in which the parties operate.	202.
CHAPTER 6 The industrial relations setting of the parties, which includes the relation of the union to other unions [and to the Australian Labor Party]; and the management to other managements, both generally and in its labour relations policies.	238.
CHAPTER 7 Conclusion	273.
Bibliography	288.
Appendices	313.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>A.C.S.P.A.</i>	<i>Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations</i>
<i>A.C.T.U.</i>	<i>Australian Council of Trade Unions</i>
<i>A.E.U.</i>	<i>Amalgamated Engineering Union</i>
<i>A.F.A.P.</i>	<i>Australian Federation of Air Pilots</i>
<i>A.F.U.L.E.</i>	<i>Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen</i>
<i>A.L.P.</i>	<i>Australian Labor Party</i>
<i>A.N.A.</i>	<i>Australian National Airways Pty. Ltd.</i>
<i>Ansett</i>	<i>Ansett Transport Industries Ltd.</i>
<i>A.R.U.</i>	<i>Australian Railways Union</i>
<i>A.T.I.</i>	<i>Ansett Transport Industries Ltd.</i>
<i>A.W.A.</i>	<i>Amalgamated Workers' Association</i>
<i>A.W.U.</i>	<i>Australian Workers' Union</i>
<i>B.C.P.A.</i>	<i>British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines</i>
<i>C.R.U.</i>	<i>Combined Railway Unions' Committee</i>
<i>D.C.A.</i>	<i>Department of Civil Aviation</i>
<i>F.E.D.F.A.</i>	<i>Federated Engine Drivers and Firemens Association</i>
<i>I.W.W.</i>	<i>Industrial Workers of the World</i>
<i>O.B.U.</i>	<i>One Big Union</i>
<i>Qantas</i>	<i>Queensland Northern Territory Aerial Services Ltd.</i>
<i>Q.C.E.</i>	<i>Queensland Central Executive of the Australian Labor Party</i>
<i>Q.E.A.</i>	<i>Qantas Empire Airways Ltd.</i>
<i>Q.R.E.A.</i>	<i>Queensland Railway Employees' Association</i>
<i>Q.R.U.</i>	<i>Queensland Railway Union</i>
<i>Q.U.R.E.A.</i>	<i>Queensland United Railway Employees' Association</i>
<i>T.A.A.</i>	<i>Trans Australia Airlines</i>
<i>T.E.A.</i>	<i>Tasman Empire Airways Ltd.</i>

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the accepted use of the word, militancy expresses a sense of combativeness and aggression. It has a ring of the military about it, and of warfare and hostility. When the term is transferred to the field of industrial labour relations, many of these overtones remain, with the result that strike action is generally regarded as the characteristic trait of a militant union.

In Australia, the word and its derivatives are in general use to describe certain types of industrial behaviour and to identify certain kinds of unions, union leaders and their supporters. In this popular sense, militant is applied loosely and often inaccurately as a synonym for Communist, Neo-Communist, or extreme "left-wing".¹ It is assumed that a militant union is one which frequently strikes or threatens direct action of some kind. It is further implied that the basis for this activity is the ideological position of the union's leaders - a position on the extreme left wing of the political spectrum. Finally, it puts forward the view that the aims of the union so described are both political and radical and that industrial means are being used to further not industrial, but political, ends.

It will be argued that militancy in this guise and the implications which flow from it, is based on unjustified assumptions about its causes, and when applied to individual unions, the term may be misleading

1. For a typical example, see *The Australian*, 30/10/1969, p.5.
"Militants out to capture A.R.U. posts".

or fallacious. While a union engaged in strike action is obviously behaving militantly, it does not follow that all other modes of union behaviour are non-militant. Confrontations between employer and employees may be of a highly combative nature and yet not involve the withdrawal of labour. Likewise, to consider all militancy within the trade union movement as having a political or ideological basis is to suppose a similarity in beliefs, values and ideas, and a unanimity of opinion on the part of large numbers of employees, engaged in a variety of pursuits with often wide differences between them in terms of salary, working conditions and status.

To illustrate: the Queensland branch of the Australian Railways Union and the Australian Federation of Air Pilots are unions to which the label 'militant' has been attached. Both unions have brought their members out on strike in the past, and are quite prepared to do so again, if necessary. The majority of members of the A.R.U. are semi or unskilled workers, while the Federation represents men who consider themselves part of a highly trained, specialist, professional elite, who, despite their strong organisation, retain many of the individualistic characteristics typical of many professionals. The railway men operate within the State arbitration system, are affiliated with the Queensland Trades and Labor Council, and with the Queensland branch of the Australian Labor Party. The pilots, on the other hand, divorced themselves from the Commonwealth conciliation and arbitration

system in 1958,² and are linked through affiliation, with only one body, the Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations.

It would seem likely, therefore, even from this superficial comparison, that there would be few common attitudes between these two groups, beyond the fact that both are organisations of employees³ whose primary reason for existence is to come to terms with their employers over salaries and wages, hours and conditions of work. Consequently, it would be dangerous to assume that the militancy of these unions sprang from identical causes (and, in the case of the Federation, that it was ideologically based), until both unions had been studied in depth and the causes of their militant attitudes traced.

As will be argued in this thesis, the proposition that militancy must of necessity, be equated with radical political views, falls to the ground immediately one begins to scrutinize closely the trade union movement in Australia. In this country many organisations of employees, which are accepted as trade unions, whether registered as such or not, disclaim any political commitment, while others, equally a part of the trade union movement, have quite frank and overt political aims.⁴ It

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2. The original association was the Australian Air Pilots' Association registered with the Commonwealth Arbitration Court in 1947. Some years later, this body took industrial action which rendered it liable to penalties imposed by the Arbitration Commission. The great bulk of the membership resigned in 1958 and left the Air Pilots' Association without its office bearers or funds.
 3. One doubts whether pilots even consciously think of themselves as employees in conflict with employers. Certainly this attitude did not come out strongly in interviews with individual pilots and executive members of the Federation, conducted 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1971.
 4. D.W. Rawson: "The Frontiers of Trade Unionism". *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 1, No. 2, May, 1956, pp. 196-209.

would be a most exceptional case for unions in the former group to take part in party politics,⁵ and just as rare for the term, militant, if applied to any of these unions, to represent a charge of ideological commitment to left wing politics. This is not to say that militant could never be a correct description for these kinds of unions, but only that it would have to have another meaning to be of any relevance.

To get away from these ambiguous and confusing views on militancy, first and foremost it will be necessary to frame a definition which will be precise and yet generally applicable. The logical place to begin such a task is with those who have already attempted it, who have studied and observed militancy, and who have come to certain conclusions about it, against which one can test one's own hypothesis.

Not surprisingly, the Marxist interpretation of militancy bears some resemblance to popular use of the term in Australia. Marxists use militant, descriptively of the proletariat, of a special part of the proletariat. As Kautsky explains it,

"there has gradually formed from skilled and unskilled workers a body of proletarians who are in the movement of labor or the labor movement. It is the part of the proletariat which is fighting for the interests of the whole class, its church militant, as it were...in this growing mass of workers, the militant division increases not only absolutely, but also relatively. No matter how fast the proletariat may grow, this militant division of it grows still faster.

But it is precisely this militant proletariat which is the most fruitful recruiting ground for socialism. The socialist movement is nothing more than the part of this militant proletariat which has become conscious of its goal.

5. Rawson points out an obvious exception, the Bank Officers' Association Campaign against bank nationalization, 1948-49, *ibid.*, p. 198.

*In fact, these two, socialism and the militant proletariat, tend constantly to become identical."*⁶

Thus, translating from Marxist phraseology, the militants are the hard core revolutionary socialists among the workers, and militancy encompasses both methods of achieving ultimate goals and the goals themselves. While it may well be that this is an apt enough description of some militant Australian trade unionists, not all those to whom this term is applied are revolutionary socialists and Marxist thinking on militancy is not entirely helpful in the search for a general definition. Obviously, the full answer to the question, "what is militancy" lies elsewhere.

An examination of the writers on industrial labour relations is a somewhat more fruitful exercise, though most are concerned with special aspects of what is an extremely wide field of interest, and many have not found it necessary to investigate or even mention militancy. One of the few who does concern himself with militancy and militants by virtue of the subject matter of his work, is Turner.⁷ He says,

*"'militant' and 'moderate' describe the methods by which particular aims are to be accomplished: the former signifies industrial action rather than reliance on arbitration or legislation, an uncompromising attempt to win all that is demanded rather than to settle for a part, an attitude which asserts the clash of class interests rather than a community of interests."*⁸

6. Karl Kautsky: *The Class Struggle (Erfurt Program)*. Charles H. Kerr and Co., Chicago, 1910, pp. 183-84.

7. Ian Turner: *Industrial Labour and Politics: the Labour Movement in Eastern Australia, 1900-1921*. A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1965.

8. *ibid.*, p. xv.

This is useful but still inadequate for our purposes as all militant trade unions can not be categorized in this way. Again, within the measure of Turner's definition come together not only methods but also particular aims. Therefore its weakness lies in its assumption that militancy is based, in part, upon a conception of industrial conflict as a manifestation of the class struggle. In this sense, it assumes, not only a political ideology for militants, but also one that sees the employer-employee relationship from the viewpoint of a class war, and the clash of class interests.

Now the militant Australian Federation of Air Pilots is not without a consciousness of class; but the pilots do not view industrial conflict or management-union relations as being an expression of class conflict. It is highly improbable that they see themselves as part of a working class proletariat, with a community of interest with all other workers, and one would be just as sceptical of their likely support for the "clash of class interests" thesis. Their concern is entirely with industrial matters, particularly those having to do with conditions of work, flight pay and safety,⁹ and with the more general question of their acceptance as professionals within the community, rather than specialist technicians. They consider themselves to be a professional élite among the work force, and have been extremely anxious, in their confrontations with management, to have their status acknowledged and reinforced by appropriate remuneration and conditions. In the protracted negotiations between the Federation and the Air

9. Interviews (1967) with the immediate past President of the Federation, Captain R.T. Holt.

Line Operators in 1966, over salaries, great importance was attached by the President, Captain R.T. Holt, and his Executive, to achieving recognition for the pilot of "his place in the salary hierarchy in Australia."¹⁰ The submissions of the Federation contained strong "community standard" arguments, backed up by elaborate charts and graphs showing the position of the Australian pilots, with regard to salary, relative to those of service chiefs, professors and both Federal and State judges, in New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.¹¹ Under these circumstances it would appear that the Federation would conform, in all probability, to parts one and two of Turner's definition of militancy but that the final part would not be applicable. The Federation's standpoint is not unique, and while the heterogeneous nature of white collar and professional unions makes it impossible to generalize, enough evidence of a similar kind from other "militant" unions can be found to cast further doubt upon the third element of the definition.

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10. *Australian Federation of Air Pilots: The President's Address to Extra-ordinary general meetings* on July 11th, 1966. Concerning contract negotiations between the Federation, Ansett/A.N.A., T.A.A., Airlines of New South Wales, Queensland Airlines, Airlines of South Australia, MacRobertson Miller Airlines, East West Airlines.
 11. By the agreement reached in 1966, parity was achieved with the salaries of certain categories of people, high in the Australian work force. The failure to maintain this position was the alleged cause of a strike called by the Federation in December, 1969. Cf. *Courier Mail*, 13/12/69 in which Captain Holt is quoted: "People whom we use as our yard-stick on the salary hierarchy have kept their position there. We have no intention of slipping down the ladder." Cf. A.A. Congalton: *Status and Prestige in Australia*. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1969. Appendix B. "Status Ranking List of Occupations in Australia", pp. 143-158. Air Line Pilots are ranked B (4 point scale) and 3 (7 point scale) while Departmental Heads, Government Service, rank B and 2, and Judges, Barristers, University professors and doctors all rank A and 1 on the same scales.

Another who has studied particular aspects of militancy is Silverman, in her work on political strikes in Australia.¹² She adopts a dichotomous approach to this question of definition, listing those things which militant unions do, which are different from those things which non-militant or moderate unions do. This leads her to suggest that

*"most trade unions are prepared to obey and conform to the conventions and laws which regulate their activities for various reasons...[while] militant unions deviate from this general pattern of activities and are prepared to wage a vigorous, all-out fight for their aims and objectives, without necessarily stopping at the borderline of propriety."*¹³

This line of reasoning brings her close to a definition of militancy, which she sees as a

*"[preparedness] to rely upon direct industrial action, particularly the strike, when compliance with arbitration procedures, legislative enactments or other traditional forms would be more acceptable and more conventional."*¹⁴

This is a similar position to Turner's, without the ideological or political motivation for militancy implicit in his work. Despite this, it must be made clear that the whole tenor of Silverman's study of political strikes is set from her belief that the militant unions are those which are prepared to strike for political reasons, over and above industrial issues; that they are those that see the strike as

12. Sondra Silverman: *Political Movements - Three Case Studies of Protest*. Unpub. Ph.D. thesis, A.N.U.; "Australian Political Strikes", *Labour History*, No. 11, November, 1966. "Political Strikes in Australia", ed. J.E. Isaac and G.W. Ford: *Australian Labour Relations - Readings*, Sun Books, Melbourne, 1966.

13. Silverman: *Australian Political Strikes*, p. 28.

14. *ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

their chief weapon in the class struggle, and that many have an ideological view of society which would deny the hope of any real improvements for the working class within the existing capitalist framework.

At the risk of labouring a point, it must be reiterated that though one can assume that the ideological factor would be the most important cause of militancy in those unions studied by Silverman, too much reliance should not be placed on this as the only or even the principal explanation for militancy. It will be argued that militancy may spring from many causes, not all of which need to be operating at the one time, and some of which may be of more importance than others at different periods in a union's history. The problem is a many-faceted one which does not lend itself readily to a single-factor answer.¹⁵ However, one would agree with Silverman and Turner, that if we are to arrive at a general definition of militancy, it must be tied to the willingness of a union to take direct action to achieve specific ends, whether these be industrial or political or a combination of both; and to use methods less acceptable and conventional than a non-militant union would use. In other words, in the context of militancy, what a union hopes to achieve is not as important as how it goes about it.

This agrees with Allen's conclusions that "the term militancy clearly refers to methods and not aims... It is not what unions are

15. R.J. May: "Determinants of the Industrial Relations Pattern in the Australian Stevedoring Industry." *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 2, October, 1961, pp. 157-165, where he argues the fallacies of the unifactoral approach to the causes of industrial unrest.

pressing for which matters so much as how they are pressing."¹⁶ It is less easy to support him when he suggests that the term is, in general usage "synonymous with good trade union practice."¹⁷ He sees militancy as evidenced by not only active participation in union affairs (the mark of a militant), but also by

*"a taking of the initiative, of exploiting fully whatever power or influence they possess, of pursuing a possibly successful policy in a prompt and speedy manner. In other words, militancy relates to achievement as well as method."*¹⁸

Here, his emphasis is on activity - of pressing union demands and claims energetically and fully and by whatever means are *appropriate* to the situation and to the conditions under which a particular union operates.

Now Allen, in discussing militant trade unionism, has drawn upon the experience of the British trade union movement, and its operation within what is mainly a collective bargaining system, and it does not necessarily follow that his statements can be applied with the same degree of accuracy to the trade union movement in this country.

Certainly most Australian trade unionists would use the term militant to describe the active participant in union affairs; they might even agree that a union was acting militantly if it were vigorously pressing the claims of its members, whatever they might be. However, in its widest and most general application, militancy has a touch of opprobrium about it, being reserved for activity that is outside the

16. V.L. Allen: *Militant Trade Unionism*. The Merlin Press, London, 1966, p. 18.

17. *ibid.*, p. 18.

18. *ibid.*, p. 19.

established norms and practices, and the traditional framework for industrial labour relations, and for action considered to be inappropriate to both the particular situation and to the particular union or unions involved.

Our traditional framework is the arbitration system whose purpose is the settling of industrial disputes. As, in practice, it also establishes National standards of wages and conditions at its major hearings, the majority of trade unions, whether willingly or unwillingly, operate under its strictures and within its heavily legalistic structure.¹⁹ Even those which are to all intents and purposes outside the system are not completely untouched by it. The Australian Federation of Air Pilots which placed itself outside the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Commission in 1958, has now, under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1967, to take any interstate industrial dispute before a Flight Crew Officers' Industrial Tribunal, appointed by the Commonwealth Government, and having the power to prevent or settle such disputes by conciliation or arbitration.²⁰ Even in Broken Hill where the Barrier Industrial Council is the ultimate authority in industrial matters, and where these are regulated almost entirely by agreement,²¹

19. J. Hutson: *Penal Colony to Penal Powers*. Amalgamated Engineering Union, Sydney, 1966, p. 77 and following.

20. Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1967. (No. 101 of 1967). *Commonwealth of Australia*. Assented to 10/11/67.

21. All State awards exclude the County of Yancowinna in which Broken Hill is situated. Cf. S.C. Taylor: "Industrial Relations in the Broken Hill Mining Industry", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 7, 1965, pp. 101-111. W.E. Hotchkiss: "The Broken Hill Mines Agreement - a Study of some objective factors in Industrial Negotiation", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 12, No.1, March 1970, pp. 9-19.

it is usual for a member of the Industrial Commission of New South Wales or a Conciliation Commissioner to assist in the formulation of the agreements.²²

Also, as part of the governmental process, the arbitration system has attracted to itself a high degree of legitimacy, and even those unions which, for a variety of reasons, are becoming increasingly disenchanted with its operation, use it still. As well, enshrined within the provisions of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act is the notion of "the public interest", which has meant that the operators of the arbitration machinery, in coming to their decisions, are expected to be mindful, not only of the desirability of maintaining production and employment, but also of all the possible effects of various proposals upon the public welfare.²³ The implication flowing from this is that trade unions, when they are parties to a dispute, bear, along with employers, a wider responsibility to society generally, than to the membership of their unions alone. Indeed, the "responsibility" of

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22. Cf. Mark Perlman: *Judges in Industry*. Melbourne Univ. Press, Melbourne, 1954, p. 48. "In point of fact, what is unique about the Australian way of handling industrial relations is the willingness to accept the principle of governmental intervention. The Australians do have considerable collective bargaining most of which is carried on by national rather than local officers. But this collective bargaining is generally practised in the shadow of the Court. Thus it is the presence of the Court system which lends to Australia's industrial relations their characteristic form." Also, Ian Sharp: "Some Features of the Australian Industrial Relations Scene", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 1, April, 1959, pp. 1-7.
23. Paul L. Kleinsorge: "Public Interest as a Criterion in Settling Labor Disputes: The Australian Experience", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 6, No. 2., July, 1964, pp. 1-22.

trade unions for the health and general prosperity of the economy is a belief which attracts a solid core of support, even within the trade union movement itself.²⁴ Union activity which cuts across these traditional attitudes, is therefore likely to be considered inappropriate and irresponsible by the community at large.

Because industrial relations have been institutionalized²⁵ to a large extent, by these means and for these reasons, the majority of unions support and operate through the system, despite in many cases, their disappointment with the gains achieved, and "methods of direct action common to other countries, such as the United States and Britain, are, to a degree, less characteristic of union activities [in Australia]."26

There may seem to be an ambivalence between the concept of legitimate and responsible actions within the bounds of the arbitration system and "the right to strike" - an article of faith which is jealously guarded by most trade unionists, even those accepted as non-militant and operating through established channels. The lack of harmony between these two principles is, however, more apparent than real.

"The strike is an incident of collective bargaining, and its isolation as a 'right' arises only when that incident is

24. Cf. D.W. Rawson: "Politics and 'Responsibility' in Australian Trade Unions", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. IV, No. 1, November, 1958, pp. 224-243.

25. R.S. Parker: "Power in Australia", *The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 1, No. 2, October, 1965, pp. 85-96.

26. Silverman: *op.cit.*, p. 28.

*divorced from the totality of the process and brought into question thereby."*²⁷

Furthermore, as Sorrell emphasises, the retention of the strike as a weapon available to unions is necessary as a pressure upon the employer to fulfil his obligations to bargain. Any seeming conflict is usually resolved by a non-militant union, in considering the strike as armament to be used as a last resort, when all the established methods of resolving industrial conflict have failed to provide a solution. A militant union would have less compunction about using the strike weapon, seeing it as one of a number of choices open to it, and using it if it seemed more appropriate, or likely to be more effective in particular circumstances, than traditional procedures.²⁸

To this point it has been suggested that, over the years, a pattern of conduct and procedure for industrial labour relations has been laid down, in Australia, of which the arbitration system is the cornerstone; further, that this has been widely, if at times reluctantly, accepted by most unions, employers and successive governments, both Federal and State. At this stage, it could then be said that a union would be regarded as militant, if it consistently, and over a period, adopted means of achieving specific goals which were contrary to, or outside of, these accepted norms and procedures.

So far, no specifications have been laid down for methods which

27. G.H. Sorrell: "The Dispute at Mount Isa", *The Australian Quarterly*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2, June, 1965, p. 24.

28. It also needs to be borne in mind that the arbitration system itself does not demand either the complete renunciation of the right to strike, or penalisation for *all* strikes.

are considered to be outside the traditional pattern, and an attempt will now be made to identify them. In the course of such an examination it may be possible to clarify even further the definition of militancy suggested above. With regard to the means adopted by unions to achieve specific objectives, it needs to be pointed out that what may be apposite at one period of time for a particular group of employees, may not seem appropriate to another, either at the same instance or at another point in time.

In addition, beliefs and values of long standing do change, albeit slowly and imperceptibly; those governing the conduct of industrial labour relations are no more immune to the passage of time than others. So it can happen that methods which are appropriate to a union at one time in its history may not be considered suitable at another. Or unions may be caught in a transitional period, when the established ways are coming under strong criticism and when a new procedural pattern has not yet been evolved. Such a period may well be upon us in Australia at the present time. Condemnation of the arbitration system is mounting, and calls for a wider use of collective bargaining or for some other scheme are increasing.²⁹

The Australian Workers Union provides a case in point. This union "has stood firmly by the principle of arbitration ever since it was established, despite considerable dissatisfaction within the union at

29. Though it should be noted that a substantial area of collective bargaining is already accepted. Cf. J. Hutson, p. 78. See also *The Australian*, 31/1/1970 and 26/2/1970 for reports that the A.C.T.U. will discuss the possibility of trade unions withdrawing from the arbitration system and seeking wage settlements by other means.

times",³⁰ and there is ample evidence over the years to support Walker's assessment.³¹ Yet in January, 1970 at the A.W.U. Federal Convention, the general secretary, T. Dougherty, launched the strongest attack ever made on the arbitration system by the union, threatening that unless changes in its operation were speedily brought about, that the union might be compelled to withdraw its support.³²

It is not suggested that such a drastic step is likely to be taken in the immediate future, but dissatisfactions of this kind increase the likelihood of moderate unions acting out of character, and occasionally using means which, under normal conditions, they would consider inappropriate. However, this would not mark such a union as being militant, until a pattern of such activity had been well established indicating that it was not a temporary aberration, but it does mean that our definition of militancy, once finally devised, will have to be flexible enough to embrace possible future changes in traditional values and procedures for the conduct of industrial labour relations.

With regard to the methods used to achieve desired goals, direct action is usually regarded as one of the major weapons in a union's armoury. What is meant by 'direct action', a term which tends to be as loosely applied as that of militancy? Does direct action consist only of the strike - of the withdrawal of labour?

30. Kenneth F. Walker: *Industrial Relations in Australia*. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1956, pp. 260-61.

31. Walker: *ibid.*, pp. 255-265. Mark Perlman, *op.cit.*, pp. 55-94. C.W. (Edgar) Williams: *The 'Isa' - Yellow, Green and Red*. The Worker Newspaper Pty., Brisbane, 1967, pp. 395-406.

32. *The Canberra Times*, 30/1/1970. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 30/1/1970. *The Australian*, 31/1/1970.

Communists, in their study of revolutionary tactics saw direct action as going much further than mere withdrawal of labour.

*"By 'direct action' we mean all forms of direct pressure of the workers upon the employers and the State: boycott, strike, street demonstrations, seizure of factories, uprisings and other revolutionary activity, which tend to unite the working class in the fight for socialism. The aim of the revolutionary trade unions, therefore, is to turn direct action into a weapon of education and to stimulate the fighting ability of the working masses for the social revolution and the institution of the dictatorship of the proletariat."*³³

One doubts that this broad interpretation of direct action would elicit a common and favourable response from all Australian trade unionists. While Communists remain a militant minority in the trade union movement they are likely to take the intelligent and practical view that they would be unable to find enough support from fellow unionists to implement all of what they themselves consider to be the essentials of direct action.

As a result, direct actionists in Australia have, to date, shown little tendency to use revolutionary tactics to achieve their ends, relying mainly on the strike, boycotting (declaring "black"), picketing, and, on rare occasions, marches and street demonstrations.

Not all militants, however, use even these forms of direct action, and at this point one must differentiate, in a general way, between groups of unions and their attitudes to direct action, in particular,

33. *Decisions of the Third Congress of the Communist International, Moscow, July, 1921.* Communist Party of Great Britain, London, n.d. p. 69. For a more up-to-date discussion of direct action see P. Clancy: *Unions and Today's Challenge*, Twenty-first Congress, Communist Party of Australia, 9-12, July, 1967. *Modern Unionism and the Workers' Movement*, Twenty-second Congress, Communist Party of Australia, March, 1970.

to the use of the strike. The basic distinction drawn between unions is that between manual and non-manual workers, while the latter group can be further divided into non-manual or white collar unions, on the one hand, and professional unions on the other.

"Traditionally it has been assumed that non-manual and manual unions behave in quite different fashions, with the non-manual unions being much less militant."³⁴ Whether this is the result of identification by manual workers with working class values and attitudes, and of white collar unionists with those of the middle class is still debatable,³⁵ and much empirical research remains to be done before the question can be finally settled.

Certainly many writers on the subject hold the view that social class and differing social values are responsible, in some measure, for differences in industrial behaviour. Allen asserts that "when employees, whoever they are, adopt collective action to protect their interests, they use the methods of trade unionism, within the context of their own social class values,"³⁶ while Williams and Paterson feel that both class and status are important determinants of attitude for at least part of the white collar work force.³⁷ Barry Hill, in his

34. Ross M. Martin: "Australian Professional and White Collar Unions", *Industrial Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 1, October, 1965, p. 93.

35. Cf. D.W. Rawson: "The Frontiers of Trade Unionism", *op.cit.* and R.M. Martin: "Class Identification and Trade Union Behaviour: The Case of Australian White Collar Unions", *Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 7, No. 2, July, 1965, and *White Collar Unions in Australia*, A.P.S.A. Monograph No. 5, 1965.

36. V.L. Allen; *op.cit.*, p. 15.

37. Rees D. Williams & John Paterson: "White Collar Unionism", *Dissent*, Winter, 1965, No. 14, p. 43.

study of secondary school teachers in the Victorian Education Department, sees them as self-identifying with the middle class, and having the material preoccupations and aspirations of that class.³⁸ All that can really be said with any degree of confidence about this aspect of non-manual unions is that they form an extremely heterogeneous group, with some of them finding it less difficult to identify with and accept the industrial methods of manual unions than others.

Professional unions, by and large, have been even less likely to strike than other non-manual unions. "To strike like a manual worker is to damage one's professional self-esteem."³⁹ "Unprofessional" conduct in industrial matters may also retard the full acknowledgement, within the community and by employers, of professional status, where, as in the case of school teachers, this has not been completely achieved. The gap between professionals and employers, with regard to class distinctions and life style, is usually much narrower than that between employers and other non-manual workers, with the result that it would be more natural for professional groups to seek their ends by means of consultation and negotiation, as between equals, than by direct action.⁴⁰

Broadly speaking, and on past evidence, it can be said that the

38. Barry Hill: "Hot White Collars", *Dissent*, Autumn, 1967, No. 19, pp. 25-29.

39. Barry Hill: *op.cit.*, p.26.

40. Cf. Joseph Ben-David: "Professionals and Unions in Israel, *Industrial Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 1, October, 1965, for a discussion of certain components of professionalism and occupational patterns which would seem to be inconsistent with trade unionism itself.

right to strike and its use has been more solidly entrenched in manual unions, many of which were involved in the early struggles of the trade union movement, than in those composed of white collar workers, or whose members hold a professional status within the community. The approach of the latter types of union to strike action has usually been one of timidity and caution. This is not to say that white collar and professional unions will not strike. Recent examples of the Bank Officers' Association and the Victorian Teachers' Union in Australia, and of the same groups in the United Kingdom over the last five years are evidence that they will. Nevertheless, Walker⁴¹ and Dufty⁴² have shown from their survey research into attitudes of blue and white collar workers to strike action that there are marked differences between these two groups, the opinions both of rank and file members and of the leaders of white collar unions being consistent with the known actions of white collar unions in attempting to achieve their aims - that is, a disposition to defend and advance their interests by negotiation and resort to constitutional procedures.⁴³

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41. Kenneth F. Walker: "Attitudes of Union Leaders and Business Executives to Industrial Relations", *Occupational Psychology*, Vol. 33, No. 3, July, 1959, pp. 157-165; "Conflict and Mutual Misunderstanding: A Survey of Union Leaders and Business Executives' Attitudes", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 1, April, 1959, pp. 20-30; "Executives' and Union Leaders' Perceptions of each others' Attitudes to Industrial Relations: The Influence of Stereotypes", *Human Relations*, Vol. 15, No. 3, August, 1962, pp. 183-196; "Personnel Officers' Perceptions of the Industrial Relations Attitudes of Union Leaders and Business Executives", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 7, No. 1, March, 1965.
 42. N.F. Dufty: "The Skilled Worker and His Union", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Oct., 1960; "The White Collar Unionist", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 2, October, 1961, pp. 131-156.
 43. K.F. Walker: "White Collar Unionism in Australia" ed. A. Sturmthal: *White Collar Trade Unions*, Univ. of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1966, pp. 20-23.

It must be acknowledged, however, that changes in the traditional attitudes to direct action of some sections of the white collar work force have become evident in Australia within this decade. The reasons for this will be discussed later in this study when the causes of militancy are examined. Even so, as a general rule, militant, non-manual unions have tended to use methods of direct action other than the strike, and these have been outside the conventional pattern of procedure accepted as being appropriate for their particular callings.

Most Public Service unions, in Australia, for example, have seldom indulged in strike activity, but some do involve themselves in practices which would be regarded as outside the accepted norms of industrial behaviour for these unions. To exemplify: the calling of mass meetings to protest decisions of their employers (as the Queensland Teachers' Union did in 1966); adoption of a public stand of an ideological kind on particular issues, such as the Vietnam war or conscription; the public attack on government policies in fields in which the union is directly concerned (again, as the Queensland Teachers' Union did in 1966 over some of the Department of Education's policies on recruitment, and also as exemplified by the advertising campaign mounted by the New South Wales Teachers' Federation in 1969-1970, protesting against the failure of the government to provide enough places for all prospective teacher trainees); public demonstrations (in the manner in which members of the Association of Architects, Engineers, Surveyors and Draughtsmen of Australia protested outside the Canberra offices of the Public Service Board in February, 1970).

It has been suggested that these sorts of activities on the part of white collar organisations should be

*"placed more in the category of the public relations activity of a pressure group than in the conventions of militant trade unions. There is a close parallel between the white collar protest meeting and that of the outer suburban Progress Association protesting against indifference to their needs on the part of water, sewerage and road-making authorities."*⁴⁴

While the common denominator for most public service unions and outer suburban progress associations would presumably be membership of the middle class, and a probable acceptance of what are generally believed to be values and attitudes common to that class, no close correlation necessarily exists between the infrequent outbursts of protest by progress associations, and the sustained use of any or all of the above mentioned practices by white collar organisations of this kind. As long as it is widely held, both within and outside the organisations, that consultation and negotiation are the proper means by which aims are achieved and conflict resolved, then activities such as those recorded above must be considered to run counter to the usual attitudes and procedures of the unions concerned, and provided they are consistently maintained over a period, should be regarded as an indicator of militancy for those unions.

Other signs of a union's willingness to cut across accepted values may be found in affiliation with bodies outside their own field of interest. Thus, for State teachers' unions to be affiliated with a Federal organisation of teachers, or even with a body like the Australian

44. R.J. O'Dea of the Professional Engineers' Association, quoted in K.F. Walker: *ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

Council of Salaried and Professional Associations would be considered normal, but ties, such as the N.S.W. Teachers' Federation has with the Australian Council of Trade Unions would be more unusual. This is particularly so in Australia, where affiliation with Trades and Labor Councils is considered to have political implications, and many non-manual groups have held themselves aloof from such affiliations for this reason. In the same way, a distinction can be made between unions affiliated with a political party, such as the Australian Labor Party, and those which are not, though both these differentiations need to be treated with caution as indices of militancy. The Australian Federation of Air Pilots, a militant union in terms of the definition, is affiliated with neither the A.C.T.U. nor the A.L.P.; whereas the Australian Workers' Union, by all counts a moderate among unions, has been heavily involved in political activity since the early days of the labor movement, is usually affiliated with all State branches of the A.L.P., yet could not be persuaded to join forces with the A.C.T.U. until 1967.⁴⁵ The various State teachers' unions offer another example of diversity in attitude. The N.S.W. Federation is the only one with a link to the A.C.T.U. None is affiliated with the A.L.P. The Queensland Teachers' Union which has shown a marked tendency towards militant action in recent years is, however, affiliated with the Combined Industrial Unions Committee of Queensland, "which links ten Queensland unions of very different kinds, but which have in common an

45. O. De R. Foenander: *Trade Unionism in Australia: Some Aspects*, The Law Book Co., of A/asia, Sydney, 1962, p. 15. This reluctance is still evident. Cf. *Courier Mail*, 31/1/1970; *The Australian*, 31/1/1970 where the A.W.U. warned it would consider disaffiliating with the A.C.T.U. if the latter joined the Communist-front World Federation of Trade Unions.

unwillingness to affiliate with the Queensland Trades and Labour Council."⁴⁶ So it would seem that associations of the above-mentioned kind between unions, or the lack of them, on their own, tell us little about the degree of militancy exhibited by a union, but they can form a link in the chain of evidence provided from other sources, and for this reason, should not be over-looked.

Summing up, it would seem that "there is no precise, universally valid form of militant action."⁴⁷ Unions have a variety of means available to them by which to press for desired ends. Even so, the difference between the militant and non-militant union lies in the willingness of the former to adopt tactics and methods which lie outside the procedures accepted by custom as appropriate for that particular union. Based on these assumptions and on the argument and evidence already presented, *militancy*, as finally defined, *becomes a preparedness to step outside the accepted norms of negotiation and action, for one's calling, in order to achieve one's objectives, whether these be ideological or industrial or both.* This interpretation of militancy will be just as apt for past and present situations as it will be for any future occasions when conventional practices for the conduct of industrial labour relations and the resolution of industrial conflict may change. It will apply equally as well to employers as to unions, as a description for management tactics which lie outside what is customary and "responsible", such as the lock-out.

46. D.W. Rawson & Suzanne Wrightson: *A Handbook of Trade Unions and Employees' Associations*. Occasional Paper No. 5, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1970, p.17.

47. Allen: *op.cit.*, p. 20.

Naturally, it is understood that others may see militancy from a different standpoint, and draw conclusions from their view which may be as valid as those derived in this thesis from the definition as stated above. The fact that there are varying approaches to a topic such as militancy is hardly surprising and it seems unnecessary to assert the primacy of one definition over another. What is important is that the formulation arrived at be consistent with the examinable facts, and capable of being applied to arrive at conclusions of a general kind. The rendering of militancy adopted in this thesis forms the foundation on which the body of the study is built, the discovery and examination of the causes of militancy in unions. To this end, means of identification of militant unions now need to be indicated.

There are at least three ways of amassing evidence of militancy in a union. The first can be called the "reputational" assessment, i.e. the public image which the union has acquired. The incidence of strikes within an industry, and the number of times a union has participated can be counted. Finally, occasions on which public acts or statements of an unusual nature are made, such as the calling of mass meetings or public criticism of policies, can be noted from a study of the press. None of these sources will furnish positive proof of militancy, but each, or all of them together, can provide a starting point for further and more reliable research into whether a union has been appropriately categorized or not.

The reputational grounds for militancy are often tenuously based, relying as they mainly do on the possibly prejudiced testimony of

politicians, trade union, business and industry leaders, and on press reports, all evidence which needs to be treated with some degree of caution, if viewed on its own. More substantial data is available in the statistics on strike incidence, and facts of this kind have provided the basis for several specialised studies on industrial labour relations, specifically in terms of international comparisons of industrial conflict.⁴⁸ However, at this level, it is not difficult to fall into error in interpretation of the available statistics. Variations will occur between countries, in the methods used to compile data, the complex web of industrial labour relations will not be the same from country to country, due to national variations in causes of strike activity; consequently, the whole question of an international industry comparison of industrial conflict, based on statistics only, needs to be treated with discretion.⁴⁹

For Australia alone, the picture is clearer, both in terms of material available and the accuracy of the conclusions that can be drawn from it, though even here a note of warning should be sounded.⁵⁰ The

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48. Clark Kerr & Abraham Siegel: "The Inter-industry Propensity to Strike", ed. A. Kornhauser, R. Dubin & A. Ross: *Industrial Conflict*. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1954. A. Ross & P. Hartman: *Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict*. John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1960.
49. Kerr & Siegel: *ibid.*, pp. 189-212; D.W. Oxnam: "International Comparisons of Industrial Conflict: An Appraisal", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 7, 1965, pp. 149-161; O. De R. Foenander: *Solving Labour Problems in Australia*. Melbourne Univ. Press, Melbourne, 1941, p. 6.
50. D.W. Oxnam: "The Incidence of Strikes in Australia", ed. J.E. Isaac & G.W. Ford: *Australian Labour Relations: Readings*. Sun Books, Melbourne, Second Edition, 1971, pp. 19-57; N.R. Conn: "The Statistics of Industrial Disputes", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 1, April, 1959, pp. 55-58.

Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, together with the appropriate Federal and State Departments, collects and compiles much statistical data on industry.⁵¹ Unfortunately, the break down of figures from these sources is not as helpful as it might be. To instance one or two examples only, work stoppages of less than ten man days are normally excluded from the official assessment of industrial disputes. This means that the record will not show time lost through "rolling" or "lightning strikes", and "working to regulations", nor the slowing down effects of an "overtime ban". Yet these are tactics which some unions have used more frequently in recent years. As a form of direct action, all of these methods are being used by the Amalgamated Postal Workers' Union, in preference to prolonged work stoppages, and have effectively created chaos on occasions in the mail sorting and delivery sections of the Post Master General's Department.

Second, information on strike incidence is made available on an "industrial group" basis, which is an inappropriate unit for the analysis of industrial strife. As a result, railway and tramway services are lumped together, as are road and air transport, though it may well be that unions within these groups have little in common with each other as regards industrial attitudes. Similarly, engineering, metals, vehicles etc. are grouped in the one industry. This would include some of Australia's biggest and most active unions, like the

51. One of the most useful would be Department of Labour and National Service, *Industrial Disputes in Australia*, Melbourne, 1958, with additions to 1963, together with *Labor Reports* and the *Quarterly Summary of Australian Statistics*, issued by the Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra.

Amalgamated Engineering Union, the Electrical Trades Union and the Federated Ironworkers' Association, and yet there is nothing in the statistics to indicate which of these unions was involved in work stoppages, and to what extent. Finally, when the attempt is made to attribute causes to industrial disputes, the distribution of figures under such headings as "wages, hours and leave", "physical working conditions and managerial policy" and "trade unionism" is too general to be of as much use as it could be. However, while taking criticisms of this nature into account, it needs to be stressed that a great deal of valuable information can be determined from official sources.

The third method of evaluation, that of assessment of press reports on the "extra-curricular activities" of unions and their leaders, and of their public stance, if one is taken, on matters and policies which do not necessarily have to do with strictly industrial issues will round out the picture of the union and its interests.

All the methods outlined above, and others can be used to identify unions indulging in direct action, but what is far more critical to an understanding of industrial labour relations, industrial conflict and the effects of militancy in these circumstances is *why* unions sanction direct confrontations with management in the first place. Why is it that unions like those in the coal mining and stevedoring industries have had a reputation for this kind of activity; why do some unions use this method sparingly while others have virtually no record of industrial conflict? A further and even more interesting question requires an answer. Why do some unions change their attitude to direct action?

Unions like the Australian Federation of Air Pilots, and, to a lesser extent, the Queensland Teachers' Union, with a past history relatively free from industrial conflict, have, in the last five years, acquired a reputation for militancy, while others, such as the unions forming the Barrier Industrial Council at Broken Hill, with a record over many years of bitter and sustained clashes with management have more recently enjoyed a "period of substantial tranquility."⁵² This study hopes to provide at least tentative answers to these questions through an examination of the causes of militancy in trade unions.

The choice of methodological approach has not been an easy one because "labor-management relations as a whole make up a constellation of inter-related types and patterns which are joined together by a complex of social, economic and political forces."⁵³ Research has tended to concentrate upon certain aspects within this galaxy: the power structure within unions or within the managerial organisation, ideological motivations, the effects of work conditions, conflict situations. It is to the last mentioned feature that attention must necessarily be directed, as militancy has to do with union-management confrontations of various kinds.

Many overseas studies of industrial unrest have adopted a "human

52. S.C. Taylor: *op.cit.*, p. 102, and Kenneth F. Walker: *op.cit.*, pp. 77-135.

53. Frederick H. Harbison, Robert K. Burns & Robert Dubin: "Toward a Theory of Labor-Management Relations", ed. Richard A. Lester & Joseph Shister: *Insights into Labor Issues*, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1949, p. 7.

relations" approach,⁵⁴ and concerned themselves with the interaction and relationships between the actors in a dispute. Some, like Gouldner,⁵⁵ have been fortunate enough to be able to follow the course of direct action, within a plant, from beginning to end, and to draw meaningful conclusions from "on the spot" evidence. Yet such exercises, while adding to the sum total of our knowledge of conflict situations, cannot produce universal rules which will apply with equal validity to all cases and at all times. The literature on Australian strikes, in itself limited, suffers, for our purposes, from the same shortcomings.⁵⁶

Now, both unions and management are structured organisations within and between which a complex system of association develops. In the case of unions with a long history behind them, these relationships will have formed, over the years, into a pattern, which may alter, however, due to other factors. At the same time the union-management connection does not operate divorced from the larger industrial environment. The union will, in all probability, have links with one or more other unions; the

54. Cf. for example, W.F. Whyte: "Human Relations Theory - a Progress Report", *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 5, 1956, pp. 125-132. *Industry and Society*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1946. "Patterns of Inter-action in Union-Management Relations", *Human Organisation*, Vol. VIII, No. 4, 1949, pp. 13-19.

55. A.W. Gouldner: *Wildcat Strike*. Antioch Press, Yellow Springs, 1954, and W.F. Whyte: "Framework for the Analysis of Industrial Relations: Two Views" (with J.T. Dunlop), *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. III, 1950, pp. 383-412.

56. Cf. Silverman: *op.cit.*, C.W. Williams: *op.cit.*, A. Stewart: *Mt. Isa: In Search of a Culprit*. Hill of Content, Melbourne, 1965. Gordon Sheldon: *Industrial Siege: The Mount Isa Dispute*. F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1965. "'Arbitrator' - The Steel Strike - January, 1961", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 1, April, 1961. Helen Hughes: "Industrial Relations in the Australian Iron and Steel Industry, 1876-1962", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 4, No. 2, October, 1962, *et al.*

same will apply to management, and both will operate within an economic and political system which is itself subject to change. Nor do they operate apart from the micro-situation, i.e. the small, informal groupings within an organisation. Finally, because industrial labor relations have to do with relationships formed between human beings, not only as workers or employers, but also as individuals with a life outside the work place, they need to be placed within the total environment of the whole community. It can be argued, then, that any attempt to isolate the causal factors of militancy will involve taking an ecological view of industrial relations as the inter-action of management and employees in an economic, technological and socio-political environment.

Some methodological constructions along these lines have been suggested or used already,⁵⁷ but Dunlop's analysis, in a very broad sense, has been adapted for this study.⁵⁸ Dunlop's thesis is that industrial relations behaviour is the result of the process of accommodation of management and union organisations in a particular environment. Hence, if at any given time, one were to analyse the two social systems (union and management) and the total environment within which they operate, meaningful results, in terms of explanations of industrial relations

57. F.H. Harbison, R.K. Burns & R. Dubin: *op.cit.*, pp. 3-24. A.M. Ross & P.T. Hartman: *op.cit.*, pp. 34-81. Kenneth F. Walker: *Research Needs in Industrial Relations*. F.W. Cheshire, Sydney, 2nd (revised) edition, 1964, and "Some Trends in American Research on Industrial Relations", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 1, April, 1959, pp. 59-61. R.J. May: *op.cit.* Maxine Bucklow: "Psychology and Sociology in the Teaching of Industrial Relations", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 6, No. 3, November, 1964, pp. 203-224.

58. J.T. Dunlop: "Framework for the Analysis of Industrial Relations: Two Views" (with W.F. Whyte), *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. III, 1950, pp. 383-412.

behaviour would be obtained. If one adds two other factors, i.e. what might be called the historical or institutionalized background to the relationship, and also the lines along which the relationship has developed, then the results are relevant not only to one point of time within the relationship, but over a long period.

Dunlop's hypothesis thus provides the following seven point framework for the analysis of industrial relations behaviour:

1. *The union and management organisations and their respective internal procedures for decision making.*
2. *The total context in which the parties accommodate to each other, conceived in terms of four environmental elements, viz:*
 - (a) *the technological and physical conditions of the work community;*
 - (b) *the conditions in the labor market in which the labor services are purchased by the management, and the conditions in the product market in which the output or service is sold;*
 - (c) *the industrial relations setting of the parties, which includes the relation of the union to other unions and the management to other managements in its labor relations policies;*
 - (d) *the ideas, beliefs and value judgments in the community and in the industry in which the parties bargain.*
3. *The origins and beginnings of the relationship as they are institutionalized and have come to have a continuing effect on the parties.*
4. *The particular axes or directions along which the relationship between the parties has grown.⁵⁹*

There are several other factors which may affect militancy and yet

59. J.T. Dunlop: *op.cit.*, pp. 386-7.

which do not fit with facility into this structural arrangement. In terms of the definition we are interested in the "accepted norms of negotiation and action". This will require an investigation of the role of the State, particularly as observed in the impact of the arbitration system and the possible effect on industrial relations of preferential or (de facto) compulsory unionism. Though Dunlop evolved his conceptual framework in the first place for use within the environmental context of a collective bargaining system, Walker has shown that it can be used successfully within the framework of the Australian arbitration system,⁶⁰ and it may well be that the factors noted above can be dealt with under the second heading. Rather than force the material to fit the structure, however, when necessary, another section will be added to Dunlop's four environmental elements.

It would have been impossible to scrutinize all unions within the confines of this thesis. One union, reputationally militant, has been chosen as a case study for intensive investigation - the Australian Railways Union (Queensland Branch). By way of comparison and contrast, material has been included which deals with the activities of other unions, with emphasis on another transport union, the Australian Federation of Air Pilots. Other unions will be used in a general way, as illustration. Some adjustment to Dunlop's original plan has been made, in the interests of more logical sequence, and the number of his criteria reduced to five. The origins and beginnings of the union-management relationship and their axes of development have been taken

60. Kenneth F. Walker: *Industrial Relations in Australia. op.cit.*

together and investigated first; point 2(b)⁶¹ has been eliminated and an examination of conditions in the labor and product markets incorporated in Chapters 5 and 6.

61. Cf. *supra*, p. 32.

CHAPTER 2

THE ORIGINS AND BEGINNINGS OF THE UNION-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONSHIP AS THEY ARE INSTITUTIONALIZED AND HAVE
COME TO HAVE A CONTINUING EFFECT ON THE PARTIES;
TOGETHER WITH THE PARTICULAR AXES OR DIRECTIONS
ALONG WHICH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES
HAS GROWN.¹

PART I: THE QUEENSLAND RAILWAY SERVICE

From the beginning, railways have been important in the political life of Queensland; conversely politics has been a leitmotif running through the whole history of railway development in the State. It is natural that this should have been so, at least in the beginning when political decisions had to be made about the form of ownership for the railways, finance, the choice of railway routes and generally the areas to be served; and because these "first inland railways were pioneer rather than pioneering railways"² it was also natural that individuals and groups should have a personal interest in and concern for the decisions made, and should attempt to influence these decisions in favour of their own interests and areas.

The first political decision taken was the most important: when to commence railway building and it was made only four years after Letters Patent created the separate colony of Queensland.³ On May 19th, 1863, A. Macalister, the Secretary for Lands and Works introduced a

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1. J.T. Dunlop: "Framework for the Analysis of Industrial Relations: Two Views", *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. III, April, 1950, p. 387.
 2. Geoffrey Blainey: *The Tyranny of Distance*. Sun Books, Melbourne, 1966, p. 234.
 3. June 6th, 1859.

Railway Bill⁴ into the Lower House of the Queensland Parliament, which when passed, would authorise and regulate general railway construction in the State. At the same time the government made known its intention to build the first railway from Ipswich to Toowoomba, with later extensions to Warwick and Dalby. Given the fact that this was done early in the life of the new colony, whose resources were, to a large extent, unproven, and whilst its finances were still in a precarious state, it would seem an act of some courage on the part of the government to initiate a costly railway programme at this stage. There was a hint, too, of chauvinism in Macalister's statement that "the purpose of carrying the line through to Dalby was to tap the Maranoa and Warrego, whose whole trade and traffic at the present was with New South Wales or South Australia."⁵ New South Wales was pushing a line up towards the Queensland border, and it was important that this challenge be met before a further siphoning off of commerce from the south western area of the colony occurred.

The proposal to initiate railway building did not meet with universal approval. Most supported the government's arguments that railways were necessary for the triple purposes of immigration-settlement-transport; as an inducement to immigrants, and therefore, closer settlement, by offering cheap and fast transport, not only for the incoming settlers, but more importantly, for their produce to market.

4. "A Bill to Make Provision for the Construction by the Government of Railways and for the Regulation of the Same." 27, Victoria, No. 8.

5. A. Macalister, Minister for Lands and Works: *Qld. Parl. Debates* (Hereafter *Q.P.D.*). First Series, Vol. 1, 1864, p. 68.

Few should have argued with the decision to drive this first railway through to Toowoomba and the Darling Downs. A permanent population and an assured traffic would seem to be prerequisites for a successful railway, and two-thirds of the traffic of the colony was concentrated in the area to be served by the proposed railway. Some critics, while agreeing in principle with the purposes of the Act, queried its timing. In their view it was too early in the life of the colony to contemplate such extensive capital expenditure; consolidation of governmental finance would be necessary before public works of such magnitude could be undertaken.⁶

More importantly, a concentrated attack on the Railway Bill was laid down by the members from the Northern Districts, with the support of those from the Brisbane constituencies. The metropolitan members saw the proposed linking of Ipswich and Toowoomba by rail, as a further round, which they stood to lose, in the continuing fight between Brisbane and Ipswich for primacy within the colony.⁷ Macalister, the Minister for Lands and Works, was one of the members for Ipswich, and the railway line was thought to be an attempt on the part of Ipswich interests, backed by the squattocracy of the Downs to further increase their wealth and influence. John Douglas, the member for Port Curtis and chief parliamentary spokesman for what was then seen as the northern districts, denounced the proposed railway as part of "a conspiracy to defraud the unsettled districts of their due. It is but

6. *Q.P.D.* First Series, Vol. 1, 1864, pp. 59-62.

7. *ibid.*, p. 70.

natural that the occupants of these districts should look with suspicion on a Bill which appears to favour one portion of the country at the expense of another."⁸ The arguments of Douglas and his colleagues were backed by a petition, signed by 210 residents of Rockhampton and the adjoining districts,⁹ from which it was clear that they were fearful that branch lines from the Ipswich-Dalby line would tap areas whose natural egress should be through Rockhampton. The petitioners asked that legislative action on the proposed Bill be suspended until further representation be granted to the northern districts; failing this they wanted another railway to be commenced, "mile for mile with the southern one, to extend westwards from Rockhampton in the direction of the Peak Downs."¹⁰

When, after considerable debate, the Railway Bill was finally put to the House, it divided evenly so that the government secured a majority of one only by the Speaker's casting vote. Deciding it was futile to proceed on this basis, the Premier, R.G. Herbert, obtained a dissolution and went to the country on the railway question. The elections gave the Government a slightly larger majority and the Railway Bill on re-submission was passed by three votes.¹¹

The battle had been won and the principle of an immediate start to railway construction in Queensland conceded, however narrowly. It was

8. *ibid.*, p. 245.

9. *Votes and Proceedings, Qld.*, Session II, 1863, p. 599.

10. *ibid.*

11. September 12th, 1864. This Act, 28 Victoria No. 24, was passed as an amendment to the Railway Act of 1863. See footnote 4.

the first of a series of political conflicts over aspects of railway construction and development. Because some of these questions recur throughout the history of the Queensland railway system, it is necessary to look at them in some detail.

There were three main issues which aroused hostility: the width of gauge to be used, the method of financing railway development, and the prospective routes and areas to be served by future railway construction. The "width of gauge" question presented problems all over Australia. Victoria had begun building its first railways in the 1850's and used the Irish gauge of 5 feet 3 inches. New South Wales, after a false start at 5 feet 3 inches reverted to the English gauge, and laid its railway lines with a 4 feet 8½ inches width of track. By the time Queensland had to give thought to railway construction, an even narrower gauge, that of 3 feet 6 inches, had become popular overseas, particularly in India. Lighter and cheaper than the wider systems, the narrow gauge track was also able to curve with greater facility, enabling cheaper crossings of the Great Dividing Range.

Considerable opposition was mounted to the proposed use of the 3 foot 6 inch gauge for the Queensland railway system, principally on the grounds of safety and "its fitness to meet, not only the present, but also the future wants of the colony."¹² In the event, the government acted upon the advice and report of its first Commissioner for Railways, A. Fitzgibbon, a civil engineer, who had had extensive railway experience in various countries, including the U.S.A. Fitzgibbon

12. Resolution of the Legislative Council, received and read by the Legislative Assembly, September 2nd, 1863. *Votes and Proceedings, Qld.*, Session II, 1863, p. 123.

preached the advantages of the narrow gauge,¹³ and his views were to be endorsed thirty years later by another railway engineer, George Phillips, a man with much experience of the Queensland railway system. It was Phillips' view that

*"to expend unnecessary capital upon railways (by adopting the expensive methods used in many other countries) which can only be expected for many years to command sufficient traffic to provide interest upon the least possible outlay compatible with certain well-known axioms of railway management, is a folly which can only result in loss to the promoters, whether they be Governments or private individuals."*¹⁴

It would seem that, ultimately, the question of the necessity for the less expensive gauge could never have really been in doubt. "For Queensland, or any colony with a vast territory and small funds, the savings of a narrow gauge seemed inviting; even on the wide plains where these savings were often slight, Queensland adopted the narrow track."¹⁵

In introducing the first Railway Bill, Macalister had offered potent arguments in favour of government establishment and control of railways, in preference to private companies or individuals. Basically, his case was that in new countries there were various public works essentially required to be undertaken for the benefit of the community generally, which had to be carried out by government, because they were

13. Cf. Report from A. Fitzgibbon Esq., C.E. upon proposed line of Railway from Ipswich to Dalby and Warwick, via Toowoomba, *ibid.*, p. 589. See also, *Queensland Railways First Half Century 1864-1914*. Govt. Printer, Brisbane, 1914, for biographical sketch of Fitzgibbon.

14. George Phillips: *Pioneer Railways for Queensland*. Watson-Ferguson & Co., Brisbane, 1892, p. 5.

15. Blainey; *op.cit.*, p. 248.

not sufficiently remunerative (where the rate of interest upon capital was so high as in the colonies) to induce private individuals or companies to embark upon them.¹⁶ It followed from this that financing of the Queensland railway system would be by loan, as it was only reasonable to expect that posterity should bear some of the financial burden for benefits which would accrue ultimately to all, future generations as well as present.

This decision to finance the railways by loan raisings created less of a political storm than might have been expected. One would have thought that the citizens of Queensland might have been troubled, by this willingness, even eagerness, on the part of their government to saddle itself at such an early stage with large capital debt and interest payments on railways alone. At the time, Queensland's credit in England was good, and the "home" loan market buoyant. Consequently, the fact that the raising of the required sums appeared to present little difficulty probably accounted for the optimism. Certainly the government's decision was in line with the thinking of other colonial governments in Australia on railway financing. Private promotion of early lines in New South Wales and Victoria had proved unsuccessful,¹⁷ so that ultimately "governments came to build their own railways with borrowed English money. Unlike the railways of the United States, Great Britain and many European countries, all but a few Australian

16. N.G. Butlin: *Investment in Australian Economic Development*. Cambridge University Press, 1964, Chapter 5.

17. For an account of corruption and scandal associated with private promotion of early Victorian lines, see Michael Cannon: *The Land Boomers*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1966, particularly Part I, Chapter 6, and Geoffrey Serle: *The Golden Age*. Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1963, Chapter 8.

railways were to be built by the Crown."¹⁸

Though the government had made it clear that the land grant system would not be introduced in Queensland,¹⁹ intermittent attempts to do so were made by individuals both in and outside Parliament in the years that followed. The proposal of Robert Tooth & Co. in 1862 to build a light railway between Ipswich and Toowoomba had not been taken up by the government yet others persisted with the idea of private railway building through land grants, and several private members' bills were introduced into the early Parliaments, to that end.²⁰ All were unsuccessful.

The action of the South Australian Parliament, early in 1868, in granting leave to a firm of private capitalists to construct a railway in the Northern Territory caused considerable agitation in Queensland for similar permission to private companies for railway building in the northern parts of the state. On a later occasion a proposal from a Melbourne firm to build a line from Dalby to Normanton (the so-called Continental Railway) was widely canvassed and received considerable support, even from within the government. The proposers' demands that large areas of land on either side of the line be granted to them in fee

18. Blainey: *op.cit.*, p. 232.

19. In reply to a parliamentary question at the time of introduction of the first Railway Bill, the Secretary for Lands stated that "it is the intention of the government to reserve from non-competitive sale the land immediately on each side of the line authorized to be made." *Votes and Proceedings, Qld. Session II, 1863*, p. 87.

20. Typical was the private members Bill introduced by the member for Port Curtis, John Douglas. See *Q.P.D.*, 1st Series, Vol. 1, 1864, p. 244. This embodied the principle that railways should be constructed by local land trusts and corporations, the costs to be defrayed by the sale of lands in the several districts.

simple, without encumbrance, proved too outrageous and the project was rejected. McIlwraith, the Minister for Works, who had been the plan's chief advocate in Cabinet resigned over this. His continuing sentiment for land grant railways led to the fall of his government in 1883, when, as Premier, his Transcontinental (Land Grant) Railway Bill was defeated by 27 votes to 16. A preliminary agreement had been made by Sir Thomas with an English company to construct a railway from Charleville to Point Parker on the Gulf of Carpentaria, with a twelve million acre land grant as part of the bargain, a project which Parliament refused to ratify by defeating the enabling Bill and bringing down the McIlwraith government.²¹

These periodic outbursts of demand for the land grant system usually coincided with times when the colony was passing through one of the cyclical fluctuations between prosperity and depression which marked colonial finances and fortunes until well into the present century. The political masters of Queensland's destiny had placed themselves in a most vulnerable position, from the very beginning, by their decision to embark so precipitously on railway building through borrowings, and this at a time when the colony's financial position was not stabilized. A contracting loan market overseas, particularly in England, could have repercussions in Queensland which might be well nigh disastrous, both politically and economically.

This danger was dramatically brought home before the first railway

21. C.A. Bernays: *Queensland Politics during Sixty Years 1859-1919*. Govt. Printer, Brisbane, no date, p. 91, and *Q.P.D.*, Vol. XXXIX, 1883, p. 60, pp. 66-155.

had been pushed even half way to Toowoomba. The failure of Agra and Masterman's Bank, in 1866, with which the government had an agreement with regard to loans, stopped short the supply of funds for the railway. The resulting financial crisis in England badly shook also the financial stability of the contractors for the Ipswich-Toowoomba line, Messrs. Peto, Brassey and Betts.²² Work on railway construction was brought to a virtual standstill, and the majority of the experienced Scots and English navvies brought out by the contractors to work on railway construction in Australia were dismissed, along with local labour.²³ Depression and labour troubles were to dog the government for several years more, and to defeat the Macalister government at the elections of 1867, just as railway matters were to bring about the fall of the Palmer Ministry in 1870 and McIlwraith in 1883.

This early crisis, established a pattern for the remainder of the "construction" era, a period which was to extend into the 1930's. In times of prosperity railways were pushed ahead, but railway finance

22. For a full account of the effect of the bank failure on this world famous firm of railway contractors, see R.K. Middlemas: *The Master Builders*. Hutchinson, London, 1963. "The most spectacular case was that of Peto in 1866 ... associated with the fall of Overend, Gurney and the London, Chatham and Dover Railway. At that period Thomas Brassey is said to have lost fl million."

Harold Pollins: "Railway Contractors and the Finance of Railway Development in Britain", *The Journal of Transport History*, Vol. III, 1957-58, pp. 41-51, 103-110.

23. *Queensland Railways, First Half-Century, 1864-1914*, pp. 44-45: Brassey had himself paid the passages of 2,000 navvies to work on the western line from Sydney, which was the firm's first Australian contract. It is not suggested that all of these were employed on the Ipswich-Toowoomba line, though undoubtedly many were. First dismissals on the railway works accounted for about 1,000 men. Further dismissals followed.

became more and more a source of political controversy, forcing the government of the day, on occasions, to put forward schemes to keep railway construction going, other than by borrowings, so that the continuing demands for railway services from the scattered districts in the state might be partially met at least.

"The Western Railway Act of 1875"²⁴ was a case in point. Its purpose was to authorize the making of a railway from Dalby to Roma and to provide funds for the construction of the same by the alienation and sale of Crown lands. To this end the Western Railway Reserve was created, an area of land stretching for fifty miles on either side of a line drawn between Dalby and Roma, and fifty miles beyond the latter town. Money from the sale of land within the Reserve was placed in a separate Trust account and used to meet the costs of building the line.²⁵

Somewhat similar reasons prompted the passage of "The Tramways Act of 1882."²⁶ Though its official title belied its provisions, the Act granted local authorities or a company registered under the companies Act, the right to construct tramways, or light railways, and to borrow from the Treasurer, under the provisions of the Local Works Loans Acts, for the purchase, construction or extension of same. With this sort of

24. Assented to, August 31st, 1875: 30 Victoria, No. 7.

25. Cf. *Votes and Proceedings, Qld.* 1876, Vol. 2, and *Votes and Proceedings, Qld.* 1878, Vol. 1, for abstracts of the Public Accounts of the Colony of Queensland for the financial years, 1875-76 and 1876-77, for amounts credited to the Western Railway Trust Account from sale of Crown lands.

26. "An Act to authorise the Construction Maintenance and Working of Tramways on Public streets and roads in such manner as not to impede ordinary traffic." 46 Victoria, No. 10.

encouragement at least thirteen such lines were built, some by mining companies; many of them, being 3 foot 6 inch gauge light railways, were later taken over by the government and incorporated in the public railway system.²⁷

At no time were politics played harder than over the determination of areas to be served by new railways, and site allocations within these broad and general limits. Successive governments showed themselves especially sensitive to pressures from the central and northern districts, particularly when these exhibited separatist tendencies. It was as well for the peace of mind of politicians in Brisbane that many of these groups were too engrossed in out-pressuring and out-manoeuving each other to realize that in unity lay strength. Even so, enough useless line was built to placate interests in one district because another area had gained a railway.²⁸

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27. By 1950, the end of the period with which this study deals, the following 3'6" private tramways were still in use: *Owned by local authorities*: Aramac Tramway, 41 miles; Mackay Harbour Board Tramway, 4 miles. *Owned by private companies*: Mount Bauple Tramway, 7 miles; Tannymorel Tramway, 4 miles; Bowen Consolidated Mine Tramway, 3 miles. At time of writing the only shire line remaining is the Aramac Tramway. A 2 foot gauge system of 30 miles, the Innisfail and Mourilyan Tramway was bought by the government in 1914-15 and is still in use, principally for sugar loading from Mourilyan Harbour.
28. For example, the Bowen Railway, opened to Wangaratta in 1890 to mollify Bowen for building the line to Charters Towers from Townsville. Cf. ed. A.G. Austin: *The Webbs' Australian Diary 1898*. Pitman & Sons, Melbourne, 1965, pp. 41-42, where they write of Queensland politics and of J.T. Bell, "a member of the Legislative Assembly, a nominal lawyer, and an "independent" supporter of the Government. His sole idea of politics was to secure the expenditure of public money in his constituency; he had intimated to the Government that if they failed to bring the railway to the principal town, he "should have to reconsider his position"."

An early example of this kind of political exercise occurred less than a month after the official opening of the first 21½ miles, on the Ipswich-Toowoomba line. In August, 1865, a tender was accepted for the construction of 33 miles of railway between Rockhampton and Westwood. This piece of track was given the grandiose title of the Great Northern line (later to be known as the Central Railway) and although it terminated in nothing more than a bullock-team staging camp,²⁹ was intended to appease those Rockhampton and district interests, which, as previously mentioned, had been outraged by the placement of the first railway line in the south-east corner of the state. Happily, this line was eventually extended beyond Westwood to serve the Peak Downs copper mines and grazing areas, reaching Clermont in 1884 and Longreach in 1892, and proving ultimately to be a necessary and successful route. On the other hand, it took almost ten years for agreement to be reached between opposing factions over the necessity for closing the gap between Ipswich and Brisbane. It was not until 1875 that the link-up was completed, and Brisbane became the terminus of the Southern and Western Railway.

The most anxious rivalry existed between the necklace of ports which had sprung up along the long eastern coastline of Queensland. The topography of the State clearly indicated that development and progress

29. Westwood was the point where three teamster's tracks converged - from Taroom, Springsure and Peak Downs, and as J. Douglas (Port Curtis) pointed out, in debate on the Northern Railway Bill, it was hardly likely that the bullock drays would unload at Westwood for transshipment when they had only one additional day's journey to make to reach the port of shipment. *Q.P.D.*, First Series, Vol. 1, 1864, p. 317.

would come to these embryonic towns in proportion to their ability to tap the resources of their hinterlands, and provide outlets for the wool or minerals or sugar for the export trade, and a point of entry for interstate and overseas imports.³⁰ All indications were that the railways must run westward from the coast to open up the back country, but what was not as clearly indicated was where these lines should be placed; and which ports should flourish or wither, live or die, depended largely on these decisions. The coastal shipping trade was well established and provided a comparatively cheap means of transport, particularly for heavy goods. It would be many years before the railways, by means of regularity of schedules and low freight rates, could hope to challenge competitively the supremacy of sea transport for the transit of goods and passengers up and down the Queensland coast. So it was well into this century before any determined effort was made to link the northern ports with Brisbane, by driving a railway up the coastal plain, on a north-south axis, and it was not until 1924 that the final section of line was built to bring Townsville and Cairns in direct contact by rail with the capital.

Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that intense competition should exist between the inhabitants of the northern ports, some of them, like Port Douglas but newly opened.³¹

"Editors and deputations from Mackay to Cooktown raised their voices in demands for what nobody could keep from

30. Cf. Blainey: *op.cit.*, pp. 247, 252.

31. G.C. Bolton: *A Thousand Miles Away, a History of North Queensland to 1920*. The Jacaranda Press in association with A.N.U., Brisbane, 1963, pp. 160-161.

*calling the iron horse. Long and tedious were the intrigues and quarrels over routes. Townsville and Bowen each had hopes of becoming the gateway to Charters Towers and the pastoral west. Bowen had the better harbour, Townsville had the better politicians and was on the right side of the Burdekin. In 1877 a Liberal government decided to start the inland railway from Townsville."*³²

And so the struggle went on: between Cairns, Port Douglas and Mourilyan, between Cooktown, Bowen and Mackay. Gratitude for a few miles of railway might bring votes for anxious politicians; when all else appeared to have failed, the Northerners could always cry "Separation".

Nor was it only the merchants, the bankers, and the businessmen of the ports who lobbied for railways. The mining operators and speculators of the Atherton Tableland and more western fields were even more anxious for the precious rails to carry their ore to the smelters, cut costs of production and, in some cases, they hoped, prolong the life and the share prices of a worked out and dying field. Strong pressures were applied in government circles and, at times, these proved irresistible. Thus the government was moved to grant to the ill-fated Chillagoe Company, in December, 1897, permission to construct a private railway from Mareeba to Chillagoe, on most generous terms,³³ and again came to their rescue in 1905 with an authorization to extend their line to Etheridge.³⁴ Other mining companies laid branch lines to

32. *ibid.*

33. *Q.P.D.*, Vol. LXXVIII, 1897. Mareeba to Chillagoe Railway Bill, pp. 1778-1784; 1821-1847; 1864-1882 and 1889-1901.

34. *Q.P.D.*, Vol. XCVI, 1905. Chillagoe-Georgetown Railway, pp. 2195-2210.

connect with this system and the district was criss-crossed with rickety two-foot tramways. With the collapse of the mining boom and the Chillagoe Company, the railway had to be taken over by the Government. The opening of the Chillagoe State Smelters in 1919-20, revitalized the Chillagoe and Etheridge mining fields, and greatly benefited the railway revenues of the Cairns district,³⁵ but this revival was short-lived, the smelters closing down in 1927 to leave the railway department with another unprofitable line on its hands.³⁶

Having learned their lesson from these experiences, in future Parliamentarians approached applications from mining companies for railway lines with greater caution, and demands for suitable guarantees. The Mount Morgan mines had to provide such security before obtaining their branch line, and tougher conditions were forced upon Mount Isa Mines Ltd. before the extension of the Cloncurry line to the company's leases was agreed upon. Both the Royal Commission on Public Works and the Commissioner for Railways recommended the construction of this railway, only

"if the companies interested in the field are prepared to guarantee to spend a sum of £200,000 on development before the line is completed and the same amount within six months after it is opened for traffic, and to undertake to make up

35. Appendix 2, Northern Division Annual Report, 1919-20; Report of the Commissioner for Railways, year ended June 30th, 1920; *Qld. Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. II, 1920.

36. Railway Commissioner's Report, June 30th, 1927; *Qld. Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. II, 1927.

*any loss in working up to an amount of £13,000 per annum for a period of ten years."*³⁷

Somewhat late in the day the principle of profitability was being accepted as one of the most important criteria for further railway construction. Yet even this could not protect politicians from pressure, nor prevent them from using railway building as a vote catcher. Much of the intensive branch line construction which took place between 1905 and 1924³⁸ would have been hard put to justify itself on the grounds of profitability, either then or in the future.

Were further proof needed of the intrusion of politics into railway affairs, and of the extent to which railway matters were a continuing source of political controversy it could be provided by the number of Royal Commissions³⁹ and Select Committees⁴⁰ which dot railway history in the State, testimony to the validity of Parker's contention that politics in Australia, in the main, have been economic politics, and that conflicts over the "allocation of values" have tended to be damped down and diffused through their "institutionalization" by governments.⁴¹ Thus, Queensland politicians, frequently under fire

37. Report of the Commissioner for Railways on proposed Railway from Duchess to Mount Isa. October 16th, 1925. *Qld. Parl. Papers*, Vol. II, 1926. However, for the past thirty years, the haulage of the production of Mount Isa Mines over the 604 miles to Townsville has dominated the mineral traffic of the Queensland Railways, and been a lucrative source of income for its Northern Division. This traffic had become so important to State revenues that the present government agreed to the complete reconstruction of this railway to make it a modern, heavy-duty line.

38. See Appendix A. Branch lines. p. 315.

39. See Appendix C. pp. 317-20.

40. See Appendix D. pp. 321-26.

41. R.S. Parker: "Power in Australia", *op.cit.*

for one reason or another, over railways, have tried to de-pressurize the situation, from time to time, by setting up Royal Commissions or Select Committees to enquire into proposals for new lines, irregularities in the department, railway finances, economy, maladministration, and many other things.

"Railways in Queensland, then, have continued to be a part of politics and it is difficult to see the pursuit of any consistent policy."⁴² As a result, the price of over-capitalization and political "log-rolling" has had to be paid, and in terms of profitability it has been steep. Problems of lasting consequence have arisen for which political solutions have been found, or, more frequently, no solutions at all.

The primary difficulty was overcapitalization, even though as has been noted previously, Queensland adopted a narrower and less expensive gauge than Victoria and New South Wales. The reduction in construction cost per mile of railway was offset in this State by the vast distances to be traversed (see Table I), and by the fact that except in Western Australia, railways in Queensland have served a much smaller and more scattered population than in any other State (see Table II).

"The railway mileage required to connect the interior with ports and markets is therefore abnormally large in relation to population and production, even for Australia. There are three main lines terminating in the remote interior. None of the other States has so large a proportion of distant

42. J.W. Knowles: "One Hundred Years of Railways in Queensland", *The Australian Railway Historical Society*, Bulletin No. 338, Vol. XVI, New Series, December, 1965, p. 238.

*terminals. Even in Western Australia, where the mileage is greater in proportion to population, the railway system can be shown on a map of the south-western corner of the state. For its sparsely populated area, Queensland is lavishly equipped with railways."*⁴³

TABLE I

COMPARISON OF GREATEST DISTANCE BY RAIL FROM CAPITAL

<i>State</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>Distance in Miles</i>
New South Wales	Sydney to Murwillumbah	579
Victoria	Melbourne to Werrimill	378
South Australia	Adelaide to Mount Gambier	305
West Australia	Perth to Meekatharra	600
Queensland	Brisbane to Dajarra	1414

Taken from *Qld. Parl. Papers*, Vol. III, 1925. Railway Commissioner's Report.

TABLE II

POPULATION PER RAILWAY MILE

<i>State or Country</i>	<i>Inhabitants per Mile of Railway</i>
West Australia	94
Queensland	130
South Australia	196
Victoria	341
Tasmania	354
New South Wales	400
U.S.A.	404
New Zealand	407

Taken from *Qld. Parl. Papers*, Vol. II, 1920. Railway Commissioner's Report.

43. The Bureau of Economics and Statistics: *Railway Economics*, Govt. Printer, Brisbane, 1931, p. 37.

The problems of over-capitalization and crippling interest payments were not confined to Queensland. Throughout the Australian Railways "the burden of interest on railways unproductive of their costs" has been heavy. "In 1925 the interest absorbed 28.2 per cent of railway revenue, and in 1930, 34.9 per cent."⁴⁴ However, the situation in Queensland has been more critical. By 1920, "the capital cost was then the highest in Australia per head of population, at £57. It is now [end of 1930] much higher, and still the highest in Australia at about £64 per head. Railway interest was then the highest in Australia, per head of population, at £2.13.2 per year. It is now [end of 1930] much higher and still the highest in Australia at £3.4.2 per year."⁴⁵ In the thirty one years (1920-50) encompassed by the present study, on only nine occasions did the railways show a surplus, after paying interest on capital indebtedness. Two of these years fell within the period 1939-45, when wartime demands for the services of the railways created unusually high profits. The other four occasions followed immediately upon the implementation of "The Railway (Capital Indebtedness) Reduction Act of 1931,"⁴⁶ under which the sum of twenty-eight million pounds was written off the capital indebtedness of railways.⁴⁷

From the point of view of the Railway Department, this situation

44. *ibid.*, p. 31.

45. *ibid.*, p. 43.

46. 22 Geo. V. No. 33. At this time, the capital indebtedness of the Queensland Railways stood at £64,184,569.

47. See Table III, p. 56, for yearly tabulation of deficit/profit for the period 1920-50.

need not have been of concern if the State - and this would include the general public - had been prepared to acknowledge and carry this burden as a cost, and an unavoidable cost, of development.⁴⁸ "This is part of the cost to the community of government enterprise in railways, and in their extension and rating as developmental agencies. The community gained the benefits during construction and still gains whatever may be the net addition to production."⁴⁹ It is not enough, however, for the government merely to pay lip service to the developmental role of the railways. An acknowledgement in governmental accounts of those expenses which may clearly be claimed to be developmental, would have given a much more exact picture of railway finances, and gone some little way towards meeting the continued criticism. Only the Victorian system has made any real attempt "to be honest to the railway as a State and business enterprise,"⁵⁰ by reimbursing railway finances for losses incurred in working new lines or in implementing a governmental policy directive.

No such allowances have been made in Queensland, where the basic conflict between the developmental theme and profitability has raged from the earliest days of railway building. Successive governments have emphasized that the railway system formed an essential part of planning

48. It would seem that the general public was not prepared to do this, e.g. *Railway Commissioner's Report, 30/6/1929* inter alia: "The public generally are unable to visualise the railways as a means of developing the country, but appear to expect them to be conducted as a commercial undertaking, and to show a return at least equivalent to the cost of operation and interest on capital invested. This leads to adverse criticism."

49. *Railway Economics, ibid.*, p. 43.

50. *ibid.*, p. 35.

TABLE III

<i>Year</i>	<i>Net Revenue (Gross Earnings less Working Expenses) £</i>	<i>Interest on Capital £</i>	<i>Deficit or Profit £</i>
1919-20	636,758	1,866,337	- 1,229,579
1920-21	230,914	1,970,389	- 1,739,475
1921-22	344,168	2,087,438	- 1,743,270
1922-23	706,138	2,181,330	- 1,475,192
1923-24	723,287	2,316,353	- 1,593,066
1924-25	1,684,043	2,578,541	- 894,498
1925-26	977,298	2,770,052	- 1,792,754
1926-27	830,355	2,794,720	- 1,964,365
1927-28	1,275,392	2,898,128	- 1,622,736
1928-29	1,365,846	2,969,826	- 1,603,980
1929-30	1,356,118	3,014,307	- 1,658,189
1930-31	1,418,293	3,037,458	- 1,619,165
Reduction in capitalization by £28,000,000.			
1931-32	1,562,198	1,588,934	- 26,736
1932-33	1,641,845	1,584,191	+ 57,654
1933-34	1,715,528	1,555,410	+ 160,118
1934-35	2,068,603	1,574,082	+ 494,521
1935-36	1,470,646	1,588,397	- 117,751
1936-37	1,614,304	1,606,432	+ 7,872
1937-38	1,499,879	1,628,970	- 129,091
1938-39	1,588,417	1,641,727	- 53,310
1939-40	1,663,629	1,662,121	+ 1,508
1940-41	1,673,566	1,675,495	- 1,929
1941-42	2,949,597	1,568,855	+ 1,380,742
1942-43	6,154,354	1,588,203	+ 4,566,151
1943-44	2,940,654	1,583,193	+ 1,357,461
1944-45	1,930,387	1,592,490	+ 337,897
1945-46	1,326,646	1,485,581	- 158,935
1946-47	742,325	1,454,899	- 712,574
1947-48	792,786	1,463,873	- 671,087
1948-49	1,156,986	1,472,599	- 315,613
1949-50	63,154	1,529,200	- 1,466,046

Compiled from *Reports of the Commissioners for Railways, 1920-1950.*

for opening up the country and increasing production.

*"If we want to arrive at a true balance of the assets and liabilities of our railway system, and the part that it plays in national economy, then land settlement, land revenue, agricultural development and population must all be added to the credit side. Viewed from that standpoint we realize that the Railway Department has played, and will continue to play, a very important part in the development of this country."*⁵¹

Year after year Railway Commissioners, thrown on the defensive by widespread criticism of railway losses, have reiterated the developmental theme. "It will be seen that the Railways, which are the State's greatest instrumentality, are being used as an expression of government policy in the development and protection of the industries of the State."⁵² "These factors should be taken into consideration when the financial position of the railways is under review, because it is impossible to dissociate the financial aspect of State-owned railways from public policy."⁵³

On the whole, however, these factors have been given very little weight, either by the parliamentarians or the general public. Beyond the remission of £28 million from the capital indebtedness of the railways in 1931, governments have done nothing of a practical nature to overcome the problem.⁵⁴ On the other hand, the general public, including, frequently, people in the country who have stood to benefit the most from railway services, have continued to criticise railway

51. The Premier, (Hon. W. Forgan Smith, Mackay): *Q.P.D.*, Vol. CLXXIII, 1938, p. 1,400.

52. *Qld. Parl. Papers*, Vol. II, 1923. Railway Commissioner's Report.

53. *Qld. Parl. Papers*, Vol. II, 1926. Railway Commissioner's Report.

54. Cf. Report of the Commissioner for Railways, 1929.

losses. They have expected that railways should pay their way, more particularly as they are, in this case, a government enterprise, and as such, losses must be met, in the end, out of the pockets of all.

*"The general policy of the government ... has been not to make the users of the railways only, pay for the additional unavoidable cost of operation, but to allow others, too, who have shared in the advantages resulting from the expansion of the railways to bear a share of the added cost through the medium of taxation."*⁵⁵

It is one thing to point out that if the railways are a significant developmental factor, their financing should take account of this; it is quite another to demonstrate that the railways have indeed played a developmental role. In other words, the theme running through the Railway Commissioners' Reports and Ministerial statements needs to be looked at with some scepticism and not simply accepted at face value. If development means opening up parts of a country to settlement where none existed previously, then with very few exceptions,⁵⁶ the Queensland railways have not been of this kind. They were not pioneering railways, as in most instances, they were built to connect existing settlements, across and through country already taken up, even if only sparsely settled.⁵⁷ Indeed, the three main western lines passed, on the whole, over country that is not conducive to closer settlement. It

55. *Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations of the Royal Commission on Railways* (Mr. W.A. Hooper), 1938, and *Comments of the Commissioner for Railways* (Mr. C.A. Murton) thereon. Govt. Printer, Brisbane, 1939, p. 12.

56. Some of the mining railways would possibly fall into this category.

57. "It will be readily admitted that railway construction in Queensland has in most cases preceded settlement." *Qld. Parl. Papers*, Vol. II, 1926. Railway Commissioner's Report. It is argued that statements of this kind are an oversimplification of the situation.

can be argued that the greatest need which the railways met was rather that for a faster and cheaper means of transport to and from the coastal areas and ports than could be provided by bullock teams. Along with this and at some cost to the department in profits, the railways, under political pressure, have provided country dwellers with numerous "fringe" benefits: freight concessions of all kinds, including tapering rates on long hauls, concessions on the transport of fodder, and the carriage of starving stock, and many others.⁵⁸

This is not to say that this is an iniquitous situation. Until recently, Queensland has depended almost exclusively on the produce of the pastoral and agricultural sectors for its prosperity, and under these circumstances it would seem natural that the greatest amount of encouragement and assistance be given to those engaged in primary production. It does cast doubt on the complete validity of the developmental theme as it applies to the railways, and also calls into question the whole problem of the extent to which this subsidization of the man on the land by the city dweller should be taken. As more people live outside the capital city than within it in this State,⁵⁹ it is, perhaps, somewhat easier to achieve a wider agreement on support for sectional interests, than may be possible in the southern states.

Certainly there is evidence to show that with regard to railway policy, over the period of this study, governments took action to placate

58. Cf. *Qld. Parl. Papers*. Reports of the Commissioner for Railways, 1920-50.

59. "Politics at State-Level - Queensland", *Current Affairs Bulletin*, University of Sydney, 1968, Vol. 41, No. 6, pp. 93-94.

country interests and court the rural vote regardless of the economics of good railway management. This applied equally to Labor and non-Labor; indeed it would not be too much to suggest that Labor politicians threw themselves into the task with even greater energy and success than their political opponents.

The problem of subsidizing primary industry in the light of railway losses can be seen most clearly in regard to branch lines.⁶⁰

*"The policy pursued by Parliament in 'authorising' the construction of railways is responsible for the above losses, and not railway management. Lines are constructed and concessions are made in rates of freight, on the assumption that the lines may ultimately pay, and that even if they never pay the production they develop will be profitable to the community. The weakness of these assumptions is that no limits are recognised, and it seems to be assumed that all production must be profitable to the community."*⁶¹

These losses are not easily discernible from the railway accounts where branch line figures were lumped together,⁶² to show a profit, on occasions.

These surpluses came from no more than half a dozen lines at most, whose profitability tended to conceal to a large extent the heavy deficits on all other branch lines.⁶³

"Quite half of the losses of the lines have their sources in branch lines serving agricultural areas, in which are included farming of all kinds, dairying, sugar and also timber. All

60. Cf. Table IV, p. 61, and Table V, p. 63.

61. Railway Economics. *op.cit.*, p. 47.

62. Until, under the provisions of "The State Transport Act of 1938", the Commissioner was required in his annual report "to deal fully with each section of railway for which the revenue does not exceed working expenses and shall justify its closure or retention."

63. Cf. Table IV, p. 61.

TABLE IV

SOURCES OF RAILWAY LOSSES, 1929-30

Class and Groups	Losses per Mile of Line.	Classification	Losses in £1,000s.	Percentages of	
				Loss.	Mileage.
A. -	£	<u>Main Lines -</u>			
1	252	Interstate Line (to Wallan-garra)	63	3.94	3.9
	242	North Coast Line	254	15.90	16.14
2	557	Brisbane-Maryborough	93	5.82	2.6
3	205	Maryborough-Townsville	136	8.51	10.28
4	119	Townsville-Cairns	25	1.56	3.26
5	1,243	South Coast Line	97	6.07	1.22
6-8	86	Main Inland Lines (to Roma, Longreach, and Hughenden: Pastoral)	75	4.69	13.64
	218	Totals, Class A	489	30.61	34.9
B. - 9-11 ..	73	<u>Inland Extensions and Branches</u> (Pastoral)	119	7.45	25.3
C. - 12, 13 ..	229	<u>Mining Lines</u> (West of Cairns and Cloncurry)	136	8.51	9.22
D. -	..	<u>Other Lines</u> (in Districts) within 150 miles of coast: chiefly Agricultural Areas,			
		South-Eastern -			
14(a)	261	West through Toowoomba	77	4.82	4.57
14(b)	752	East of Toowoomba	236	14.77	4.90
	514	Whole of South-Eastern	313	19.59	9.47
15	302	Maryborough and Bundaberg	153	9.58	7.87
16	503	Central (Rockhampton District)	176	11.02	5.44
17	246	Mackay	16	1.0	1.01
18	705	Cairns	141	8.83	3.11
(14(a) to 18)	462	Total for Agricultural Districts	799	50.03	26.90
19-20	232	Other Northern Lines	55	3.44	3.68
	434	Total, Class D	854	53.47	30.58
	247	Total all Lines (<u>Less</u> 1 (fractions)) ..	1,597		
		<u>Add</u> - Interest on Unopened Lines, etc.	61		
		Total Railway Deficit	1,658		

Note: The above losses do not provide anything for depreciation.

The Bureau of Economics and Statistics: *Railway Economics*. Govt. Printer, Brisbane, 1931, p. 40.

*of these areas are within 150 miles from the coast. The main through lines where losses are heavy also pass through agricultural territory. It is clear that the main ultimate source of railway loss is the lavish provision made for agricultural settlement and to assist farming. The cost of closer settlement is to be found in the railway deficits as much as in the direct costs of other assistance."*⁶⁴

The construction of branch lines has been more susceptible to political pressure and lobbying than any other aspect of railway policy. As has been previously noted, the peak period of branch line building was between 1905 and 1924, when 1728 out of a total of 2983 miles constructed were for this purpose.⁶⁵ It is of interest that this period is evenly spanned by both non-Labor and Labor governments, each equally as anxious, presumably, to consolidate the farming vote of the south-east corner of the State behind their own party by means of liberal hand-outs from the "pork barrel".

Even before the virtual cessation of railway construction in the mid 1930's, the continued maintenance of unprofitable branch lines had become a source of controversy, but one to which governments turned a deaf ear. In setting up the State Transport Commission in 1938,⁶⁶ the Forgan Smith Labor government attempted to disarm the critics by giving to the Commission the power "to examine the position of branch working lines that are earning less than working expenses, and to recommend on the same."⁶⁷ At no time did the Commission recommend the

64. *Railway Economics, op.cit.*, pp. 41-42.

65. Cf. Appendices B, C and D.

66. Under the provisions of "The State Transport Act of 1938", 2 Geo. VI. No. 15.

67. *ibid.* Section 14, paras. 3 and 5.

TABLE V

MILEAGES OF GOVERNMENT RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION IN QUEENSLAND

Decade	Total Capital Expenditure at end of decade (b) (£ millions)	Main Line (miles)	Branch Line (miles)
1865-74	2.65	249.5	1.0
1875-84	8.03	736.0	220.4
1885-94	16.42	691.2	491.3
1895-04	20.89	521.6	176.7
1905-14 (a)	33.85	779.8	874.9
1915-24 (a)	49.71	477.0	864.1
1925-34	64.07	232.4 (c)	280.1
1935-44	69.5	-	-
1945-50	74.6	-	-

(a) includes purchases of private and shire lines

(b) includes £28 million written off in 1931

(c) includes Interstate 4'8½" gauge line of 68.8 miles.

Adapted from J.W. Knowles: "One Hundred Years of Railways in Queensland", *The Australian Railway Historical Society, Bulletin No. 338, Vol. XVI* (New Series), December, 1965, p. 233.

closure of any such sections,⁶⁸ and the continued subsidization of the

68. E.g. from their report, included in the *Separate Report of the Commissioner for Railways on Sections of Railways for which Revenue did not exceed working expenses, year ended June 30th, 1946*, p. 116, the Commissioners said *inter alia*, "the Commission expressed doubt as to whether the value of non-paying branch lines could be judged purely on a railway accounting basis. The Commission pointed out that an analysis of the position in 1938-39 indicated clearly that in the great majority of cases examined, the lines carried almost exclusively rural products at a rate which was unprofitable to the Railway Department. Motor Transport could not carry the products at the railway rates but had the railway not been functioning it is doubtful whether the districts could have continued in full production and the result would have been a substantial reduction in the quantity of food-stuffs available to the general community."

operation of most branch lines remained an integral part of government policy. It was not until Ford, Bacon and Davis Inc., a firm of American consulting engineers, were commissioned by the Nicklin government in 1960 to fully investigate the operation of the Queensland railway system that the question of the contribution which branch line operations were making to railway deficits was squarely faced. The Ford, Bacon and Davis report recommended the immediate closure of certain unprofitable, branch railways⁶⁹ and the government took action, along the lines suggested in this portion of the report.

The whole question of railway finances and more particularly, the causes of railway deficits has been a complex one, rooted in the concept of political control. Competition from other means of transport may well have been another contributory factor to railway difficulties, but the place for discussion on this lies elsewhere.⁷⁰

What is relevant at this point is to note certain of the long term effects that these questions at issue have had on what is the theme of this study - industrial labour relationships. In the matter of close political control over railway policy making, and its concomitant problems, it is suggested that a resultant development was the tendency on the part of both management and union to take a political view of

69. *Summary of Recommendations and Conclusions contained in the Report of Ford, Bacon and Davis Inc., on the Organisation, Facilities and Operations of the Queensland Railways*, pp. 23-24 and 27. Cf. Colin A. Hughes: *Images and Issues. The Queensland State Elections of 1963 and 1966*. A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1969, p. 256 for the consequent political complaints.

70. Cf. Chapter VI.

what were often essentially industrial matters, and to seek, more often than not, a political solution to these questions. This tendency was fortified by the fact that the employer was, in this instance, not a private individual or group, but a political entity - the government of the day. It will be argued later in this thesis, as a corollary to the above statement, that the situation was exacerbated when the government of the day happened to be a Labor government: in that case further and complicating expectations were held by both parties.

The issue of railway losses produced a sensitivity to criticism which in turn was reflected in labour-management relations. Railway Commissioners, on various occasions noted the effect on employee morale that year after year deficits were having. "To stimulate cooperation and initiative in both the management and the staff of the railways it is necessary to present them with a task that can reasonably be accomplished. The writing down of capital would, therefore, have a good influence upon efficiency."⁷¹ Be that as it may, management's reaction to condemnation of railway losses was to be seen in a greater emphasis on intra-departmental economy and on a professed expectation that railway employees would set a standard for efficiency and service to the community higher than that required of workers in the private sector. Railway workers were expected to be better employees than others: for their part, railway unions expected the Department to be a model for other employers, a presumption which assumed the certitude of a Gospel truth when the employer was a Labor government.

71. Professor D.B. Copland, quoted by the Commissioner for Railways in his Annual Report for year ended June 30th, 1930.

Two further points should be mentioned in view of their connection to arguments which will be developed subsequently. The decentralisation of the railway system⁷² which was caused by the physical configuration of the State and the ad hoc construction policy of governments determined to a large extent, the type of administrative framework set up to regulate and direct the railway system; a form of structure which in its turn influenced the unions in devising their own institutional organisations.

It is also of some importance to note that sixty years elapsed between the passage of the first Railway Act, and the passage of the first *through* train between Brisbane and Townsville. Until 1924, communication in person between the North and the capital involved several breaks in journey⁷³ - by ship from Townsville, usually to Port Alma, and thence from Rockhampton by rail to Brisbane. It is suggested that, as a consequence, the comparative isolation of the northern districts until late in railway history had a pronounced effect not only on union-management relations but on intra-union associations as well; and not only were these influences to be felt prior to 1924, but they could be clearly distinguished until the end of the period under scrutiny.

72. Cf. Appendix B, p. 316.

73. The question of the break-of-gauge between the State railway systems and its effect on the development of Australia as a whole has not been raised in this chapter, which is concerned only with intra-State railway matters. For a general discussion on the question, however, see Michael Robbins: *The Railway Age*. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1965. N. McCosker: "Standard Gauge Railway Systems", *Public Administration*, Sydney, Vol. XXI, No. 1, March, 1962.

Isolation was an important factor in breeding independence of spirit and action and the northern divisions of the principal railway union were to reflect the effects of their separation for many years.

PART II: THE AUSTRALIAN RAILWAYS UNION (QUEENSLAND BRANCH)

The construction, operation and maintenance of the Queensland railways necessitated the employment of a sizeable work force. Whereas in 1865, at the beginning of the "railway era", the total number of employees was two - the Commissioner for Railways and a Railway Conveyancer⁷⁴ - by 1950 there were 25,674 on the Railway Department payroll.

Within twenty years of the laying of the first miles of railway line, unions of employees had been established within the labour force. While some, like the Engine Drivers, Firemen and Cleaners, followed the familiar craft organisation pattern, a determined and conscious effort was directed towards the organising of all railway employees from top to bottom of the department into an "all grades" industrial union. By 1886 such a union was functioning under the name of the "Queensland Railway Employees' Association".⁷⁵

The basis of this form of unionism was an awareness of the great economic power that could be exercised by railway workers in industrial and political matters, together with a belief that all employees within the service had a consciousness of class solidarity and a community of interest which would be best served by the one mass union covering the whole industry. The Q.R.E.A. attempted to embrace a complex range

74. Estimates of Expenditure, 1867, p. 38 in *Votes and Proceedings*, 1866, p. 932. By 1866 the number of employees had risen to 15.

75. *The Daily Standard*, September 9th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Railway Advocate* (hereafter *The Advocate*) Vol. XLVI, No. 1, January 1966, p. 1.

of occupation and status, but it was, in effect, the lack of unanimity of attitude which proved the greatest stumbling block to the complete fulfilment of "all-grades" unionism within the railways.

Employer reaction to union formation in these early years was predictable, following a similar pattern to that in the United Kingdom and the United States of America.⁷⁶ The right to organise, let alone to strike,⁷⁷ was in some doubt until the advent of the Ryan Labour Government in 1915 brought open encouragement of trade unionism.⁷⁸ The Railway Commissioners were not alone in their antagonism to trade unions.

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76. Philip S. Bagwell: *The Railwaymen - the History of the National Union of Railwaymen*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1963. No permanent trade union was established within the railway industry in the U.K. until 1871. Ownership was in the hands of private railway companies who used every inducement to secure the loyalty of their employees as a buffer against "insubordination". Very real risks were incurred by engaging in any form of trade union activity: loss of bonus, company housing, company sponsored friendly societies, free clothing in the form of company livery.
77. Trade unions were first legalised under the Trade Union Act, 1886. However, following the Taff Vale decision in Britain, and two cases in Brisbane in 1906, *Heggie v. Brisbane Shipwrights' Provident Union* and *Standley v. Queensland Typographical Association*, the protection of union funds and the right of unions to levy members for political purposes were placed in doubt. The A.W.A. and the A.W.U. de-registered themselves in 1911 for fear that, under the Trade Union Act, they would be prevented from paying money to the Labor party. The General Strike of 1912 and the Industrial Peace Act which followed, heightened these fears. Cf. S.K. Proctor: "Brisbane Unionism and the Plumbers' Union, 1904-15", ed. D.J. Murphy, R.B. Joyce, Colin A. Hughes: *Prelude to Power. The Rise of the Labour Party in Queensland 1885-1915*. The Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1970, pp. 142-144. J.H. Portus: *The Development of Australian Trade Union Law*. Melbourne Univ. Press, Melbourne, 1958.
78. A Trade Union Act and an Industrial Arbitration Act overcame most of the obstacles of previous legislation, though the Industrial Peace Act (1912) was still in force.

Prospects within the service were good for regular employment and job security, and "most men, once they had been fortunate enough to secure such posts were careful not to jeopardize their positions by such reckless indiscretions as joining a trade union and taking part in strikes."⁷⁹

The early Commissioners harried the embryonic organisation through a policy of victimisation of its leaders; in retaliation, the workers tried to place the Q.R.E.A. in a position to withstand attack by removing at least one of its officials beyond the reach of the Commissioner. Jimmy Wilkinson resigned from the railway service to become secretary of the union and at about the same time, the decision was taken to establish a union paper to aid in propaganda work. The first number of "The Queensland Railway Times" was issued on October 1st, 1889.⁸⁰

The harassment of the union continued, and was taken to the point where the Commissioner issued an order to all "officers-in-charge-of-men", that they must choose between their membership in the union and their position in the service. Many skilled personnel resigned from the union at this stage - station masters, head gangers and chargemen - leaving behind only those who were not in positions of responsibility.⁸¹ Forced transfers of union activists to remote areas of the state was another method used by management to undermine the viability of the union.⁸²

79. Philip S. Bagwell: *op.cit.*, p. 20.

80. *The Daily Standard*, September 9th, 1922, p. 8. Reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 1, Jan., 1966, p. 1.

81. *The Daily Standard*, *ibid.*

82. *ibid.* Also interviews with Ernie Sampson, W. Morrow and George Rymer, ex-Executive officers of the A.R.U. August-September, 1967, May-June, 1969.

This and other forms of victimisation, together with the devastating effect of the great strikes of 1890-94 on trade unionism generally,⁸³ put the Q.R.E.A. out of existence, though Wilkinson, on his own, kept the paper going as a monthly.

In 1896 a move to reconstitute the Q.R.E.A. on the basis of Brisbane and Ipswich branches was successful. Thereafter, for some years the union had an up and down existence. Branches were formed in different centres and died as interest dwindled or as the heads of the service forced officials out. Others were resuscitated by some enthusiast who happened to be transferred to the particular centre.⁸⁴ However, direct and unconcealed hostility to all-grades unionism continued.⁸⁵ So long after the event, one cannot be certain of the reasons for this antagonism on the part of management. It is not clear whether their dislike was for unionism per se, or for all-grade or industrial unionism as against craft unionism.

In the United Kingdom, where railway workers were organising themselves in all-grades unions - the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (1871) and the General Railway Workers' Union (1889) - as well

83. Ian Turner: *op.cit.*, p. 14.

84. Note the analogy with the foundation years of the Amalgamated Engineering Union where "a branch was formed only when there were already a dozen or more members in the particular town, and the initiative came with the arrival of an active and trusted member from another Australian branch." K.D. Buckley: *The Amalgamated Engineers in Australia, 1852-1920*. Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1970, p. 25.

85. Ernie Sampson who had become secretary of the Brisbane branch of the Q.R.E.A. was transferred to Normanton in 1905 and there is evidence of similar victimisation of other union activists.

as into craft unions,⁸⁶ the hostility of management motivated by a desire "to keep the most perfect control over their servants",⁸⁷ was directed against trade unionism in any form. These views were those of private ownership, however, and it might be expected that in Queensland, where the railway service was a state-owned enterprise, that the heads of the various sections would have been anxious to see the organisation of the workers, the better to achieve cooperation in the efficient operation of the industry. While it can also be said that in the United Kingdom, "the closing years of the nineteenth century were marked by the increasing militancy of the rank and file railwaymen and their growing support for the A.S.R.S.",⁸⁸ militancy in the Q.R.E.A., at a similar stage in its development, was inhibited by lack of a stable organisation and membership.

Nevertheless, it was active in its support for reforms to improve working conditions and pressed hard for the establishment of a Board to which appeals could be made against punishment by the heads of the department. The Railway (Employees' Appeal) Act of 1905 went a good deal of the way towards satisfying the railwaymen's demands.⁸⁹ The next year, a Workers' Compensation Act came into operation, to be followed

86. Philip S. Bagwell: *op.cit.*, pp. 44-69, 132.

87. *ibid.*, p. 26.

88. *ibid.*, p. 175.

89. *The Daily Standard*. September 9th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 2, 1966, p. 2. Cf. C.A. Bernays: *Queensland Politics during Sixty (1859-1919) Years*. Government Printer, Brisbane, n.d., p. 478. The Board was to consist of five members, the general traffic manager, chief engineer, locomotive engineer, a police magistrate and an employees' representative - three of whom would constitute a quorum.

by the memorable Order-in-Council of July, 1907, granting to all government employees earning daily wages an eight hour day and fortnightly wage payments.⁹⁰ The Q.R.E.A. took some of the credit for these achievements.

By 1910 three separate and independent Q.R.E.A.s existed, the Southern,⁹¹ Central and Northern Divisions. Distance, difficulty of direct communication with the northern areas, and the decentralisation of the railway system must all have played a part in creating this unusual situation. A cogent argument put up against amalgamation with the Southern Division was that such an arrangement would mean loss of power and independence to the Brisbane based Q.R.E.A. This was reinforced by a belief, in some quarters, that the flame of industrial unionism burned brighter north of, say, Bundaberg, than elsewhere. To be sure, much of the energy of the Ipswich and Brisbane branches in particular was dissipated "in combating the evils of crafts and scabs, [while] Central and North Queensland are in a better position to more closely solidify railway forces, the latter not having antagonistic

90. *idem*. "The agitation for an eight hour day and fortnightly pay had commenced in 1890 and had been kept going during the 17 years that had intervened before they were granted."

91. At June 30th, 1910, the membership of the Q.R.E.A. (Southern Division) was approx. 1,200, with branches at North and South Brisbane, Ipswich, Toowoomba, Roma, Charleville, Maryborough, Bundaberg, Gympie, Cairns and Mackay (the two latter surprisingly attaching themselves to the Southern Division rather than to the respective Northern and Central Divisions). *The Daily Standard*, September 16th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, 1966, p. 2.

organisations."⁹² The railway building programme which concentrated men in large but isolated groups, for months on end, assisted in fostering the growth of unionism in these areas. The department's previously mentioned policy of forced transfers had also inadvertently contributed to the vitality of industrial unionism in the northern railway districts. The exile of the more active and militant leaders, while it weakened the spirit of the organisation in the metropolitan area, had animated and brought into focus all-grades unionism in other areas of the state.⁹³

In 1911 some degree of consolidation was achieved by the amalgamation of the Q.R.E.A. (Southern Division), Q.R.E.A. (Central Division) and the Traffic Association which had been established in the railway service as an offshoot of a similar organisation operating in the southern states. In the process a new name was adopted - that of the Queensland United Railway Employees' Association. Further attempts to widen the union were interrupted by the 1912 General Strike,

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92. Report of the Secretary of North Brisbane branch of Q.R.U. *The Daily Standard*, January 8th, 1920, p. 3. "Railway unionism in Brisbane should 'set the pace' for the other centres in Queensland. Notwithstanding the educational facilities such as the Workers' School, the Socialist League, Workers' Educational Association and free lectures on working class subjects, we find that outside of Brisbane there is a better feeling of class-consciousness and solidarity, particularly in North Queensland. Brisbane is the home of sectional unionism as far as the railway is concerned. Within an area of 25 miles there are over a score of craft unions. Whereas in outside centres railway unionism is practically confined to the Q.R.U., A.S.E. and A.W.U."
93. Cf. interviews with E. Sampson, W. Morrow & G. Rymer: *op.cit.* p. 70. *The Daily Standard*, September 9th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 1, 1966, p. 4. "The North was the railway Siberia, to which were exiled all railwaymen who dared to support their claim for citizen rights."

but in its aftermath the Northern men, now more aware of the futility of divided organisation, agreed to amalgamation. Two years later, trouble between the Council of the Q.R.U.⁹⁴ and the Townsville Branch led to the latter's breaking away and forming another all-grades union - the Amalgamated Railway Union. The resultant overlapping was detrimental to the fortunes of industrial unionism in the north, but by 1916, the errant branch had returned to the fold and organisational unity was at last achieved.⁹⁵

The general strike,⁹⁶ over the right of workers to organise and the recognition of trade unionism generally, affected the Q.U.R.E.A. The Railway Commissioner set up a Board of Enquiry to which each striker had to make application for reinstatement. Most were re-employed but transferred immediately to other centres, forfeiting their previous service in the process. Yet, in the long run, this strengthened the union, as these men were active in reforming or establishing branches wherever they went and a general revival of interest in the Q.R.U.

94. The annual conference of the Q.U.R.E.A. in 1913 had agreed to a further name change to Queensland Railway Union.

95. Its return hastened, one suspects, by the passage of the Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916. See *supra*, p. 69.

96. For a full account of this strike see A.A. Morrison: "The Brisbane General Strike of 1912", *Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand*, Vol. 4, No. 14, May, 1950; Ian Turner: *op.cit.*, Chapter 2. In the Southern Division 1956 railwaymen struck work (1511 permanent, 445 casuals) and the majority of them were members of the all-grade union. *The Daily Standard*, September 16th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 5, 1966, p. 2.

followed.⁹⁷

With the election to office of a Labour government in 1915 and the passage of the Industrial Arbitration Act in the following year, the labour movement in Queensland entered a new era. The enthusiasm and promise for the future with which trade unionists generally greeted both a labour administration and the arbitration system were shared, initially, by the Q.R.U.⁹⁸

The appointment of Tim Moroney as paid General Secretary of the union in 1917, followed by that of George Rymer as paid President and editor of *The Railway Advocate* in 1921, brought changes. Neither man saw anything of value to be gained by the workers through political organisation. They believed that the only key to unlock the future was strong economic organisation based on industrial unionism, leading to self-government within each industry and eventually workers' control. In their view, the arbitration system was simply the tool of the employer,

97. Immediately following the strike there was a period of confusion within the Q.U.R.E.A. The strike committee set up within the union had been "unconstitutional", causing the resignation of the official executive, and a special conference had to be called to choose a new executive. The railway strike committee had been chaired by Ned Hanlon, Tim Moroney was secretary, other committee members were:- Mick Kirwin, Joe Sherry, Jack Kelvin, Joe McCarthy, Charlie Knight and Tom Brown. *The Daily Standard*, *idem*.

98. "The hope of the railwaymen seemed to lay (sic) in securing the return of a Labour Government." Tim Moroney writing of the period after the 1912 strike in *The Daily Standard*, September 16th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 6, 1966, p. 1. Cf. *ibid.*, September 23rd, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 7, 1966, p. 6. "Great interest was centred in the Industrial Arbitration Bill, ... which it was hoped would give railwaymen the opportunity of having their wages assessed and their conditions laid down by an independent tribunal."

whether government or private, emasculating union militancy and independence. Only through direct action, backed by the power of organised unionism could gains be made by the workers.⁹⁹

Ideological beliefs of this kind held by the leaders of the all-grades union - tenets which the *Railway Advocate* propagated in every edition thereafter - were one of the reasons why, from 1917 onwards, the one big union, embracing all workers within the railway service, was never a viable possibility. They ran counter to the more moderate, even conservative, views of many other unions, particularly the railway craft unions and the A.W.U. which were prepared to support both the arbitration system and the gradual reformism of the A.L.P. as it developed from the 1920's onwards.

It is doubtful whether the establishment of one union covering all grades in the railways was ever a workable hypothesis even prior to 1917, no matter the amount of fervour and enthusiasm its supporters used to state its case. While their efforts were being frustrated at every turn, it must have been small consolation to the Queenslanders to know that, though beset originally by the same difficulties of craft unionism, the majority of British railwaymen were able, by 1913, to reject both regionalism and sectionalism in favour of amalgamation within one

99. A full discussion of the relationship of the union with the A.L.P. and other unions, and of the ideology of its leaders is undertaken in Chapters 5 and 6 following. Cf. also M. Bridson Cribb: *Some Manifestations of Ideological Conflict within the Labour Movement in Queensland (1924-1929)*. Unpub. B.A. (Honours) Thesis, Univ. of Qld., 1964.

industrial union - the National Union of Railwaymen.¹⁰⁰

There was little affinity between the railway staff men, or even the "running grades" employees, and the semi-skilled and unskilled labourers. For the former groups the railway was a career service and they chose to organise along professional or craft lines.¹⁰¹

Craft unions had been established within the railway service at an early date. The Engine Drivers, Firemen and Cleaners were already operating when the Q.R.E.A. was founded and the guards, station masters and operating porters (the equivalent of the present day night porters) each had their own organisation by 1908 at the latest. The all-grades union tried to combat sectionalism in two ways: firstly through constant attempts to bring about amalgamation, and secondly by writing into its rules the provision that "branches may form guilds composed of six financial members. These guilds may meet and transact their own business and submit their decisions to their branches in the form of concrete resolutions, which, if necessary, shall be forwarded to the general secretary for action."¹⁰² By making provision through the guilds

100. Bagwell: *op.cit.*, pp. 339-35. The N.U.R. was officially inaugurated on March 29th, 1913, with a membership of 180,000, though it must be admitted that some craft organisation remained - notably that of the loco-enginemmen and firemen. Any person employed on any railway or in connection with any railway in the U.K. was eligible for membership in the N.U.R.

101. Turner: *op.cit.*, pp. 13-14. "The typical problems of industrial unionism were the seeming clash of interests between staff men, skilled craftsmen and unskilled workers; the wide range of attitudes to political and industrial affairs, which tended to hold the whole union back to the pace of "its most moderate section".

102. Quoted by Tim Moroney in *The Daily Standard*, September 9th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 3, 1966, p. 2.

for sectional interests and attaching them by the lightest possible organisational bond it was hoped to keep them within the union. The ploy was successful, for a time, in the case of the clerks and labourers, but although a separate signalmen's branch remained within the Q.R.U., the main body broke away in 1916 to form a signalmen's union.

Offers of amalgamation were made frequently in the early days, the most serious attempt in 1916 being once again rejected by all the recipients.¹⁰³ , The Q.R.U. officials were of the opinion that "snobbishness, stupid ignorance or foolish prejudice alone"¹⁰⁴ prevented the attainment of a closer relationship, yet there were other more practical reasons for the continued refusal of amalgamation offers by the craft unions. They feared that within one union they would be swamped by the larger membership of the unskilled and semi-skilled grades and pulled out on strike over every dispute within the service. As well, and in addition to their consciousness of superior status within the service,¹⁰⁵ the vested interests of the officials of the craft unions was probably the most serious stumbling block to the creation

103. In reply to a letter from Q.R.U. secretary Callaghan, the Station Masters' Association "regretfully advised that their rules precluded their amalgamation with any organisation whose members are subordinate in rank to the position of station master." The Guards' Association was of the opinion that "the time was not ripe" for an amalgamation and other organisations made similar excuses. *The Daily Standard*, September 16th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, 1966, p. 2.

104. Tim Moroney: *idem*.

105. "The guards wanted to be separate because they considered themselves a sort of aristocrat - "my train" and all that rubbish - they were inflated with their own egos." Interview with W. Morrow.

of one big union.¹⁰⁶ After 1920 the fact that they did not like the political and industrial views of the leaders of the A.R.U. or the militant activity of the union would have reinforced their earlier assessment of the situation and their determination to retain their independent craft identity and their power within their own small empires.

By 1920 the pattern of organisation of workers within the railway service was firmly established. It consisted of three kinds of union:

1. The industrial union, which by then had become the Queensland branch of the Australian Railway Union, whose membership was open to all workers in the industry, no matter what their calling.
2. Craft unions of a particular type, such as the Amalgamated Engineers Union, the Vehicle Builders, Painters etc. These craft unions organised the workers on the basis of his craft or skill and in a number of cases admitted the semi-skilled and unskilled to membership. They also covered workers outside the railways, in fact, the bulk of their membership lay outside the service and some of these unions were prone to involve the railway unions in their disputes outside the industry, e.g. the A.E.U., while others, such as the Vehicle Builders, were not.
3. Sectional unions, such as the Station Masters, Maintenance, Traffic Employees, Guards and Shunters, Railway Officers etc. These were confined exclusively to the railway service; some were to be found only

106. The Q.R.U. proposed that the officials of the other organisations would head their own departments within the one big union, if they came in, but they were not to be tempted. This endorsed by Messrs. Morrow, Rymer and Sampson in interviews.

in Queensland, and were formed as breakaway unions from the A.R.U. The workers in these unions were organised on the basis of class of work performed.¹⁰⁷

Sectionalism ensured that solidarity was much more difficult to achieve in the approach of workers to management, and encouraged the latter to adopt a "divide and rule" policy in industrial relations. On several occasions, a loose organisation of railway unions was formed to discuss matters of mutual interest.¹⁰⁸

The Grand Council of Queensland Railway Unions was the first of these, whose high-sounding title was not matched by its effectiveness.¹⁰⁹ A more recent body, the Combined Railway Unions' Central Committee set up in 1936, is still in existence, but only on rare occasions has complete unity on major industrial matters been achieved through it.¹¹⁰

In terms of inter-union relationships, multiplicity of organisation led to "body-snatching" and demarcation disputes, which also undermined

107. Interview with Mr. Frank Nolan, then General State Secretary of A.R.U. (Q'ld. branch), June 28th, 1967. Cf. *Railwaymen and Unionism - A case for Amalgamation*, A.R.U. (Q'ld. branch), Sydney, n.d., and files of the Industrial Commission, Brisbane. While it is clear that a union like the F.E.D.F.A. would be placed in category two, the A.F.U.L.E. is not as easily classified, though a case could be made for including it with the other sectional unions. There are also several professional unions within the service.

108. At the lowest level the most useful of these was probably the "Ipswich Railway Workers' Industrial Conference" centred around those unions who had members employed in the Ipswich Railway Workshops.

109. Evidence indicates that this body existed in 1905 and in 1917, but when it was formed and ceased to exist has not been ascertained.

110. Pamphlet. "United We Stand, Divided We Fall". Reprint from the *Railway Advocate*, October, 1965.

solidarity. As the union representing the majority of semi-skilled and unskilled railway workers,¹¹¹ many of whom were employed in country areas, the A.R.U.'s principal opponent in the struggle for numbers was the A.W.U., a fact which exacerbated tensions already present after 1920 between the two unions over industrial and political beliefs.

Regardless of the views of the Q.R.U. leadership on the arbitration system and the extent to which it could benefit the workers, there were certain features of the Arbitration Act of 1916¹¹² and the first railway award under the new legislation in 1917, which made it imperative, even obligatory, for the union to register under the Act and become a party to the award. These factors were de facto compulsory unionism and "bracketing".

The inclusion of a preference clause in the railway award, which, incidentally the Q.R.U. claimed was incorporated at their request,¹¹³ affected trade unionism and its operation thereafter, not only within the railway service, but in terms of industrial relations generally throughout the State.

The variety and extent of these effects have been the subject of much speculation¹¹⁴ and little unanimity. Many on the management side

111. Cf. Appendix H, p. 342, showing occupational breakdown of Q.R.U. membership at time of registration in 1917.

112. 7 Geo. V. No. 16. The Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916, Part III, sec. 26-37.

113. Tim Moroney: *The Daily Standard*, September 9th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 2, 1966, p. 1.

114. Cf. V.L. Allen: *Power in Trade Unions*. Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1954, Chapter 4; Allan Fraser: "Compulsory Unionism", *Voice*, Vol. 2, No. 9, April, 1953, p. 12; *Voice*, Vol. 2, No. 11, July, 1953, p. 4; Ross Anderson & Tom Truman: "Compulsory Unionism in Queensland", *Voice*, Vol. 3, No. 6, March, 1954, pp. 14-15.

of the relationship have been happy enough with compulsory unionism, seeing it as "watering down" unionism generally and militancy particularly, by forcing into union membership not only the apathetic and uninterested, but also those of a more conservative frame of mind, less likely to be swayed by the inflammatory oratory of the mass meeting. From a union's point of view, solidarity based on a shared conception of the function and philosophy of the union is of the utmost importance, but it is not naturally increased in proportion to the increase in membership brought about by compulsory unionism. Card-holders and trade unionists are not necessarily synonymous.

As it operated in Queensland, compulsory unionism meant that, as a matter of general principle, union officials did not have to "sell" trade union membership to the workers. The oversight of a twice yearly show-of-tickets in the railway service was, in this respect, the limit of the recruitment responsibilities of officials. But the position of the all-grades union was unique in that it offered to those men and women employed in the railways an alternative to the unions covering their own craft or calling. In this way compulsory unionism served to intensify inter-union rivalry as the unions competed with each other for the right to represent workers forced by the Act to join a union. It may have been a factor in the battle for membership that a union had to prove itself better than other unions at achieving substantial gains for its members and looking after their interests, but as an argument for militancy it is largely suspect.

Indeed, compulsory unionism may have acted as a counterweight

to militancy through its encouragement of bureaucracy in unions.¹¹⁵ The situation of the union official becoming tied to his desk, solving the petty problems of every Tom, Dick or Harry among the membership, when he should have been out on organising tours, propagandising to keep the spirit of militancy and direct action alive, was not unknown within the A.R.U.¹¹⁶ In retrospect, compulsory unionism enriched the unions, financially and in membership - in particular, the A.W.U. - while, by encouraging inter-union rivalry, it aggravated the tensions already existent between the all-grades union and others. To these, "bracketing" and its application in practice were also contributing factors.

The Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916¹¹⁷ provided among other things, for the registration of unions of employees, as industrial unions, and also for the registration of "a list of callings comprised in the

115. Anderson and Truman: *ibid.*

116. Both Rymer and Morrow agree that many A.R.U. officials, particularly those at district level, became office bound. However, in their view this was because these officials were invariably "weak and wishy-washy" types concerned only with the bureaucratic side of union organisation and with building their own empires, however small. Such men did not see their role as that of the active and peripatetic organizer, nor were they concerned with the vital principles of industrial unionism or with the need to personally convince the workers through organising tours, that they must use their economic power through direct action to get what they wanted. The question of the aims and aspirations of the early trade unionists and their leaders, and the arguments on this theme recently presented by H. McQueen: *A New Britannia*. Penguin Books, Ringwood, Victoria, 1970, will be discussed in Chapter 5.

117. An Act to Provide for the Regulation of the Conditions of Industries by means of Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration; to Establish a Court of Industrial Arbitration and certain Subsidiary Tribunals, and Define their Jurisdiction; and for purposes consequent thereon or incidental thereto. 7 George V. No. 16. Assented to December 18th, 1916.

membership or objects of the union."¹¹⁸ One of the responsibilities of the Industrial Registrar was to see that when an industrial union applied for registration for a calling for which another industrial union was already registered, both should be registered for the calling and "bracketed" together, subject, of course, to a right of appeal against this action. Bracketing thus gave unions joint rights under the Act of representing the people included in those callings and of participating, on their behalf, in the making of awards by the Industrial Court.

Though it was held that the reason behind the inclusion of "bracketing" in the Act was to prevent overlapping, to avoid unnecessary duplication within an industry and demarcation disputes,¹¹⁹ in practice it meant a perpetuation of sectionalism within the railways. By 1920 the Court had "bracketed" twenty-four unions with the A.R.U. even though, in each instance, this union had lodged a vehement appeal against such action.¹²⁰ The practice had other long term results as well.

118. *ibid.* Part III. Sec. 27E. At the time of its registration under this Act (17/2/1917), the Q.R.U. listed 96 callings, together with a blanket cover of "generally all those trades and occupations necessary in the conduction of the Queensland Railway system." Appendix F. p. 328.

119. *ibid.* Cf. Transcript of a hearing in the Industrial Court of Queensland, before the Registrar: Brisbane, July 28th, 1933: In the matter of an application by the Queensland Railway Traffic Employees' Union to amend its callings. File 57, p. 9. Mr. T. Moroney (for the A.R.U.): "The purpose of it [the registration of callings under the Act] is to restrict the spheres of influence of a union and to avoid unnecessary duplication; and in order to avoid that, it will be seen from this Act that the probable duplication of Organisation in any industry is foreseen by the framers of the Act, and they have given the Registrar power over the registration of organisations, not in respect of industries, not in respect of their rules, but in respect of their callings, and the purpose of that is to ensure that there will be no over-lapping."

120. Cf. Appendix G. p. 340.

Firstly, the A.W.U. and the A.R.U., as the only unions in a position to represent a wide range of callings in the railway service, notably those concerning semi and unskilled work, were forced even further into rivalry over membership.

More importantly, both compulsory unionism and "bracketing" must have been influential in impelling the A.R.U., against the personal desires and beliefs of its leaders, into participation in the State arbitration system. It would have been vital to the continued growth and success of the all-grades union, for it to show that it was in the vanguard of the union movement when it came to achieving practical benefits for its members. This required frequent and purposeful advocacy before the Industrial Court, which Tim Moroney and Frank Nolan, his successor as A.R.U. Secretary provided in full measure. However, it meant that the union's leadership became trapped in the ambivalent position of having to work within and help to prop up a capitalist system with its ancillary bodies such as the arbitration system and the industrial court, while intellectually and emotionally repudiating the system and all it represented.¹²¹

While, personally, Moroney and Rymer saw nothing of value to be

121. It is this writer's opinion that Communist trade unionists must find themselves caught in a similar conflict of interests. While they feel they are using the State and its instrumentalities, such as the arbitration system, for their own ends, they are, in reality, assisting in the perpetuation of a system, to whose ultimate destruction they are committed.

gained by the workers from either the Arbitration system,¹²² or through affiliation with the A.L.P., they were forced to admit that many of their rank and file thought otherwise¹²³ and this acted as something of a restraint upon their own militancy, and checked, to some extent, the use of direct action by the union; at the same time, the union's use of the arbitration system meant that workers' control of the railway system became more utopian as each year passed.

Little of this was evident, however, before 1920. In fact, all indicators pointed to a short life for the arbitration system; industrial unionism was about to be achieved through the establishment of the One Big Union (O.B.U.).

It is not pertinent to the theme of this chapter to enter into a discussion of the changes which were taking place within both the trade union and labour movements throughout Australia, from 1910 to 1920, especially as this has already been done with brilliance and at length by Turner.¹²⁴ It should be enough to state that the idea of industrial

122. *The Advocate*, September 21st, 1927, p. 2. "The Crisis in Trade Unionism". "The War Upon Trade Unionism was being made by political action and by direct action. The State as such, and its instrumentalities, like arbitration and the machinery of employerdom were all in the fray, for the retention, exercise and development of monopolistic privilege and profit." Cf. M. Bridson Cribb: *op.cit.*, Part II, and Chapter 5 following.

123. *The Advocate*. April 15th, 1929. Addressing the State Council of the A.R.U. Moroney said that "he was not one of those who believed that it was necessary that they should have an Organised Political expression. They had got on fairly well without one during the last four years. However, he was forced to recognise that his members desired some form of Political expression, but he thought that it was not in their interests that it should take the form of support of the Labour Government."

124. Ian Turner: *Industrial Labour and Politics. op.cit.*

unionism and of one big union had been gaining support steadily during the war, for a variety of reasons, and that by 1918, even those trade union leaders who were basically unsympathetic to these ideals deemed it wise to support the movement, with a view to ultimately controlling its strength and direction.¹²⁵

The wave of interest in and commitment to industrial unionism probably peaked in late 1918 with the formation, in New South Wales, of the Workers' Industrial Union of Australia - or O.B.U., drawing much of its inspiration from the De Leonite version of the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.). It was not to last, breaking upon the rocks of the mixed motives of its original supporters; on the desire of the A.W.U. to use the O.B.U. to expand its own hegemony, on the reluctance of the craft unions, and on the conflict between those industrialists who

125. Report of the annual convention of the A.W.U. (Q'ld. Branch). *Daily Standard*, January 30th, 1920, p. 5; Report of A.W.U. Convention, Sydney. *Daily Standard*, March 11th, 1920, p. 3. These reports bring out clearly the lack of ideological support for industrial unionism and the O.B.U. among a majority of A.W.U. delegates. The point is repeatedly made that industrial unionism already exists in the shape of "that greatest of all Australian Industrial Organisations, the A.W.U." (*Daily Standard*, March 11th, 1920, p. 3.) Rather than support an O.B.U. set up on syndicalist or I.W.W. lines, the leaders of the A.W.U. wished to alter the constitution of their own union in order to allow for expansion by taking in additional unions. It was also clearly stated that the A.W.U. intended to "strike hard at direct action methods and will have no truck with these methods at all, preferring to adopt the methods of conciliation and arbitration which it is contended, bring better and more lasting results to the workers." (*Daily Standard*, January 30th, 1920, p. 5.) Re political action, see Senator Barnes, delegate to A.W.U. Convention, Sydney: "But he would like to point out that they should never neglect political action. It would be useless to be closely organised on industrial lines, and allow the "other fellow" to have charge of the political machine. What chance would industrialists have if Mr. Hughes or Sir Joseph Cook decided to turn the machine guns on them." (*Daily Standard*, March 11th, 1920, p. 3.)

eschewed political action and those who wished "to award Parliament a much more considerable role in their plans for the reconstruction of society."¹²⁶

On this issue it was quite clear where the Q.R.U. stood and, conceivably, would continue to stand. The union was an all-grades one, and from its inception its leaders had worked tirelessly toward the achievement of the one big union, embracing the whole of the railway industry. The philosophy of both the President and Secretary, Rymer and Moroney, was heavily syndicalist, committing them to a reliance on direct industrial action to secure their social objectives - the socialisation of industry and workers' control.

The rank and file of the Q.R.U. had been balloted as early as 1915 on their views on one big union, and had responded favourably. It seems clear that Rymer and Moroney still expected to see the extension of industrial unionism in the immediate future, even though evidence to the contrary was mounting, including the abortive attempt by the A.W.U. in 1920 to form one union from a number of those operating in the Queensland railway service.¹²⁷ Certainly the Q.R.U.'s support for the federation scheme in 1920, which resulted in the change from the Q.R.U. to the Australian Railway Union (Queensland Branch) was conditioned largely by the belief that a national organisation would advance the

126. Turner: *op.cit.*, p. 184.

127. *Daily Standard*, April 7th, 1920, p. 3. W.J. Riordan (A.W.U.): "The A.W.U. had about 2,000 members at present engaged in the railway service, which section of the A.W.U., the union was prepared to let join up with one big union of railway workers."

cause of industrial unionism.¹²⁸

All things considered including the failure of the O.B.U., one is still astonished at the degree of apparent success achieved by the A.R.U. in the next five years (1920-25). The membership figures speak for themselves, climbing from 9,094 in 1922 to reach the all-time peak of 13,190 for the years 1925-26.¹²⁹ At the same time the A.R.U. was spearheading a campaign to bring the parliamentarians under a large measure of rank and file control, and to force the Labour government to legislate for a 44-hour week and other industrial claims, including the restoration of the £4.5.0. basic wage.¹³⁰

At the Emu Park Labour-in-Politics convention in 1923, the A.R.U. delegates, in alliance with the industrialists on the Trades and Labor Council, narrowly failed to have passed resolutions which would have given the party's central executive (Q.C.E.) power to instruct the parliamentarians on interpretation of any plank in the platform, and others which would have similarly bound them to the dictation of the extra-parliamentary wing.

On the industrial front, the agitation for restoration of the wage cut, also led by the A.R.U., finally culminated in strike action

128. Cf. *The Advocate*, official organ of the A.R.U. (Q'ld.) for 1920. Also *Daily Standard*, September 27th, 29th, and October 5th, 1920. The formation of the federal body is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, Part I.

129. Cf. Table VI, p. 91.

130. In February, 1922, the Industrial Court had reduced the basic wage to £4.0.0., taking into account both widespread unemployment and the Commonwealth Statistician's cost-of-living figures. Cf. M. Bridson Cribb: *op.cit.*, Part I, p. 11.

TABLE VI
RAILWAY EMPLOYEES

<i>Year</i>	<i>Salaried Staff</i>	<i>Wages Staff</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>A.R.U.</i>	<i>F.E.D.F.A.</i>	<i>Loco Enginemen</i>
ended 30.6.1920			16823			
" " 1921			15899			
" " 1922			15726	9094	2059	1580
" " 1923			16838	9037	2587	1513
" " 1924			16940	10361	2652	1513
" " 1925	3279	15093	18372	13190	2628	1809
" " 1926	3617	18419	22036	13190	3046	1809
" " 1927	3565	16105	19670	8972	2734	2271
" " 1928	3478	16146	19624	7153	2691	2265
" " 1929	3403	15467	18870	7455	2869	2239
" " 1930	3219	14542	17761	7033	2884	2102
" " 1931	3030	12970	16000	6176	2650	2010
" " 1932	2985	12598	15583	5789	2792	2023
" " 1933	2943	12565	15508	5845	2609	1987
" " 1934	2936	12809	15745	5885	2849	1938
" " 1935	2987	13978	16965	6287	3071	1800
" " 1936	3063	14063	17126	6434	3279	1870
" " 1937	3085	14351	17436	7015	3751	1892
" " 1938	3122	14590	17712	7059	3405	1915
" " 1939	3160	14836	17996	7251	3761	1916
" " 1940				7524	3932	1948
" " 1941	3249	16117	19366	7847	4061	1979
" " 1942	3296	16800	20096	8450	4556	2097
" " 1943	3394	17430	20824	8647	4874	2231
" " 1944	3407	18015	21422	9221	5108	2349
" " 1945	3570	18871	22441	10038	5021	2279
" " 1946	3672	18909	22581	10038	4138	2077
" " 1947	3707	19616	23323	9748	3881	2305
" " 1948	3759	20195	23954	9311	4006	2520
" " 1949	3918	20910	24828	9523	4075	2694
" " 1950	4076	21598	25674	9358	3850	2977

Sources: Railway Commissioner's Reports, 1920-50, *Queensland Parliamentary Papers*; *Queensland Year Book*; *A.B.C. of Queensland and Australian Statistics* - compiled by George Porter, Registrar-General, (Government Printer, Brisbane), 1928-34.

within the railway service in 1925. The government of Premier Gillies capitulated, conceding to the workers, not only the demanded wage rise,

but also the principle that a Labor government should *legislate* general industrial reform. It was evident that the leaders of the A.R.U. saw this as a triumph for militancy and direct action.¹³¹

Yet all this was deceptive for the reality was quite different. Between 1920 and 1930 the final links were forged in the alliance between Queensland Labor governments and the A.W.U., beginning under the premiership of E.G. Theodore and continuing into that of W. McCormack. It was ultimately a complete victory for arbitration and gradual reformism over industrial unionism and workers' control. Less than two years after its 1925 successes, the A.R.U.'s delegates had been expelled from the Labor-in-Politics convention,¹³² the union had disaffiliated from the A.L.P.¹³³ and its power and position of leadership within the trade union and labour movements, as well as in the railway industry had been seriously eroded in the 1927 strike. The union was isolated and forced into the position of a "permanently protesting minority".¹³⁴ While McCormack's "lock out" of the railwaymen in 1927 alienated the labour movement at the time and was a factor in the defeat of his government in the 1929 elections, the effects were not permanent. A term in opposition provided an opportunity to unite behind a new leader, Forgan-Smith, and after their re-entry to office in 1932, the alignment of Labor governments and the A.W.U. against the industrialists

131. Moroney in *Brisbane Courier*, September 5th, 1925. "the great victory meant that only a gesture would be needed in future to get all that was demanded."

132. Southport, February, 1926.

133. The A.R.U. did not affiliate again with the A.L.P. until 1957.

134. Turner: *op.cit.*, p. 217.

of the A.R.U. and the Trades and Labor Council remained constant for the next twenty years and more.

The Depression which followed closely upon the eclipse of the A.R.U. disillusioned trade unionists with these traditional instruments for achieving their ends - Labor governments and the arbitration system.¹³⁵ Yet the rivalry, suspicion and distrust between union leaders, together with their ideological differences, which had destroyed the infant O.B.U., also prevented the formation of an alliance with the left wing militants, which might have produced, if not workers' control, at least some more positive alleviation of the workers' lot than was ultimately achieved. Philosophically, a union such as the A.R.U. was perhaps better equipped to meet the Depression than those based on more orthodox thought. To fighters in the class war, there was little to be lost and much to be gained from a situation where capitalists and governments alike were, seemingly, being beaten to their knees by economic forces which they could not control. Capitalism was destroying itself, and, in the process, leaving the way open for the workers to take control of what was rightfully theirs.

If the opportunity was there, the A.R.U. missed taking it. In part this stemmed from the inability to forge a solid working alliance within the trade union movement, in part from the failure of the militant industrialists to provide practical solutions which would be acceptable

135. Cf. L.T. Louis: *Trade Unions and the Depression: a Study of Victoria, 1930-1932*. A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1968. ed R. Cooksey: "The Great Depression in Australia", *Labour History*, No. 17, 1970. Richard Dixon: "Industrial Policy in the 30's", *Australian Left Review*, October-November, 1970, pp. 19-31.

to majority opinion.¹³⁶ Union membership was declining alarmingly, and it is always difficult, if not impossible to make gains through direct action when unemployment is widespread, as economic necessity erodes solidarity. Even before the onset of the Depression, the A.R.U.'s membership figures had tumbled to 8,072 in 1927,¹³⁷ and in the following years, continued to fall further, relatively, than those of the railway sectional and craft unions.¹³⁸ By 1932, they had dropped to 5,789, and although the total number of railway employees did not fall as low as might have been expected,¹³⁹ due to the introduction into the service of the practice of working the men "short time" equal to the man hours required,¹⁴⁰ still the union became preoccupied with the economic survival of each individual railway worker.

When the situation was at its worst in July, 1933, the union had also to fight off a most determined attempt by the Queensland Railway Traffic Employees Union to have its own registration altered "from that

136. Cf. Alister Davidson: *The Communist Party of Australia*. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1969, Chapter 3. L.L. Sharkey: *The Australian Communist Party: Outline History*. A.C.P., Sydney, 1944. One tactic proposed by the Communist Party - that of revolutionary action - was definitely not acceptable.

137. Table VI, p. 91.

138. *idem*.

139. Table VI, p. 91.

140. Cf. *Reports of the Commissioner for Railways for the Years Ending June 30th, 1929-1933*. "In some workshops, married men are working as low as seven days per fortnight, single men working only six days per fortnight, whilst the running staff must, of course, share whatever work is offering." *Report of the Commissioner for Railways*, year ended June 30th, 1929.

of a union catering for a section only of the railway service to one which would provide an all-grades union to which any employee of the Commissioner for Railways could belong."¹⁴¹ Had this application been granted, it is likely that the A.R.U.'s membership and power would have been further reduced.

The Second World War finally pulled both the railway service and the A.R.U. out of the depression doldrums. At its end, the union's membership had doubled to 10,038¹⁴² and railway business had increased to such an extent that profits of up to £4½ million (1942-43) had been made.¹⁴³ The price paid for these gains was high in terms of man-hours worked, often under the worst of conditions, and in the heavy toll taken of the Department's locomotives and rolling stock.¹⁴⁴

In the immediate post-war period, industrial grievances mounted within the service and the feeling grew among the railway unions that the Department was purposely delaying in meeting legitimate demands for wage increases and a general improvement in working conditions, so that profits could be maintained. At the same time, the shift which had taken place in the power relationships within the trade union movement in the 1940's was becoming more open and obvious. As early as 1940, Communists had gained control of the Queensland Trades and Labor Council

141. Transcript of a hearing in the Industrial Court of Queensland before the Registrar, Mr. P. Wallace, on July 28th, 1933. File 57. *Records of the Industrial Commission.*

142. Table VI, p. 91.

143. Table III, p.56.

144. *Report of the Commissioner for Railways for Year ended June 30th, 1945.* In 1943-44, for example, the average time paid for drivers, firemen and guards was 116 hours per fortnight.

and held executive positions in other unions, notably those of the waterside and meat workers.¹⁴⁵ Radicalism, born of the Depression and war time experiences was spreading among rank and file unionists, and manifesting itself in a new militant spirit among industrial workers.¹⁴⁶ In turn, this was reflected in the wave of strikes which struck the meat, mining and stevedoring industries, in particular, in the late 1940's.

As a left-wing militant union, wedded to the principles of industrial unionism, the A.R.U. had much in common with the Communists in the trade unions, and a close alliance had been forged between them through the T.L.C. It was in these circumstances that the A.R.U. essayed its longest and most important piece of direct action against the Government, on February 2nd, 1948. The ensuing railway strike lasted nine weeks, until April 6th, and was notable for the high level of solidarity maintained among the railway workers, due in some degree to the severe manpower shortage of the time.¹⁴⁷ It was also marked by the ferocity, both verbal and physical, with which both sides contested the issues.

It is never easy to define precisely the issues in industrial disputes, as both management and union put up propaganda screens for public consumption. In this instance, there is no doubt that there were

145. Robert Murray: *The Split: Australian Labour in the Fifties*. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1970. Alastair Davidson: *op.cit.*, Chapter 6.

146. R. Dixon: *op.cit.*, p. 23.

147. *Report of the Commissioner for Railways for the Year ended June 30th, 1948*. D. Olive: *The Queensland Railway Strike*. Communist Party of Australia, n.d. *The Queensland Railway Strike*. Queensland Railways Central Disputes Committee, February, 1949.

genuine industrial grievances. It is also indisputable that there was an underlying political motive on the part of the A.R.U. to embarrass, if not undermine, the A.W.U.-dominated Labor government. In addition, the Communist Party was convinced at this time that Australia was ripe for revolution during the period of post-war reconstruction, and part of their strategy for undermining constitutional authority was to foment continuous industrial disputes, and to extend each of them as widely as possible.

The highly organised and effective picketing, the size of the mass meetings, marches and public demonstrations which set this railway strike apart from its predecessors were more than matched by the hostility of the Hanlon Labor government. A state of emergency was declared, a total press blackout imposed, and the Industrial Law Amendment Act rushed through Parliament giving the police wide powers to arrest without warrant and to enter and search union offices and buildings. During the strike, union leaders were arrested and gaoled, and numerous incidents of bashing and brutality were recorded.

Politically, the A.R.U. achieved little at that time through the strike. It did indicate that the industrialists matched the government more evenly than at any time since 1925, and subsequently, with the fall of the Gair Labor government in 1954, and the splitting off of the Queensland Labor Party, the balance of power within the labor movement swung to the Trades Hall group, which included the A.R.U.

Industrially, some tangible gains were made by the railwaymen in conditions and marginal rates of pay, but the cause of industrial unionism

and workers' control was advanced not one iota. As well as this the union recognised that the price paid was too high. "Apart from the personal hardship suffered by so many unionists, the bitterness the strike engendered went too deep and endangered the whole labor movement."¹⁴⁸ Future tactics were to be different. While the union was not foregoing direct action, it would use "lightning" and "rolling strikes" and see to it that strike action was limited, in each instance, to several days at a time.

From the preceding account, in abstract, of the history and development of the A.R.U. possible reasons for its militancy can already be detected. In its origins the union was different from many others, in that it was conceived as a mass union, based on the industry in which it operated, and geared to represent all the workers in that industry. As such, it was rooted in a particular philosophy which saw the aspirations and needs of the workers in an industrial society capable of fulfilment only through their organisation into mass industrial unions, and the placement in their hands of the management and control of these industries. Thus, from the beginning, the union had important social as well as industrial objectives, and from 1917 to 1970 these were promulgated on behalf of the union by a tiny handful of men of which the two general secretaries, who divided the period between them, were the most influential. Another important strand in this ideology was the rejection of political action as an effective means of achieving social ends, in favour of direct industrial action. Therefore, possible causes

¹⁴⁸. Frank Nolan, General State Secretary, A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch) in an interview June 28th, 1967.

of militancy lie in the kind of union it was, and in the ideological beliefs and personalities of its leaders. The degree of success which it could have through the use of direct action would depend, to some degree, on the extent to which leadership beliefs were representative of those of the rank and file membership, or on the amount of democratic control which its members could exercise over their leaders. For this reason it will be of interest to discover along what lines the union was organised, and whether or not decision-making was a centralised process.

Other factors have already shown themselves to be of some relevance, particularly that of inter-union relationships though this may ultimately turn out to be more of a provocative element than a prime cause. Finally, it already seems clear that something special is introduced into industrial labour relations when the employer or management side is represented by a Minister of the Crown, as head of a government instrumentality. This is particularly so when a Labor government is in power. Such a singular relationship may well have a direct bearing on the development of militant attitudes within a union, and warrants a close examination at a later stage of this study.

PART III: THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY IN AUSTRALIA

The airline industry in Australia dates from 1920 only. The expansion to its present dimensions is even more recent, lying exclusively within the post Second World War period. Therefore, unlike the railway service, history will have played a much smaller role in shaping general industrial attitudes and the particular relationships which have evolved between the airline operators and their employees, the pilots. Politics, however, has been as much if not more a part of the airline industry as it has, at the State level, of the railways, and has been influential in the determination of its lines of development; these, in turn, have to some extent decided the form and substance of industrial relationships.

Until 1920 all commercial flying in Australia was completely unregulated. For reasons of safety alone, the need for control was becoming widely recognised, but constitutional difficulties seemed to prevent regulation by the Federal government, even though the requirements of defence and interstate commerce dictated the exercise of federal power in this field. However, as a signatory of the 1919 Paris Convention on Air Navigation, "Australia undertook certain obligations with respect to such matters as the issue of certificates of airworthiness, minimum qualifications for pilots and navigators, admission of the aircraft of other contracting States over its territory, and so on."¹⁴⁹ It appeared possible that on this basis, when taken together with the

¹⁴⁹. D.M. Hocking & C.P. Haddon-Cave: *Air Transport in Australia*. Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1951, p. 77.

Commonwealth's external affairs power, under Section 51, XXIX of the Federal Constitution, which included the right to enforce international treaties and conventions, that central government right to control flying throughout Australia could be sustained. Accordingly, an Air Navigation Act was passed in 1920, which, with its accompanying regulations, placed the control and direction of the industry in the hands of a Controller of Civil Aviation.¹⁵⁰

From the beginning the basis of government policies was the dual requirements of development and defence. At an early stage, it also became clear that, initially at least, much of the commercial flying in Australia would need to be subsidized to ensure future economic viability. The federal authority determined routes to be flown and entered into subsidization agreements with operators servicing remote areas. Direct subsidies took the form of payments on a mileage flown basis, while most operators received valuable monetary assistance through the granting of contracts to carry airmail. Emphasis was placed on non-competition with other forms of transport, particularly the railways, so that the first routes for which tenders were accepted in 1920-21 were those linking Geraldton and Derby, granted to Western Australian Airways Ltd., and between Charleville and Cloncurry, which

150. The Act gave the Controller the power to acquire airport sites and to construct the required facilities, but also placed him "in the strategic position of being able to dictate the routes to be flown through his power to grant or withhold subsidies. In addition, he could, and did, stipulate the nature and frequency of the services, the type and performance of the aircraft to be used and even, to some extent, the conditions of employment of pilots and mechanics." Hocking & Haddon Cave: *ibid.* p. 2.

went to Queensland and Northern Territory Aerial Services Ltd. (Qantas).¹⁵¹ Subsequently a change in emphasis occurred, with regard to air routes, reflecting changes in demand for air services. While the need for developmental and rural services remained and continued to be met,¹⁵² the greatly increased desire for fast transport between the centres of population along the eastern seaboard was matched, in the 1930's, by the growth in inter-capital city services, both government assisted and unsubsidized, in direct competition with land and sea transport.

The power of the Controller of Civil Aviation to dictate routes to be flown was also relevant to the wider field of defence planning, and it seems clear that it was used for such purposes, the establishment of a subsidized service between Perth and Adelaide in 1929 being a case in point. Of more importance was the degree to which the requirements of Empire defence and communications were instrumental in the entry of Australia into the field of international air transport.

Flowing on from policies decided at the Imperial Conference in 1926, both Australian and British governments accorded a high priority to the establishment of an airmail link between London and Australia. At this stage, (British) Imperial Airways was extending its London-Karachi route eastwards, and the Australian government acting on the advice of

151. For the story of the establishment of Qantas and its subsequent history, see Sir Hudson Eysh's trilogy: *Qantas Rising*. Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1965, *Qantas at War*. Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1968, and *Wings of the World, the Story of Qantas, 1945-1966*. Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1970.

152. Though no longer as important, relatively, as it was in the early stages of commercial flying Federal governments have continued this policy of developmental and rural subsidies. See Appendix I for amounts outlaid for these purposes in the period, 1960-1969.

an inter-departmental committee which it had set up in 1931 to investigate the matter, came to an arrangement with the British government, whereby the link, Brisbane-Singapore, was to be operated and subsidized by Australia. Qantas became the "chosen instrument"¹⁵³ of the Australian government in this enterprise, and in 1934, a new company Qantas Empire Airways Ltd. (Q.E.A.) in which Qantas and Imperial Airways Ltd. had equal shares was formed to implement the contract. The introduction, in 1938, of the Empire Flying-boat Service, primarily for the carriage of first-class mail between England and Australia at the same rate as that charged by sea transport further extended the England-Australia service, and once again Q.E.A. was chosen as its flag carrier by the Australian government. New Zealand was linked in the following year, with the creation of Tasman Empire Airways Ltd. (T.E.A.) in which the flag carriers of the three countries held the shares.

Because they are pertinent to subsequent history certain other developments in the inter-war years need to be noted. One with far-reaching implications was the constitutional question. The Federal government's power to regulate and control civil aviation throughout

153. "In the field of international aviation each airline operator needs the full backing and bargaining strength of its national government in order to secure landing rights, shares of traffic and other concessions. On the other hand, the national government, because it is concerned with prestige and defence, seeks to use its airlines as instruments of government policy. A government tends to choose one airline to be the national flag carrier abroad, and then subsidizes it to help it compete with the airlines of other nations. A chosen instrument airline, therefore, if it is privately owned, is private enterprise with a difference. It is private enterprise 'affected with a public interest'." Such was the position of Q.E.A. Cf. D. Corbett: *Politics and the Airlines*. George Allen & Unwin, London, 1965, pp. 20-21.

Australia was challenged in 1934,¹⁵⁴ and part of the Regulations made under the Air Navigation Act (1920) declared invalid by the High Court. This decision meant that Commonwealth authority over air navigation was now limited to implementation of the Paris Convention, to control of air navigation in relation to trade and commerce with other countries and among the States, and within the territory of the Commonwealth,¹⁵⁵ but did not apply to intra-state flying. An immediate appeal to the people, through a referendum, to grant to the Commonwealth government the power to make laws with respect to "air navigation and aircraft" was made and rejected, and it was only through the cooperation of all the State governments that a way around the impasse was finally found. The State governments agreed to adopt uniform State Air Navigation Acts, which, in effect, applied the Federal Air Navigation Regulations to all air operations within the States and vested the administration of these regulations in the Federal Department of Civil Aviation.¹⁵⁶ In this way, Commonwealth control over air navigation, safety, etc. was re-established, but the question of the ultimate authority of the central government over all aspects of civil aviation was not resolved and was to create impediments to the plans of a later Labor government for nationalization of the airline industry in Australia.

Heavy investment in civil aviation by shipping and road transport interests was another feature of the inter-war years. The New England

¹⁵⁴. Judgments in this case, *The King v. Burgess, ex parte Henry*, 55 C.L.P. 608, were not handed down until November, 1936.

¹⁵⁵. D. Corbett: *op.cit.* p. 23.

¹⁵⁶. *ibid.*, p. 24.

Motor Co. Ltd., a road passenger transport company, entered the air transport field in 1931, with its New England Airways Ltd., operating originally between Brisbane and Lismore, but later extended to other routes. Another such enterprise which expanded into civil aviation and was later to become an important operator in this field was Ansett Transport Industries Ltd. Shipping interests were backers of the Holyman brothers who pioneered air services from Melbourne to Tasmania in the early thirties. Their original enterprise, Tasmanian Aerial Services Ltd. was incorporated in 1936 as Australian National Airways Pty. Ltd., (A.N.A.) with five steamship companies as major shareholders.¹⁵⁷ As in the years ahead, A.N.A., and, to a lesser extent Ansett Airways, continued to expand and to absorb smaller airline operators, fears were aroused within some sections of the Australian Labor Party that the air transport industry was in danger of becoming totally controlled by a few powerful shipping and road transport interests. While, according to Corbett,¹⁵⁸ the A.L.P. was, in any case, dogmatically attached to the concept of nationalisation of industry, this concern for trends within the industry must have carried some weight in the final decision of the Federal Labor government in 1945 to create a government monopoly of air transport in Australia. However, these were to be matters of consequence for the future.

By the time war came in 1939, the air transport industry, though still in many ways in its infancy, was yet firmly enough established not only to survive but also to benefit from lessons learned under

157. D.M. Hocking & C.P. Haddon-Cave: *op.cit.*, pp. 25-26.

158. D. Corbett: *op.cit.*, Chapter 2.

wartime conditions. Inevitably, the international operations of Q.E.A. were severely curtailed, though a non-stop ocean flight from Perth to Ceylon was maintained under the most hazardous of conditions.¹⁵⁹

Internally, the number of passenger miles flown rose from 42,901,209 in 1938-39 to 142,902,187 for the period 1944-45,¹⁶⁰ much of this logged under contract to the United States military authorities (See Table VII below).

TABLE VII

GRAND TOTAL OF OPERATIONS BY COMPANIES ON BEHALF OF THE
U.S. SERVICES FOR THE PERIOD NOV. 1942 - APRIL 30, 1946¹⁶¹

<i>Company</i>	<i>Hours Flown</i>	<i>Passengers Carried</i>	<i>Freight Carried</i>	<i>Miles Flown</i>
Australian National Air- ways	65,883	97,538	(lb.) 16,530,770	10,312,171
Qantas Empire Airways	25,592	33,585	6,203,837	4,098,600
Guinea Air- ways Limited	15,509	22,307	1,577,966	2,574,508
Total All Companies	106,984	153,430	24,312,573	16,985,279

Maintenance facilities also were expanded and perfected: all of these factors added up to an invaluable gain in experience in flying for operators, pilots, and the travelling public, both military and civilian.

With the projected return to peacetime operations in 1945, the

159. Cf. Hudson Fysh: *Qantas At War. op.cit.*, Chapter 23.

160. Hocking & Haddon-Cave: *op.cit.*, p. 38.

161. Annual Report of the Department of Civil Aviation: *Report on Civil Aviation in Australia and New Guinea, 1945-46*, p. 25.

problems facing the post-war industry appeared to be serious, though not insurmountable. They included the virtual re-establishment of civil air transport,¹⁶² allocation of routes, the availability of new aircraft and the need to gain permission from the Commonwealth government to tap its dwindling dollar reserves should the purchase of aircraft of American manufacture seem desirable. Yet, in retrospect, these critical questions must have paled to insignificance alongside the crisis which suddenly confronted the industry as a result of policy decisions re civil aviation taken by the Federal government, and announced in Parliament on November 22nd, 1944. Cabinet's decision was "that a wholly government-owned statutory authority be formed to take over, operate and maintain all inter-state airlines."¹⁶³ In effect this meant that the Labor government intended to establish a public enterprise monopoly of domestic aviation.

With this purpose in view, the Australian National Airlines Bill was introduced in the House of Representatives in July, 1945 and assented to on the 16th August of that year. The Act provided

"for, inter alia, the establishment and operation by the Commonwealth and, subject to the provisions of the Air Navigation Regulations, of National Airline Services and for the setting up of the Australian National Airlines Commission,

162. By 1945, there were nine companies operating regular air transport services within Australia. They were: Australian National Airways Pty. Ltd.; Ansett Airways Ltd.; Aircrafts Pty. Ltd.; Butler Air Transport Co.; Airlines (W.A.) Ltd.; Connellan Airways; MacRobertson-Miller Aviation Co. Ltd.; Guinea Airways Ltd.; Qantas Empire Airways Ltd. Hocking & Haddon-Cave: *op.cit.*, Appendix II, p. 177. A.N.A. came out of the war in a stronger financial position than any other company.

163. C.P.D. Australia, 1944, p. 1943. The Acting Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. F. Forde.

*consisting of five Commissioners, to establish and operate such services. The Act included provision for services between any place in a State and any place in another state; between any place in any Territory of the Commonwealth and any place in Australia outside the Territory; between any place in any Territory of the Commonwealth and any other place in that Territory, and, with the approval of the Minister, between any place in Australia and any place outside Australia. It also empowered the Commission to enter into any agreement or contract with the Minister on behalf of the Commonwealth for the transport of mails by air."*¹⁶⁴

These portions of the Act did little more than provide the statutory authority for setting up Commonwealth owned air services, to operate in all areas other than that of intra-state flying, over which Commonwealth jurisdiction was void unless referral of power was made to it by a State government. The critical section was Statutory Rule, 1940, No. 25,

*"which provided, by an amendment to the Air Navigation Regulations that the Director-General of Civil Aviation [might] issue an airline licence upon such conditions, in addition to compliance with the Regulations, as he considered necessary, or he [might] refuse to issue a licence."*¹⁶⁵

The power to issue, withhold or withdraw licences was to be used to eliminate any or all established operators on any inter-state, territorial or international (if originating within Australia) route, once the Australian National Airlines Commission had established a service "adequate to meet the needs of the public for transport by air."¹⁶⁶

In the context of this thesis, the motivation for nationalization of the airline industry is of less importance than the attempt itself.

164. Annual Report of the Department of Civil Aviation: *op.cit.*, pp. 1-2.

165. *idem.*

166. Commonwealth Acts, 1945, No. 31. *Australian National Airlines Act.*

However, it must be remembered that government control of monopolistic industries was an article of faith for the A.L.P., and that between 1942-44 they had energetically pressed for the transfer from the States to the Commonwealth of fourteen powers,¹⁶⁷ including that over civil aviation, to facilitate the implementation of their plans for post-war reconstruction and economic planning. As well, the expansionist policies of Holyman on behalf of A.N.A. had not escaped the attention of the Labor leaders, whose fears that this company was planning a monopoly of post-war air services¹⁶⁸ were exacerbated by their knowledge of the strong element of British shipping interests in A.N.A.'s financial backing, and by the pressures exerted on leaders such as Chifley and Drakeford, ex-railwaymen themselves, by the railway unions and State governments.

In the event, the Federal government found its policies on civil aviation inhibited once again by the Constitution. The privately owned airlines challenged the Australian National Airlines Act and in its judgment, the High Court declared that "in Part IV of the Act subsection (1) of Section 46, so much of Section 47 (including paragraph (a)) and so much of Section 49 as refer to interstate airline services were invalid, and that Statutory Rule 1940, No. 25 also was invalid."¹⁶⁹

167. The proposal for the transfer of fourteen powers, placed before the people at a referendum on August 19th, 1944, was defeated.

168. Cf. Stanley Brogden: *Australia's Two-Airline Policy*. Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1968, p. 44. "The truth was that A.N.A. did plan a complete takeover of all domestic services except those of Qantas, and even in 1943 had quite precise plans for massive overseas services. Had these ideas developed in 1946-50 the situation would have been clearcut: a direct clash between A.N.A. and Qantas, with A.N.A. by far the greater financial concern."

169. Annual Report of the Department of Civil Aviation, 1945-46. *op.cit.*, p. 2.

In broad terms, this meant that while there was no impediment to the establishment through the Australian National Airlines Commission of a wholly government-owned airline, no moves to restrict competition could be made against the private operators, by refusal to issue licences for interstate airline services, so long as safety requirements were met.

On the other hand, control of Australia's international airline was achieved more easily in that there was no constitutional impediment. In 1946, the Australian government acquired the British government's fifty per cent shareholding in Qantas Empire Airways,¹⁷⁰ and by July 1st of the following year had bought out all private shareholders to gain complete control of the company. Again, there was strong opposition to the second part of this transaction, though it is of interest to note that Hudson Fysh, co-founder and chairman-managing director of Q.E.A. has suggested that as Q.E.A. was the "chosen instrument" of the Australian government in international aviation, a fair case could be made for the need to place its ownership in the hands of the government.¹⁷¹ The Australian government also acquired the Q.E.A. shareholding in Tasman Empire Airways Ltd., and, in 1946, became a partner with the New Zealand and British governments in a government-owned tripartite organisation, known as British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, for the purpose of

170. Originally the shares were held by (British) Imperial Airways, and were acquired by the British government through its takeover of that Company.

171. Cf. Sir Hudson Fysh: *Wings to the World: the Story of Qantas, 1945-66. op.cit.*, Chapters 5 and 6. Hudson Fysh retained his positions in Qantas under public ownership. The corporate identity of the Company continued, with members of the Board appointed by the government of the day.

operating a trans-Pacific air service. Initially the service was undertaken by A.N.A. under charter from B.C.P.A., but by 1948 B.C.P.A. was able to assume responsibility for the flights. Qantas, in turn, took over the routes in 1954 and B.C.P.A. was disbanded.

Though thwarted in the full realization of its policies with regard to internal aviation, the Federal Labor government, through its agent, the Australian National Airlines' Commission, proceeded in September, 1946, to set up an inter-state airline, Trans Australia Airlines (T.A.A.), and to engage in ruthless competition with the existing private operators. At the same time it made quite clear its policy with regard to internal air services:

*"The Australian National Airlines Commission is the chosen instrument of the Commonwealth Government to operate interstate services and services operating within or to Commonwealth territories, and Governmental assistance will not be given to others to establish or maintain such services, except to the extent that the Commission may be unable, for the time being, to provide such services."*¹⁷²

T.A.A. was given a near monopoly of Government transport work, including freight and airmail, on any routes it served, which compensated for its virtual boycott by private business interests. It recorded its first profit in 1949-50, by which time a change in government to that of a Liberal-Country Party coalition led by R.G. Menzies presaged new policy orientations on civil aviation.

Contrary to the expectations of many, the new government decided to retain T.A.A.; at the same time it had to mount a rescue operation

172. Annual Report of the Department of Civil Aviation: *Report on Civil Aviation in Australia and New Guinea, 1946-47.* p. 24.

for A.N.A. which by now was in serious financial difficulties. Governmental policy was expressed in the Civil Aviation Agreement Act 1952, which attempted to establish rationalised competition between the two major domestic operators at that time - T.A.A. and A.N.A. The agreement was between the Commonwealth and A.N.A. the Australian National Airlines Commission having refused to be a party to an arrangement which was designed to assist its competitors, though forced by the government to comply with its conditions. The Act "provided that both airlines were to have equal access to mails and governmental business, and financial assistance by way of loan guarantees was to be afforded the private operator to permit re-equipment with aircraft fully competitive with the pressurised aircraft procured by the Commission."¹⁷³ Routes, timetables, fares, etc. were also to be kept under review by the airlines.

While it brought some degree of stability to the industry, the legislation failed to achieve its goal of profitable rationalised competition, particularly with regard to A.N.A. which was losing out in a competitive battle with other interstate operators like Ansett Airways Pty. Ltd. and Butler Air Transport Ltd., private operators who were not bound by the rationalisation provisions of the Act. "Because of the limitations placed on the Commonwealth by Section 92 of the Constitution, these last named operators were free to engage in competitive interstate services, thus making unworkable any agreement

173. *Report on Civil Aviation in Australia and Papua-New Guinea, 1952-1959.* The Department of Civil Aviation, Melbourne, p. 6.

on capacity designed to improve the economics of operation by the major airlines."¹⁷⁴

The financial position of A.N.A. continued to deteriorate and the shipping group controlling the airline decided not to invest additional capital in the company without further government guarantees. At the same time, they revived an earlier plan for the establishment of a mixed private-government holding company to operate all air services in Australia; this, too, was rejected by the government.

The whole complicated situation was relieved in 1957 with the purchase of all the shares in A.N.A. by Ansett Transport Industries for the sum of £3.3 million. The operations of the two companies, A.N.A. and Ansett Airways Pty. Ltd. were subsequently integrated under the name Ansett-A.N.A.

By means of a new Civil Aviation Agreement Act 1957, A.N.A.'s rights under the earlier agreement were transferred to Ansett Transport Industries and improvements made in the rationalisation machinery, through the appointment by the Minister of a three-man Rationalisation Committee, under a Co-ordinator.¹⁷⁵ The Government's views on the desirable organisation of domestic trunk route services were also clearly stated in the Act:

*"One of the objects of the parties to this Agreement is to secure and maintain a position in which there are two, and not more than two, operators of trunk route airline services, one being the Commission, each capable of effective competition with the other..."*¹⁷⁶

174. *idem.*

175. Cf. Appendix J. on the Rationalisation Committee.

176. Annual Reports of the Department of Civil Aviation, 1952-59, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

A continuing weakness in the rationalisation scheme lay in the presence in the field of interstate flying of private operators who were not bound by the terms of the Act. This anomaly was substantially corrected when Ansett-A.N.A. gained control of Butler Air Transport Ltd. and its subsidiary, Queensland Airlines Pty. Ltd., and restricted their operations to routes that did not compete with any Ansett-A.N.A. service.

By means of further legislation enacted in the period 1958-61, the Federal government consolidated its two-airline policy, and did so in a way which seemed, to some observers, to be inhibiting the progress of its own airline, T.A.A., for the benefit of the privately owned company. The Airlines Equipment Act 1958, while providing a government guarantee of substantial amounts to be borrowed by Ansett Transport Industries for re-equipment purposes, also conferred on the Minister the power to determine the number and types of aircraft to be used by the two airlines and the capacity that should be provided by each airline over the competitive and non-competitive routes. In the Minister's view,

*"the twin aims of the legislation are to limit the importation of new aircraft to the real needs of the industry, and to increase airline profitability by limiting the capacity, each operator being permitted to provide only fifty per cent of the total capacity to be scheduled on the competitive routes."*¹⁷⁷

At the time, it seemed that the government was using its authority under the Act to prevent T.A.A. from purchasing the aircraft of its choice - the Caravelle - and to force it to order the same planes as those chosen by A.N.A. - the Electras, machines which T.A.A. considered inferior.

177. *idem.*

Certainly the Cross Charter Agreement of 1960 clearly disadvantaged T.A.A. which had to charter three of its Viscounts to A.N.A. in return for two of A.N.A.'s propellor-driven DC6B's.¹⁷⁸ The independent judgment of the Commission in matters affecting the operation of T.A.A. was further restricted in 1961 when the Australian National Airlines Act was amended to provide that the Commonwealth should receive a return on its investment in airline operations comparable (after taking into account certain cost variables prescribed in the Act) with that gained by the shareholders in the private enterprise company. Henceforth "the Commission was required to present estimates and the Minister to fix a profit target at the beginning of each financial year."¹⁷⁹

Finally, prior to the introduction of pure jet aircraft into service on internal air routes in Australia, the government enacted a new agreement with the Commission and Ansett-A.N.A. which further strengthened and delineated the two airline policy; at the same time rationalisation was introduced to the New Guinea trunk route and internal air network. The new jet fleets of the Commission and Ansett-A.N.A. had to be comparable in quality and capacity, and their introduction rigidly circumscribed, so that the operators had to agree that each would introduce its first and second jets concurrently with the other's first and second jets.

178. As Corbett: *op.cit.*, p. 133 points out, "the government was forcing their airline to pay for the technical short-sightedness of A.N.A. which had made a serious mistake six years earlier in buying DC6Bs instead of Viscounts."

179. 2nd Annual Report of the Minister for Civil Aviation, 1961-62, p. 15. Profit targets set by the Minister and met by T.A.A. were as follows: 1962-3, 6%; 1963-4, 7%; for each financial year from 1964-1969, 7½%; 1969-70, 8½%.

The government's policy of strict rationalisation of routes, freight, fares, quality and capacity of aircraft etc. creates, in their view, "an atmosphere in which planned competition on the major routes can continue with consequent benefit to the operators, to the travelling public and to the nation."¹⁸⁰ Yet much of this argument is specious. There can be little competition when most of the factors which go to create a competitive situation are rationalised and controlled by the government.

Be that as it may, arguments for and against the two-airline policy have no place here. What is of relevance is the extent, if any, to which the adoption and development of this policy, and other historical factors may have influenced industrial labour relations, as they have been determined between the operators and the pilots. More pertinently, our concern is to evaluate their effect on the militancy of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots.

Fierce competition in an industry may act as a deterrent to militancy or direct action, from fear of forcing the employer out of business; though this may be qualified if there are comparable jobs available with other companies. Extensive government control and support of an industry, however, gives it the flavour of a protected activity. In these circumstances, it may well be that the pilots will feel it appropriate that they should share in the benefits accruing to the companies from the degree of protection they enjoy. This may increase a tendency to militancy, particularly if management is slow to recognise

^{180.} *ibid.*, p. 14.

and respond to pilots' demands.

These suggestions can only be advanced speculatively and it is more likely that the evident increase in militancy on the part of the Federation in recent years is due to factors of a non-historical nature. In all probability, history and the development of the two-airline policy have had a more marked effect on the organisation of the industry, and it is to this area that one must extend the search for the causes of militancy within the Federation.

PART IV: THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION OF AIR PILOTS

The history of the pilots' association is even more recent than that of the industry as a whole. The immediate post-war expansion of commercial flying in Australia was based in part on the availability of wartime pilots, many of whom, for a variety of reasons, wished to continue flying in civilian life. Their absorption into the airline transport industry was facilitated by the Department of Civil Aviation, which for a period of two years after the war's end, licensed, without test, service pilots wishing to enter commercial flying.¹⁸¹ The establishment of T.A.A. in 1946 provided further opportunities for wartime flight crews within the airline industry.

For the first few years, both management and employees were preoccupied with the problems associated with the transfer from wartime to domestic operations. For the pilots, this meant relating to civilian life and work, and for those employed by T.A.A. the need for complete identification with a new organisation on whose success or failure to survive their own livelihoods depended. Pilot morale in this period was high and employer-employee relationships were, on the whole, good,

181. Exemption from normal flying tests for the issue of a civil pilot's licence was given in all instances to R.A.A.F., R.A.F. or equivalent service personnel where:-

(a) The applicant for an "A" licence had satisfactorily completed an E.F.T.S. course of flying training;

(b) The applicant for a "B" licence had satisfactorily completed a full course of flying training (S.F.T.S.) and had graduated and received the flying badge.

Under these exemptions the Department issued 112 "A" licences and 664 "B" licences in the 12 months ended 30/6/1946. *Report on Civil Aviation in Australia and New Guinea, 1945-46*. The Department of Civil Aviation, Melbourne, p. 40.

mainly as a result of the transfer to civil occupations of the serving officer's training to obey orders.

By 1947, in many respects, the honeymoon was over. In that year, the Australian Air Pilots' Association was formed, and pilot attitudes towards the operators hardened. The Association was registered under the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Acts, and in 1954 approached the Court to establish a work value for pilots. Though there was some improvement in salaries as a result of this move the principle of a work value was not accepted by the Industrial Court. Thereafter a series of skirmishes with the operators followed, and a number of incidents, including the occasional day stoppage culminated in the imposition of a £3,000 fine by the Industrial Court as a penalty on the Association.

Feelings within the Association that they were making no progress with regard to their claims crystallized into a decision to withdraw from the arbitration system. A ballot of members was taken, resulting in the payment of the fines, but also in the withdrawal of the membership from the Australian Air Pilots' Association, leaving it without office bearers, funds or rank and file membership.¹⁸²

Having departed from their original association and from the arbitration system, the pilots formed themselves into a non-corporate organisation - the Australian Federation of Air Pilots - in 1959, and

¹⁸². The Australian Air Pilots' Association remained as a registered union though it was only a shell. In 1971 the Federation's solicitors were informed by the Commonwealth Industrial Registrar that the Association had finally been de-registered.

industrial matters were taken up with the operators on an ad hoc collective bargaining basis. With the assistance of Sir Henry Bland, at that time permanent Head of the Department of Labour and National Service, a voluntary agreement on procedures was reached between the Federation and the operators in 1965. This "Industrial Relationships Procedures-Airline Pilots" Agreement provided a framework for the conduct of industrial relations and included provisions for a cooling off period before a strike could be called.

The major concern of the pilots at this time was the question of salaries. These had been fixed initially in 1946 "under circumstances in which a large supply of demobilised airforce pilots, unorganised for industrial purposes, came into the labour market."¹⁸³ It was the Federation's view that since that time, "using DC3 Captain as a constant yardstick, pilots in this country have received only minimum national wage adjustments. They had received no salary recognition for the increased demands and responsibilities created by the vastly increased complexity and density of air traffic movements and the more critical operation of modern aircraft today."¹⁸⁴

Consequently, the basis of their demands was the desire "to achieve salaries which will give to the Australian pilot a position, relative to other salary and professional groups in this country, commensurate with

183. "Such a starting point, in a comparison with other sections of the community, would, if anything, understate the case for an adjustment of pilot salaries." *Report of the Inquiry into the Dispute between the Australian Federation of Air Pilots and Domestic Airline Companies* (the Isaac Report), June, 1966, p. 28.

184. *The President's Address to Extra-Ordinary General Meetings of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots*, July 11th, 1966, p.3.

that of pilots in other countries."¹⁸⁵ and hence-forward the Federation made it abundantly clear that by both threat and deed they were prepared to support their claims with direct action in the form of work stoppages.

As a way around the impasse over salaries the operators suggested that both management and pilots investigate the American and Canadian systems with a view to introducing those aspects which appeared relevant to Australian conditions. At about the same time, under the "Industrial Relationships Procedures Airline Pilots Agreement", Professor J.E. Isaac began an Inquiry into some of the matters in dispute between the parties with particular reference to the salaries question. The Federation's case was based on four factors: community standards, work value, productivity and overseas comparisons.¹⁸⁶ In his report¹⁸⁷ Professor Isaac conceded productivity and expressed the opinion that pilot salaries were at least 15% behind community standards.

Under the threat of a strike, agreement was finally reached in July 1966 in the contract negotiations between the domestic operators and the Federation, and the North American bidding system became the basis for the computation of salaries and pilot flight hours and routes. This scheme replaced the rostering of pilots by the companies with a bidding system whereby the pilots had the right,

"in order of seniority, to secure monthly flying blocks of varying degrees of financial and work-time advantage. In effect, a large proportion of pilots would in this way establish their own rosters one month in advance."

185. *idem.*

186. Report from the President, R.T. Holt to all members of the Federation, June 20th, 1966.

187. Isaac Report. *op.cit.*

*The advantage of the resulting stability and greater certainty of work pattern could be expected to remove much of the pressure for reduced hours of work to overcome the disabilities of the roster system. The [previous] system of standardised work loads devised through a complicated and unstable roster system would be supplanted by a system which would guarantee a minimum salary related to a monthly number of hours (ultimately agreed to by the parties to be 65 hours for blockholders) for which a pilot would be on call for flying duty. Pilots would be able to bid for extra hours of flying in particular flying blocks and open flying in return for extra pay in accordance with their seniority rights, the limit to these extra hours being set by the parties. As a result of negotiation, the parties agreed on the Canadian limit of 85 credited hours of monthly flying."*¹⁸⁸

The Federation's pleasure at the results they had achieved through militancy is reflected in Table VIII and in their assessment that "the 1968 maximum achievable salary agreed for the B727 Captain in the National scene is 892% of the maximum achievable rate for the top Captain in 1946 while the movement in community salary from 1946 to 1967 is estimated at 335%?"¹⁸⁹

The successful conclusion of negotiations with the domestic operators, and the acceptance by them of the community standards principle as a yardstick for pilots' salaries was followed almost immediately by a much more serious dispute between Qantas and the overseas pilots' branch of the Federation. Ostensibly the questions at issue were those of safety: the need for three man crews on short range

188. *idem.*

189. President's Report to the 1967 Convention of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots, Sydney, September 11th, 1967, p. 10.

TABLE VIII

Year	DOMESTIC AIRLINES		OVERSEAS AIRLINE		
	Senior Capt.	Senior F/O	Senior Capt.	Senior F/O	Senior S/O
	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$
1946	1,800	1,100	2,650	1,450	-
1946	2,516	1,600			
1947	3,000	1,900	3,700	2,200	1,200
1950	3,540	2,290	4,240	2,540	1,400
1950	3,700	2,450			
1951	3,856	2,606			
1952	4,012	2,762			
1953	4,048	2,798	4,728	3,028	1,888
1955	4,750	3,000	5,760	3,576	2,142
1956	5,652	3,672	6,912	4,398	2,374
1957	5,704	3,724	6,964	4,450	2,426
1958	6,130	4,000	7,716	4,928	2,542
1959	6,208	4,078	9,312	5,984	3,198
1961	7,812	5,022			
1962			10,750	6,922	5,312
1963	8,442	5,374			
1964			11,778	7,568	5,798
1966	9,672	5,662			
1966	12,501	7,864	14,412	9,277	6,968
1966	14,708	9,078	15,250	10,000	7,400
1967	15,297	9,442			
1968	16,061	9,914			

Source: The President's Report to the 1967 Convention of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots, Sydney, September 11th, 1967, p. 10.

707 operations¹⁹⁰ and refusal to continue night landings at Djakarta.¹⁹¹ The covert and real issues were salaries and the continuing unhappy relationship between the Qantas management - and in particular, the general manager, Captain C.O. Turner - and its pilots. After a secret ballot of Qantas pilots expressed approval, the Federation called a work stoppage of the overseas group in support of their claims. The strike lasted 35 days, cost the company an estimated \$8 million loss, and an operating deficit of \$1.51 million, the first in its history.¹⁹² It gained for the pilots most of what they had asked in salaries and the introduction of a bidding system based on a Pan-American style contract which was more suitable for overseas operations. The issue of three man crews for 707's was not resolved; to this day these aircraft are

190. Much literature on this matter was circulated to its members by the Federation. Included was: *A Summation of the Case for Three Crew on the DC9/30 in Australia*. Australian Federation of Air Pilots, November 24th, 1967, and a brochure explaining "the Federation's reasons for insisting on a complete and thorough crew complement evaluation of the DC9/30 series aircraft during its initial entry to the Australian scheme." Sydney, May 10th, 1967.

191. The International Federation of Airline Pilots' Association in conference in March, 1966 had recommended a ban on night landings at Djakarta because of its lack of landing facilities. The recommendation was moved by the Australian delegates. The Federation argued that DCA used double standards by prohibiting B-727s from landing at Hobart and at 20 other Australian airports which do not have instrument landing systems or visual glide slopes, while approving Djakarta landings for the bigger B-707s. They had to admit that other airports, such as Cairo and Manila, were also not up to standard, though miles ahead of Djakarta where, for example, theft of landing lights was a common occurrence.

192. Estimated loss of revenue was \$13 million, against which cost savings of less than \$5 million were achieved. *Seventh Annual Report of the Minister for Civil Aviation, 1966-67*. p. 12.

being flown by two men crews, as they have been from the beginning by all world airlines operating them.¹⁹³ However, with the retirement from Qantas of Captain Turner soon after the strike ended, it was hoped that the way was now clear for the future development of a better relationship between Qantas management and its pilots.

In the aftermath of this latest burst of militancy by the pilots, the Federal government acted to amend the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904-1966, in relation to industrial matters affecting Flight Crew Officers.¹⁹⁴ In future, industrial disputes affecting flight crew were to be handled by a special tribunal - the Flight Crew Officers' Industrial Tribunal - constituted by a person appointed by the Governor-General for 5 years, with re-appointment rights. In a departure from usual practice in the conciliation and arbitration field, the government, after consultation with the Federation, appointed an academic, Professor J.E. Isaac, as the Tribunal.¹⁹⁵ The Federation took the view that this legislation, while being in accordance with the government's own inclinations, had been urged upon it by the companies, as "the

193. Although shortly afterwards, pilots employed by American Airlines won a long fight on the three crew issue on the B737, an identical aircraft to the 707 (though built by Boeing).

194. The Conciliation and Arbitration Act, No. 101 of 1967, assented to November 10th, 1967.

195. "Whoever is appointed as the Tribunal must become really knowledgeable in the industry background, its technology and operational problems. These problems involve many disciplines. The right man may be found in Industry, Commerce, the Professions or the Academic field. He may not necessarily be a lawyer." L. Bury (Wentworth-Minister for Labour and National Service) introducing 2nd reading of the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill 1967. C.P.D. Australia, Vol. H. of R. 57, 1967, p. 2064.

airline operators made no secret at any time of their ultimate intention to persuade the government to provide for statutory means of controlling the Industrial Relationships together with the ability to enforce, through penalties, a decision made at Arbitration."¹⁹⁶

There are many unique aspects about arbitration in this field.¹⁹⁷ Some arise from the nature of the profession itself and the skills required; others from the fact that matters of safety and government policy are involved. There are, as yet, few precedents and it was apparent in the three years in which he acted as Tribunal that Professor Isaac's decisions were being tested at every opportunity by all parties.

In the same period the pilots' association has not been totally quiescent either. The dispute over the crewing of DC9's dragged on, superannuation became an issue and stoppages were called or threatened though much of this appeared more "sabre-rattling" than serious, in view of the substantial gains made by the pilots in 1966-1967. However, the mass dismissals of pilots foreshadowed by Qantas management for November, 1971, could provoke serious direct industrial action by the Federation.

Recent changes in the composition of the Tribunal, occasioned by the resignation of Professor Isaac, could also affect industrial

196. B.I. Crofts, Executive Vice-President, A.F.A.P.: *Comments on the Second Reading Speech by the Minister for Labour and National Service (Hon. L.H.E. Bury) - October 19th, 1967.*

197. "I don't think anyone would dispute that flight crew and their conditions of employment differ appreciably from just about all, if not all, other classes of employees ordinarily dealt with by the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission." L. Bury: C.P.D. *op.cit.*, p. 2064.

relations in the airline industry in the long term. On February 18th, 1971 the government appointed Peter Abernethy Coldham Q.C., a practising barrister from Victoria, as the new Flight Crew Officers' Industrial Tribunal.¹⁹⁸ The Federation was not consulted on this appointment. At the same time he was also appointed a Deputy President of the Commonwealth Industrial Commission. Coldham's appointment was thus a dual one, but in formal terms matters affecting pilots are still to be handled outside the regular arbitration machinery. This may become more de jure than de facto, and certainly Mr. Justice Coldham's approach to the industrial problems of the airline industry will be much more legalistic than the somewhat free-wheeling methods of his predecessor. This gradual but steady pressure back to the arbitration system may provoke some future reaction on the part of the pilots.

Tiny cracks in the united front of the pilot body have appeared over some of the Federation's policies. The national press for March, 1968 carried numerous reports of dissension within the Federation over its stand on three man crewing of DC9's.¹⁹⁹ Of greater interest was the formation by a group of Sydney based pilots, led by Captain I.A. Cameron, Ansett/A.N.A., of a breakaway union - the Air Pilots' Guild of Australia - and the acceptance of its application, in February, 1969, by the Industrial Registrar, for registration under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act. At this stage, the Guild had

198. *The Age*. January 6th, 1971.

199. Cf. *The Australian*. 7/3/68, "Pilots forced a special meeting of the Federation in Melbourne, attended by most pilots who have flown DC9's. The meeting called on the A.F.A.P. to withdraw its three-man policy." *The Australian*, 16/3/68.

between 100 and 200 members, mostly drawn from the smaller companies and from general aviation. While personalities played their part in providing a reason for the break with the Federation, there was also a genuine belief that some Federation policies and actions had been detrimental to the interests of pilots generally.²⁰⁰

The Guild claims that although the A.F.A.P. is not a registered organisation,

*"it is liable to all the penalties and strictures of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, but enjoys none of the benefits nor considerable protection which the Act bestows on registered organisations and their members. Federation members cannot call for Court controlled ballots. They cannot demand disclosure of the financial affairs of their Union. They cannot appeal against oppressive rulings..."*²⁰¹

There is some measure of truth in this statement, and, as previously stated, Mr. Justice Coldham's appointment as Tribunal may well open the way to the further development of a situation whereby the Federation finds itself bound more and more by the strictures of the arbitration system without legally being a part of it.

The Guild's major criticisms are reserved for the introduction of the North American bidding system,²⁰² a scheme which it feels stands to benefit only a small, select group of senior pilots. It goes so far as to claim that the system had had a detrimental effect on the future

200. Much of this assessment of the Guild is based on interviews with Captain I.A. Cameron in December, 1970 and with Captain R.T. Holt, February, 1971.

201. Roneod publication of the Air Pilots' Guild of Australia, Sydney, March 30th, 1969, p. 2.

202. See *supra*, pp. 121-122.

security and promotional opportunities of pilots.

*"In Ansett Transport Industries alone, many pilots have been demoted and at least twenty more have been dismissed. This happened in spite of the fact that Ansett Airlines has lost another sixteen due to death or resignation over the last two years. In T.A.A. promotions virtually ceased following introduction of the bidding system in November, 1966. Twenty-three T.A.A. pilots were promoted to Captains in 1965, eleven in 1966, but none in 1967 or 1968."*²⁰³

Finally, the Guild claims, and with some justice, that the Federation, until very recently has done little to improve the salaries and conditions of its members in general aviation.

Like many breakaway movements, the Guild and its officers are severely hampered by lack of time to organise, of finance and publicity, and already they are facing difficulties in maintaining membership at recent levels. At this stage it is doubtful whether the Guild has a future as a viable organisation. Certainly, were it to flourish, the conduct of industrial labour relations in the airline industry in Australia would be drastically altered.

Several factors stemming directly from the history and development of the airline industry, and of the relationship between management and pilots could be influential in the creation of militant attitudes within the pilot body. Recruitment of large numbers of wartime pilots to the industry in 1945-47 means that over the next ten years (1970-80) substantial numbers of senior pilots will leave the companies on retirement.²⁰⁴ As far as can be ascertained, little or no effort has

203. Air Pilots' Guild of Australia: *op.cit.*, p. 1.

204. Cf. Appendix K, Licensing of Flight Crew, p. 349. Also *Sixth Annual Report of the Minister for Civil Aviation, 1965-66*, p. 607 for discussion of pilot shortages. *The Bulletin*, May 22nd, 1971, p. 23.

ever been made by the industry to rationalize the intake of new pilots as against expected retirements, so that availability of trained staff fluctuates between glut and deficiency.

Some degree of regulation of pilot intake was achieved by Qantas through the introduction of its Cadet Pilot training scheme. Since its inception in 1964, this scheme has provided the company with an average annual intake of 50 cadet pilots. The remainder of the industry has had to rely on potential staff achieving commercial licence standard on their own initiative and at their own expense, a costly matter even with the assistance of a Commonwealth Flying Scholarship.²⁰⁵

In the mid-1960's, an acute pilot shortage was felt, in what was then a rapidly expanding industry,²⁰⁶ and it was in this situation that the Federation successfully pressed its claims by direct action. By 1971, a severe recession had overtaken the world aviation industry, and it was to offset some of the worst effects of this that Qantas envisaged mass pilot dismissals for later in the year, and cancelled its Cadet Pilot Training scheme. In this situation of over supply there is already

205. It is estimated that the cost in 1971 would be between 4,000-4,500 dollars. For many years the Department of Civil Aviation has subsidised Aero Clubs, originally to provide pilots for the defence forces, but more recently, for those in the industry. In the early 1960's, the Commonwealth Flying Scholarship scheme was introduced, whereby financial assistance was given to a limited number of candidates for flying training.

206. One of the main reasons for this shortage was the Vietnam War. Before the war, the United States Air Force was a constant source of pilot supply for the commercial airlines. New pilots were remaining in the services and many more young pilot recruits were going to the Air Force rather than to commercial aviation. The effect was felt throughout the world as American airlines sought pilots from other countries. Canadian Pacific Airlines which had been losing pilots to the United States, advertised for Australian pilots in July, 1966, offering salaries for senior captains of up to \$Can. 30,000 a year.

evidence that the Federation, while talking strike action, is seeking other, more peaceful ways to a solution, such as forming its own charter company to employ the dismissed pilots. While the domestic airline industry in Australia has not felt the cold winds as yet, there is considerable pilot unemployment, much of it caused by continuing drought and a weakening of the mineral boom. It is anticipated however, that an upward swing towards acute shortage will reach its peak by 1976 with the retirement of many wartime pilots. Under these sorts of circumstances, then, the *degree* of militancy exhibited by the pilots can be correlated to the cyclical fluctuations in supply and demand of pilots.

The system of licensing, adopted from the beginning by the Department of Civil Aviation, has brought into industrial relations what is, for the pilots, the most important of all issues, that of seniority. Pilots have to demonstrate twice a year, in the air and in simulators, that they have achieved or are maintaining a rigid standard of proficiency. At the same time they have to pass rigorous medical examinations. Once their licences have been granted or renewed, it has to be assumed that they are all of equal ability and competence, with the result that, in the present scheme of things, there are no means available of recognising merit other than through seniority. Hence seniority becomes the over-riding consideration of the Captain as he proceeds up the aircraft type ladder, and the basis for "a form of civil war which will never be completely controllable."²⁰⁷ While

207. President's Report to the 1967 Convention of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots, *op.cit.*, p. 6.

this issue poses questions for the Federation itself, of possible conflict situations within its own organisation between the senior pilots' group and others, it means that in their relations with management, the pilots will adopt an inflexible and militant attitude to any threat, real or implied, to their seniority arrangements.²⁰⁸

Other factors such as personalities, conditions of work, organisation and the pilot's place in the wider community etc., play their part in the formation of militant attitudes within the pilots' organisation, and these will be dealt with subsequently. The two-airline policy, which has created a whole industry supported directly or indirectly by government finance, and a situation where true competition has been replaced by stability and rigidity, has probably given the pilots greater opportunity for militancy than would otherwise be the case.

Finally, it must be said that the development of management-union relationships has been based to a large extent on their mutual recognition of the unique position held in industry generally, and in the airline industry in particular, by the pilot group. This is one of the most vulnerable of all industries to work stoppages. Pilot salaries cover only a small percentage of gross overhead costs,²⁰⁹ so that it becomes imperative for the companies to keep their aircraft

208. "If money is the blood of this contract, then seniority is surely its heart." The President's Address to Extraordinary General Meeting on July 11th, 1966. *op.cit.*, p. 7.

209. "Direct crew costs of pilots is absurdly low at 4.9% of gross revenue, although it can be argued that other indirect costs of 3.2% should be added." R.T. Holt, President, A.F.A.P.: *Contract Negotiations: A.T.I.-T.A.A.*, July 1st, 1966, p. 2.

flying and with as high a capacity load as possible, if they are to operate profitably. Yet the responsibility for taking the aircraft off the ground is the pilot's alone, and he can refuse to do so for a variety of reasons of which safety is probably the most important. Nor can he be replaced except by another fully qualified and licensed pilot.

At the same time, the mystique and glamour attached to flying and to those who fly is a tangible asset for the pilots. Jet travel has accentuated this and it is a factor on which the operators attempt to capitalize in their advertising.²¹⁰ These community attitudes have tended to support the pilot in his own convictions of his worth. Pilots are essential, and, in the short term, irreplaceable, and this very uniqueness of their position gives them a greater degree of control over the style and content of their relationships with their employers than most workers could hope to enjoy.

In short, it is suggested that militancy is no more than a tactical weapon for the pilots; it is not a matter of conviction. Consequently direct action within the airline industry may stem from causes different from those which inspire such action in other industries.

210. Note recent advertisements placed by State Railway Departments to recruit staff, which bear a similar stamp.

CHAPTER 3

UNION AND MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS AND THEIR INTERNAL PROCEDURES FOR DECISION MAKING¹

PART I: THE RAILWAY DEPARTMENT AND THE A.R.U.

One of the first tasks of the Queensland government when it authorized the commencement of railway construction in 1863 was to set up an administrative and political organisation to run the railway service. Until 1875, political control of and responsibility for railway policy were vested in successive Ministers for Works, a dozen of whom held the office over this period. A further seven Ministers for Lands and Works, or Works and Mines were responsible for railways until 1888. At that time, the implementation of the Railway Act of 1888 considerably altered the whole concept and application of railway administration and control, and as part of this administrative reorganisation, a new and separate portfolio, Secretary for Railways, was created. This system continued until the present portfolio of Minister for Transport was established by the Moore Country-National-Progressive Ministry on January 28th, 1932.²

The enabling legislation³ created, under the Minister, a Department of Transport, comprising the Railway Department, the Department of the

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1. J.T. Dunlop: *op.cit.*, pp. 386-7.
 2. For comparison with another State system, see N. McCusker: "Administration of the New South Wales Government Railways", *Public Administration*, Sydney, Vol. XVII, No. 3, Sept., 1958, and A.A. Shoebridge: "Administrative Organisation and Functions of the Department of Government Transport, New South Wales", *ibid.*
 3. 22 George V, No. 48. "The State Transport Coordination Act of 1931".

Commissioner of Main Roads, and "any other Department or sub-Department which may from time to time be transferred to the Department of Transport by the Governor-in-Council."⁴

The continued political importance of the railways was attested to by the Cabinet seniority which, for many years, was accorded to its Ministerial head.⁵ This is not surprising, in view of the developmental theme which has been a continuous thread running through the policies and public pronouncements of every Queensland government since 1860, regardless of party. Assuredly, in a State so dependent on the primary producer for its revenue and prosperity, railway policy has been important. Even now, when mining and the limited industrialization based upon it provide a greater proportion of State revenue than formerly, and when alternative means of transport for both passengers and freight are available in most parts of the State, the question of railway freight rates can be a politically sensitive matter.

Having provided a political head for the newly created railway service, the government of the day also set about supplying it with

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4. *ibid.*, Part II, Sec. 4 (2). Important features of the 1931 Act and subsequent legislation which related to the coordination of transport are discussed in Chapter 6.
 5. A.A. Morrison: "The Government of Queensland", ed. S.R. Davis: *The Government of the Australian States*. Longmans, Melbourne, 1960, p. 315. Colin A. Hughes & B.D. Graham: *A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, 1890-1964*. A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1968. Cabinet Lists, pp. 166-184.

the necessary administrative tools. Abram Fitzgibbon,⁶ whose ardent advocacy of the narrow gauge had been instrumental in its acceptance for the Queensland system over serious objections and organised opposition, was appointed Chief Engineer in both civil and mechanical capacities, on September 23rd, 1863.⁷ The appointment was on a contract basis, for surveys, specifications and supervision, at a total rate of £400 per mile.⁸ The Railway Act had made provision for the office of Commissioner for Railways, and on December 23rd, 1863, Fitzgibbon received this appointment also. The Gilbertian situation was thus created of a Chief Engineer responsible to himself, as Commissioner, for the proper construction and maintenance of the railways.⁹

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6. For biographical details, cf. J.W. Knowles: "Centenary of the Ipswich-Grandchester Railway", *The Australian Railway Historical Society Bulletin*, Vol. XVI (New series), Bulletin No. 333, July, 1965; George Bond: "The Genesis of the Queensland Railway", *Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland*, Vol. VII, No. 3, 1964-65, pp. 521-539; A.E. Cole: "Early History of the Queensland Railways", *Journal of the Historical Society of Queensland*, Vol. III, No. 4, 1945, pp. 284-311; "Queensland Railways - First Half-Century, 1864-1914", *op.cit.*, *The Queensland Year Book*, Government Printer, Brisbane, 1901, pp. 346-366.
 7. Cf. *supra*, pp. 39-40.
 8. The Ipswich-Toowoomba railway, built to the survey prepared by Fitzgibbon, dated December 29th, 1863, was formally opened on April 12th, 1867, six months before Fitzgibbon retired as Chief Engineer. It was 61 miles long, and, at the contract rate, Fitzgibbon should have received the, for those days, princely sum of £24,400 over the four-year period in which he was Chief Engineer.
 9. *Q.P.D.* First Series, Vol. 1, 1864. Legislative Assembly, May 17th, 1864, p. 69. R.R. Mackenzie (Burnett): "Nothing could be more absurd than the arrangement made with the Engineer-in-Chief. It was absurd for one man to hold at the same time the offices of Engineer-in-Chief, Commissioner of Railways and Railway Contractor. The Commissioner of Railways in the other colonies was an officer appointed to look after the railways and the Engineer-in-Chief as well. He received a high salary and his duty was to see that the lines were properly surveyed."

It was almost a year before the government moved to correct this absurdity of its own making; however, in September, 1864, it announced that, because much of the railway construction work was closely tied up with land acquisition, it was logical to adopt the N.S.W. system of making the Under-Secretary of Lands and Works, the Commissioner for Railways also.¹⁰ Fitzgibbon while remaining within the service as Chief Engineer until October 1867, was deprived of one of his two hats, which passed to Arthur Herbert, the Under-Secretary of the period.

Except for a few months in 1868 when the office of Commissioner was abolished and the appointment vested in the Ministerial head of the Department, the practice of placing the conduct of the railway system in the hands of the Under-Secretary of Lands and Works, as Commissioner, continued until 1889. The Railway Act of 1888,¹¹ modelled on similar Acts in Victoria (1883/4), South Australia (1887) and New South Wales (early 1888), placed the management of the service in the hands of three Commissioners of whom one was to be designated Chief Commissioner and receive double the salary of each of his colleagues.¹² As stated in the Act, it was to be "the duty of the

10. *Q.P.D.*, First series, Vol. 1, 1864, p. 348. Legislative Council, Railway Act Amendment Bill, September 6th, 1864. The Hon. J. Bramston: "It had been found inconvenient that the duties of Engineer-in-Chief and Commissioner of Railways should be performed by the same person; it was, therefore, sought by the Bill to appoint a gentleman to the latter office who would be altogether independent of any of the Engineers-in-Chief. The duties were not likely to be very onerous, and could be easily performed."

11. Cf. *supra*, p. 134.

12. £3,000 for the Chief Commissioner, £1,500 for each of the other Commissioners. *The Railways Act of 1888*. Part II, sec. 10.

Commissioners to maintain the railways and all works in connection therein in a state of efficiency, and to work the same in such manner as will best conduce to the general public benefit."¹³

The Act had a two-fold purpose. It was expected that, by means of this new organisational arrangement "the railways for the future shall be managed more for the public interest, and probably more economically than they are at the present moment."¹⁴ At this time, there were 1870 miles of line open for traffic, in three, as yet unconnected systems (southern-south western, central and northern); further construction was envisaged, and a better system of administrative control than had sufficed in the past was deemed necessary.¹⁵

However, like its sister Acts in other States,¹⁶ the primary concern of the Queensland legislation was the elimination of political

13. *ibid.*, Part II, Sec. 23(1).

14. *Q.P.D.* Vol. LV, 1888, p. 127. It should be noted, however, that in the lengthy debates on the Railway Bill, members stressed the importance of the railways as a developmental tool and the Minister for Railways categorically denied that there would be any attempt under the new Commissioners to manage the railways on "commercial principles". Cf. The Minister for Railways (Hon. H.M. Nelson): *idem*.

15. One of the peculiar features of railway management in this period was the habit of incoming ministries to mistrust the railway engineers appointed by the outgoing governments. Invariably changes were made, and much work previously finished was redone. This applied particularly to railway surveys, e.g., a survey for the line from Dalby to Roma was done for the *third* time in 1874. Cf. Queensland Railways - First Half-Century, *op.cit.*, p. 64.

16. R.L. Wettenhall: *Railway Management and Politics in Victoria, 1856-1906. Report of a Case Study in the Origins of the Public Corporation.* Royal Institute of Public Administration, A.C.T. Group, Canberra, May, 1961.

patronage. This problem was not unique to Queensland¹⁷ nor to the railway services,¹⁸ though the latter were for obvious reasons, and, with the exception of the police forces, the most exploitable of all governmental activity at that time. Virtually all speakers in the debates on the Railway Bill attested to the continual pressure brought to bear upon them by candidates for employment in the railways; pressure which they, in their turn, applied to the Minister.¹⁹

The government's purpose, then, was to place the Commissioners in as independent a position as was possible. As stated by the Minister for Railways, "we want to have three commissioners who will manage our railways, and who will be altogether outside and independent of party and political influences - to be entirely beyond and have no interest whatever in party manoeuvres or party politics of any kind whatsoever."²⁰ Accordingly the Commissioners were given authority over employment and dismissal. In anticipation of subsequent public service reforms, and to exclude any possibility that patronage would merely shift from the Minister to the Commissioners,²¹ the Act laid down certain criteria for

17. K.W. Knight: *The Development of the Public Service of New South Wales from Responsible Government (1856) to the Establishment of the Public Service Board (1895)*. Unpub. M.Econ.thesis, Univ. of Sydney, 1955, pp. 64-67.

18. K.W. Knight: "Patronage and the New South Wales Public Service: The 1894 Royal Commission", *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. VII, No. 2, November, 1961, pp. 166-185.

19. *Q.P.D.*, Vol. LIV, 1888. Legislative Council, pp. 84-91, 97-101, 105-109. *Q.P.D.*, Vol. LV, 1888. Legislative Assembly, pp. 126-147, 221-237, 249-253, 568-590, 610-618, 677-716, 731, 983, 1014-1019.

20. Hon. H.M. Nelson: *Q.P.D.*, Vol. LV, *ibid.* p. 127.

21. Though section 53 of the Act did provide a legal loophole.

appointment including entry into the service through the lowest grade in each branch, and consequent upon the satisfactory completion of a qualifying examination.

It is clear from debate and public discussion at the time that it was not the intention of the government to abdicate the realm of railway policy making in favour of the Commissioners. This was to remain firmly under ministerial control. It was also fairly obvious however that the legislators on both sides of the House were themselves unsure as to where to draw the line between management and policy making. In the event, neither they nor the Act itself pointed a distinction between political and managerial control, nor attempted a definition of policy matters as against administrative ones. Whilst, on the one hand, the Act designated the three Commissioners as a corporation sole, it also placed them under the Railways Department headed by a new ministerial creation, the Secretary for Railways, complete with under secretary and staff.²²

In commenting on the Victorian legislation which was taken as a model by Queensland, Wettenhall states that

"the continued existence of a political office concerned especially with railway affairs, despite the drastic reduction in its statutory powers, brought about a situation hardly reconcilable with the constitutional concept of ministerial responsibility, and resulted inevitably in some overlapping of authority and some encroachment on the Commissioner's powers. This position no doubt also ... encouraged other members of Parliament to continue to regard the railways as

22. *Q.P.D. op.cit.*, p. 225. Note that "The Civil Service Act of 1889" excluded the Railway Department from the Public Service and this exclusion has been continued by subsequent Acts.

*a legitimate field for playing the game of politics."*²³

These criticisms are equally valid for Queensland. Certainly the appointment of one, three or a round dozen Railway Commissioners was not likely to completely insulate railway management from political pressures.²⁴ Indeed, one would be naïve to assume, as is so often done, that any aspect of governmental activity can be insulated from politics simply by the creation of a statutory body. Ministerial intrusion into matters of employment and dismissal was not unknown after 1889. The failure to clearly define areas of authority in policy making, or perhaps, the impossibility of so doing, has also meant the encroachment, at different periods, of either Commissioner or Minister on each other's preserves.

While one might expect in State politics the stereotype "weak Minister - strong permanent head" relationship, this is too facile a description of the situation, at least for railway administration from 1889 to 1950. Personalities and ability in any given administration cannot be discounted, while the long periods in office of some Commissioners²⁵ would add weight to their side of the Ministerial-public servant balance. On the other hand Morrison has pointed

23. R.L. Wettenhall: *op.cit.*, p. 27. Cf. E.P. Rogan: "Government Department or Statutory Authority?", *Public Administration*, Sydney, Vol. XVII, No. 4, December 1968, pp. 328-341.

24. The continued and heavy use of Select Committees and Royal Commissions on Railway matters after 1889 supports the contention that the Railways Act of 1888 was unsuccessful in divorcing politics from the railways. Cf. Appendixes C and D.

25. E.g.:— J.F. Thallon (1/11/1902-11/4/11), C.B. Evans (1/6/11-13/10/18), J.W. Davidson (1/11/18-28/2/38), P.R.T. Wills (1/3/41-28/2/48), G.V. Moriarty (1/9/52-31/8/62), A.G. Lee (1/9/62-

out²⁶ that under Labor rule in Queensland, heavy emphasis was placed upon the administrative responsibilities of Ministers, and that each was expected to be closely attentive to every aspect of his department's activities. Support for this statement comes from trade union leaders who gained the understanding over years of negotiating with railway department management, that industrial relations matters and policy came under ministerial direction rather than Commissioner control.²⁷ In addition, the majority of Queensland Premiers since 1915 have been men of strong personality and leadership and on those occasions when union-management relations within the railway service deteriorated to the point of strike action, it was the character of the Premier and the role he chose to play in the situation, rather than that of the Minister for Railways, which was vital to the outcome.²⁸

It is understandable that these future difficulties were not clearly foreseen in 1889, though sentient queries were raised at the time, in particular those of Sir Samuel Griffith, leader of the

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- 26. A.A. Morrison: "The Government of Queensland", *op.cit.*, pp. 313-14. In Morrison's opinion "Labour's successor in office, the Country-Liberal Coalition Government, has shown itself no less sensitive to the heavy administrative demands of ministerial responsibility."
 - 27. Interviews with Messrs. Sampson, Morrow, Rymer and Nolan, all past Executive officers of the A.R.U. with experience on ministerial deputations and in negotiating with the Railway Department which would cover a period from the turn of last century to present date.
 - 28. The success of the railway unions in the 1925 dispute could be attributed in no small measure to the conciliatory attitude of Premier Gillies, whereas in the 1927 railway strike, Premier McCormack went so far as to take personal control of the Railway Department and "lock out" the striking railwaymen. Similarly, government initiatives in the 1948 railway strike would seem to have stemmed from Hanlon, rather than from his Minister for Transport, J.E. Duggan.

opposition.²⁹ "The Victorian Railways legislators did not realise the full extent of the administrative revolution they were pioneering"³⁰ and there is no evidence to indicate that their Queensland colleagues were any more perceptive.

The first appointments under the new system were those of J. Mathieson (Chief Commissioner), A. Johnston and R.J. Gray. Both Mathieson and Johnston had had railway experience in the United Kingdom,³¹ while Gray, at the time he received his commission, was Principal Under Secretary in the Queensland Civil Service.³²

Before their initial seven year terms had been completed, relations between Commissioner Johnston and his senior colleagues became so strained³³ that a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament was appointed to investigate the matter. Its report, presented on

29. *Q.P.D.*, Vol. LV, 1888, pp. 131-137.

30. R.L. Wettenhall: *op.cit.*, p. 27.

31. "John Mathieson was born at Cummock, Glasgow, in 1846. When a lad, he entered the service of the Glasgow and South Western Railway, working his way up through the various grades to the position of Superintendent of the line, an appointment he resigned in 1889 to take the post of Chief Commissioner of the Queensland Railways. He is credited with possessing a special knowledge of the procedure for the promotion of new lines." Philip Mennell, F.R.G.S.: *The Dictionary of Australasian Biography (1855-1892)*. Hutchinson, London, 1892. Andrew Johnston's experience in the United Kingdom had been as a well qualified railway engineer. He was a Member of the Institute of Civil Engineers.

32. In 1894, Gray had served 30 years in the Queensland Public Service. Prior to appointment as Railway Commissioner he had served for 10 years as Under Colonial Secretary, 10 years as Immigration Agent and in subordinate positions in the Colonial Secretary's and other Departments.

33. The initial and continuing cause of the trouble was the friction between Commissioner Johnston, himself a well-qualified engineer, and the Chief Engineer of the Railway Department, H.C. Stanley.

November 20th, 1894, recommended Johnston's immediate retirement from the Railway Commission and further stated that

*"the Committee are of the opinion that divided responsibility in the administration of the Railway Department is a mistake; and that the interests of the community will be best served by placing this large and important Department of the Public Service under the control of not more than one Commissioner."*³⁴

Johnston did retire, as recommended, but Mathieson and Gray continued as Commissioners until 1896, when Mathieson accepted the position of Chief Commissioner of the Victorian Railways. At that point the government implemented the earlier suggestion of the Joint Committee and Gray was confirmed as sole Commissioner, a practice which continues to this day.

The Q.R.E.A. shed no tears at Mathieson's departure. They considered him a tyrannical Commissioner³⁵ and held him responsible, not only for the victimisation of the early union organisers but also for many of the difficulties they were facing in keeping the union alive.³⁶ His antipathy towards trade unionism was, in all probability, the product of his experience gained in the management side of privately owned railway companies in the United Kingdom, where a stress on the master-servant relationship was characteristic of industrial negotiations.

The "lad porter to Commissioner" era in railway administration opened with the appointment of J.F. Thallon to succeed Gray on his

34. Report of the Joint Committee on Relations between the Railway Commissioners, *Votes and Proceedings*, Vol. III, 1894, pp. 1275-6.

35. *The Daily Standard*, September 9th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 1, 1966, p. 1.

36. Cf. *supra*, p. 70.

retirement in 1902. Thereafter, with rare exceptions,³⁷ all subsequent Commissioners reached that office by way of the Traffic Branch and from the position of General Manager. While service in Traffic and as General Managers meant that they have brought to their final office long experience in "running the railways"³⁸ it is suggested that this is not necessarily the best background for the effective control and management of one of the State's largest enterprises. The Railway Department itself sees the Commissioner's role as one of interpretation and implementation of government policy as it is conveyed to him through the Minister. The performance of individual Commissioners and their staff in these fields has been criticised on occasion but never as roundly nor as trenchantly as by Ford, Bacon and Davis, Inc.,³⁹ the American engineering consultants retained by the Nicklin government in 1960 to fully investigate the operation of the Queensland railway

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37. The major exceptions were P.R.T. Wills (1941-1948) who came from the Accounts section, and the present Commissioner, A.G. Lee (1/9/1962) who was a clerk (administrative section) before being brought to Brisbane as private secretary to the Commissioner. He remained in the Secretary's office as Assistant-Secretary until his appointment as Commissioner.
38. For the fatuous observations of an outside "expert", commissioned by the Ryan Government to make a thorough investigation of the railway service but who, in the event, was able to spend only a few days in a cursory examination, see Robert McC. Anderson: "Some Notes on the Queensland Railways", *Qld. Parl. Papers*, Vol. III, 1915-16, p. 1317. "Probably owing to the fact that your Commissioner and his officers have been right through the mill from the lowest rungs to the top of the ladder, there is evidence more of a family feeling between the various classes and ranks (numbering in all 12,000 individuals) than is usually the case in a service like this. I came across no evidence of dissatisfaction, excepting in matters of minor degree."
39. Cf. *supra*, p. 64.

system.⁴⁰ Yet their condemnation was not so much of the ability of the Commissioner and his officers, as of their operating arrangements. As the Report stated,

*"Government expects its Commissioner for Railways to function primarily as a Chief Traffic officer. Other duties tend to be assigned to the Secretary who is primarily the Administrative officer. These two officers "run" the Department. Both are so fully occupied with routine responsibilities that neither can devote the attention necessary for effective planning and control."*⁴¹

The administrative structure of the Department is partly to blame for this situation. There are two distinct bases for organisation, with a functional allocation of duties, i.e. a branch organisation, superimposed upon a geographical division by area, i.e. a divisional and district organisation. The latter was the outcome of the decentralization of the railway system itself, which in turn, resulted from the physical configuration of the State and from railway construction policy.⁴²

Representations from the central and northern areas for a decentralized administration to match the physical layout of the railway system were constant in the first forty years of railway history, and

40. Cf. "The loan funds assigned to the Railways have been relatively small; therefore it would be logical to expect the Commissioner and his staff to critically appraise proposed projects to assure maximum operating savings from those selected. Judging from Works undertaken, this criterion does not appear to have been applied... Also, the fact that present operating statistics fail to provide for comprehensive evaluation of savings versus investment indicates a lack of understanding of the principles involved." Summary of Recommendations and Conclusions contained in the Report of Ford, Bacon and Davis, Inc.: *op.cit.*, p.2.

41. *ibid.*, p.3.

42. Cf. *supra*, Chapter 2, Part I.

the change to the three Commissioner set-up in 1889 appeared to provide such an opportunity. Suggestions that a Commissioner be permanently stationed in the northern, central and southern divisions were strongly canvassed,⁴³ but the necessity for them to sit together as a Board precluded this. During Commissioner Evans' term of office (1/6/11-31/10/18) the basis of the present system of Divisions, Northern (Townsville), Central (Rockhampton), Southern (Brisbane), and South-western (Toowoomba) was laid down,⁴⁴ though not in final form until the re-organisation of the administrative system which took place in 1920.⁴⁵ In 1929 the South-western Division was abolished for reasons of economy and not re-established until 1939.⁴⁶ Each Division is headed by a General Manager, and some important areas, such as Mackay are designated as Districts, under a District Manager.

Superimposed on the divisional system and cutting across it at various levels is the Branch organisation. Control of all sections of the system is exercised by the Commissioner through the Secretary and his staff, below which are to be found the heads of the Branches: Chief of Operations (Traffic), Locomotive (Chief Mechanical Engineer), Maintenance (Chief Engineer-Civil), Stores, Finance (Chief Accountant) and the commercial branch which includes the refreshment rooms. The two systems overlap, so that a bridge carpenter at Roma would come

43. *Q.P.D.*, Vol. LV, 1888, pp. 228-30.

44. Queensland Railways - First Half Century: *op.cit.*, p. 89.

45. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for Year ended June 30th, 1920, pp. 25-26.

46. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for Year ended June 30th, 1939, p. 28.

under the General Manager, South-western Division, at Toowoomba, but would also be part of the chain of command coming down from the head of the Maintenance Branch, i.e. the Chief Engineer (Civil). Likewise a station master at Charters Towers would be responsible to the General Manager, Northern Division (Townsville) but also to the Chief of Operations (Traffic) in Brisbane.

This would suggest a division in responsibility and, presumably, in decision making also, and would partially account for the tendency, over many years of railway administration, for matters of routine importance to be pushed across the Commissioner's desk instead of being dealt with at the level of the section heads. This appears to reflect a traditional ingrained distrust of delegation of authority which has grown up over generations of railway administrators, unrelieved by any form of managerial or administrative training either inside or outside the Department at any level.⁴⁷

A combination of all the factors discussed above long ago produced the situation of a Railway Department lamentably short on planning and long range policy formation, and these criticisms are as applicable to the field of industrial relations as they are to other areas of departmental activity.

No evidence has been found to support the existence, at any time, of a general departmental policy on industrial relations. Problems

47. The creation of the position of Chief of Operations in 1962-63, following the report of Ford, Bacon and Davis Inc., was for the purpose of transferring to this officer the duties of a Chief Traffic officer formerly undertaken by the Commissioner, thus freeing the Commissioner to act as Chief Administrative officer.

arising from day to day operations have been settled at the General Manager - Union District officer level, where the General Manager has the power to fine, reprimand and suspend, with anything out of the ordinary going up the line to the Commissioner. General policies on industrial relations have been lacking and no positive approaches made to the unions for joint management - union consultation on matters of mutual importance, such as the apprenticeship system which has been a perpetual source of friction. No initiatives came from the Department for consultation with the unions concerned before dieselization of the railway service commenced, and such discussions as did occur were virtually forced on the Department by trade union activity. In recent years, passenger traffic has fallen sharply, in line with overseas trends, but the Queensland railways have been carrying a record freight tonnage, and suburban passenger traffic has risen with the extension of dieselization. This situation, together with the introduction of container service, and a growing degree of automation in operations has made redundancy a crucial problem for the unions, and there appears to be a good deal of justification for the railway unions' claim that neither cooperation nor forward planning to meet this contingency have been forthcoming from the Department.

Also as previously demonstrated, many industrial issues have been seen as political rather than as administrative matters, and therefore meriting the attentions of the Minister rather than the Commissioner. The location of the Minister's office within the Railways Building and adjacent to that of the Commissioner assisted in keeping the Minister

in close touch with his administration.

The organisation of railway administration and its operating patterns, together with the attitudes of Commissioners and their staff have been, accordingly, a factor in the development of militancy within the major railway union, the A.R.U. An uncooperative approach to mutual problems, together with the failure of the Commissioner to act as an impartial arbiter, have contributed on many occasions towards a hardening of union attitudes. This is the more unfortunate since Walker, in his study of industrial relations in the metal mining industry of Broken Hill,⁴⁸ has shown that the attainment of a cooperative approach by the Barrier Industrial Council and the Mining Managers' Association to the question of industrial disease "removed one of the most bitterly contested issues underlying past industrial conflicts,"⁴⁹ and was a contributing factor in the general decline in militancy.

This combination of decentralization with a high degree of centralized decision making which characterises the administration of the Railway Department was repeated, to a large extent, in the organisation of the A.R.U. This was not the result of chance but of a conscious union decision, taken in its earliest days, to match its own organisation to that of the Department, so that when Workers' Control had been achieved the union could take over the running of the Department with the least amount of disruption.⁵⁰

48. Kenneth F. Walker: "Industrial Relations in Australia", *op.cit.*, pp. 77-135.

49. *ibid.*, pp. 130-131.

50. Interview with Mr. Frank Nolan, General State Secretary, A.R.U. Q'ld. Branch, June 28th, 1967.

Consequently, the A.R.U. changed its own organisation to meet structural alterations made from time to time by the Department, and by 1920⁵¹ a basic framework similar to that of the railway administration had evolved. The A.R.U. was divided into six Districts, each under the control of a District Committee, which in four of them (Townsville, Rockhampton, Maryborough and Toowoomba) consisted of a representative of each branch of the Union within the District, while for the Ipswich and Brisbane Districts, where only one branch operated, the District Committee consisted of grade and job representatives. The State Council of the A.R.U. incorporated, in similar fashion, representatives from the District Committees, chosen by ballot of the whole membership of a particular Division of the service, together with job (or branch) representatives.⁵²

By these means, a combined industrial and territorial representation was achieved vis-à-vis the divisional-cum-branch organisation of the Department, with the union's District organisations ready to replace the Department's Divisions, and the union State office that of the Commissioner and Secretary, once Workers' Control was achieved. It was, according to the A.R.U., representation "such as the Parliament of the Socialist State will consist of ... and it's doubtful if there was another union in the world covering a particular

51. Cf. *The Daily Standard*, January 8th, 1920, p. 3, and January 24th, 1920, p. 3. The new Brisbane branch incorporated what were formerly the South Brisbane, Clerical, North Brisbane and Signalmen's branches.

52. One representative from each of the following branches: loco, workshops, traffic, permanent way, stores, clerical, interlocking and refreshment rooms.

industry upon whose management body the two interests are so definitely recognised.⁵³ Yet it was not true industrial unionism, the territorial representation being a concession to the peculiar requirements of the Queensland railway system.⁵⁴

Over the years, still following the pattern of the Railway Department, union organisation was modified to that of four Districts, centred upon Brisbane, Rockhampton, Townsville and Toowoomba, contracting further however in the 1950's to the present three Districts structure based upon Brisbane, Rockhampton and Townsville.

Constitutionally, the most important bodies within the A.R.U. organisation are the District Committees, the State Conference, the State Council and the State Executive. Democracy within the union is most clearly evidenced at the District level, where delegates from the branches and sub-branches, and grade and job representatives, all chosen by ballot, make up the Committees. The District officers who are the union organisers for the area, as well as secretaries to the Committees, have a great deal of scope for independent action. They take up day to day problems with the Divisional General Managers of the Department, and only if the matter has to go beyond them to the higher levels of the Department in Brisbane, does the State office of the

53. *The Daily Standard*, September 30th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 9, 1966, p. 2.

54. Note that when the National Union of Railwaymen was formed in England in 1913 - the first serious attempt there at organising an industrial union - the country was divided into six electoral districts for the purpose of choosing representatives on executive bodies. However, within these districts, elections were held on the basis of grades or callings and not on area. Cf. Philip S. Bagwell: *op.cit.*, p. 336.

union come into the picture. Yet, as has been pointed out previously,⁵⁵ within the Railway Department more is referred to the Commissioner than would be expected in a fully decentralized system and, as a corollary to this, the A.R.U. State office also deals with some questions which it would prefer to leave to the District secretary.

Nevertheless, comparatively speaking, there is a high level of local autonomy in the union, with regard to bread and butter issues, a reflection not only of the decentralization of the service, but also of the fact that for many years the northern and central divisions were physically unconnected with each other and with the southern part of the system, and the union within each area developed as an organic whole. The difficulty in forming one all-grades union from these elements has already been recorded,⁵⁶ and with the continuing tendency of the northern and central divisions to take action independently of the Brisbane office if they saw fit, a light rein on the conduct of their local affairs became a practical necessity.

The State Conference and, between sessions, the State Council of the union are, constitutionally, the policy making bodies, yet the infrequency of their meeting (the Conference only triennially, and the Council once or twice a year) militates against their effectiveness as policy making bodies, and has resulted in the concentration of policy control and decision making in the hands of the permanent officers of the union. In 1920, both President and Secretary were full-time, paid

55. Cf. *supra*, pp.146-148.

56. Cf. *supra*, pp. 73-75.

officials, but as the union's membership has contracted, so have its finances, and for some years the only permanent officer of the State Executive has been the Secretary.⁵⁷ This position should be contested every six years, while the remainder of the Executive who are voluntary officers come up for re-election every two years. However, Frank Nolan's incumbency was unchallenged from the time he won the secretaryship in 1944 until his retirement in 1970. His immediate predecessor, Tim Moroney, had had a 27-year unbroken term of office from 1917 until his death.⁵⁸

For those 53 years, the control of the A.R.U. in Queensland virtually rested with the two secretaries, partly because of the sort of men they were, and the kind of leadership they offered, but also because the union was organised in such a way as to place a great deal of power in their hands, if they should seek to use it. This is not to suggest that Moroney and Nolan were complete autocrats, manipulating the rank and file to their own ends even when this meant commitment to strike action, but it would seem that the secretary was placed in the position where he could make himself responsible for much of the

57. For an account of the organisation of the A.R.U. (New South Wales Branch) see Lloyd Ross: "Problems of Communication within a Trade Union", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 2, October, 1959; also State Conference Reports of A.R.U. (N.S.W. Branch).

58. For a comprehensive, comparative study of British trade union officers, including a break-down of their major duties, their origins, selection, education levels, attitudes etc., see H.A. Clegg, A.J. Killick and Rex Adams: *Trade Union Officers. A Study of Full-Time Officers, Branch Secretaries and Shop Stewards in British Trade Unions*. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1961. Note that the full-time officers of the National Union of Railwaymen are elected for life.

determination of policy on industrial and other matters.

At the same time his connection with the rank and file was not lost⁵⁹ through decentralization because of the need for him to take up individual cases with the Commissioner and his office. Contact with the grass roots of the organisation was further maintained by means of the A.R.U.'s paper, the *Railway Advocate*, over whose editorial policy the secretary has had control.⁶⁰ The long terms in office of Moroney and Nolan produced a continuity of ideals and purpose which has been reflected in the pages of *The Advocate*. Such use of the union's newspaper accords with Truman's observations on the techniques of internal political leadership. "It is a major means, sometimes the only ones that group leaders use, to develop those consistent responses of members to leaders' actions, responses that are the basis of leadership."⁶¹

Financially, the Queensland branch has never been wealthy, at least

59. For a discussion of the problems of communication within a trade union, see Lloyd Ross: *ibid.*; V.L. Allen: *Power in Trade Unions*. Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1954.

60. While George Rymer was President of the A.R.U. he was also editor of *The Advocate*. On most matters to do with the union, his views and those of Moroney were in accord. During his term as secretary, Frank Nolan edited and wrote most of the contents of the *Railway Advocate*.

61. David B. Truman: *The Governmental Process*. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1962, p. 195. Also of relevance to A.R.U. organisation is Truman's further statement that "these effects of leadership control of the channels of communication within the group may be accentuated where the membership is large and sufficiently dispersed, so that individuals seldom have direct communication with one another except through rigidly formal means." *ibid.*, pp. 195-6.

in comparison with some of the southern branches.⁶² Membership fees have always been low⁶³ and, consequently, even had they been so inclined the union's leaders have never been in the economic position to sponsor the kind of research study undertaken by the N.S.W. branch.⁶⁴

Organisationally, then, the permanent officers of the A.R.U. and, in particular, the General Secretary, were placed in a position where they could be highly influential and command the respect and support of the rank and file.⁶⁵ In the words of George Rymer,

"it was this active, intelligent minority whom the crowd accepted, rightly or wrongly, and it was this hard core of thinkers and workers who were the pioneers, and

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62. N.S.W. and Victoria had the advantage of much higher membership figures. In N.S.W., for example, where the A.R.U. covers not only railwaymen but also public transport workers, e.g. bus drivers, its total membership in 1965 was 20,152 of whom 16,609 were financial income for the same year was \$176,340. Membership in the Queensland branch in 1967 was 7,554. Cf. *State Conference Report*, N.S.W. Branch, A.R.U. 1965.
63. For many years annual dues were \$4. They are now (1971) \$16.
64. Cf. *State Conference Report*, N.S.W. Branch, A.R.U. 1959, p. 40. At that date, this branch had sponsored reports on Dermatitis among Workshop Employees, Blood Pressure among Guards and Morale among Railway Workers. "These have provided us with valuable information which may yet prove to be very serviceable. The prestige value of the Union has been high; the Department has been disturbed at this new and unique interest by a union - and the results have been worthwhile."
65. V.L. Allen: *Power in Trade Unions*. *op.cit.*, pp. 231-233 writes of the difficulty in assessing the ability and efficiency of a trade union general secretary. He also believes that "trade union leaders are able to create a leader/follower relationship which is difficult to break down even when the leader becomes incompetent, because it is not based on rational grounds "but on elements of 'charisma' found in trade union leadership." These elements he sees as "the devotion of the followers and the conception of duty possessed by the leaders."

*exhibited the militancy. As far as the rank and file were concerned, we had their confidence and they followed us."*⁶⁶

Though it will be argued subsequently⁶⁷ that rank and file support came, in the main, for reasons other than their belief in the leaders' views on industrial action and workers' control, the acceptance of industrial unionism and the necessity for its implementation in the railway service were much more deeply rooted in the membership of the A.R.U. Therefore, because it has some bearing on this, one further organisational change made by the union should be noted.

In September, 1920, the Q.R.U. became the Queensland branch of the Australian Railways Union. The creation of a national organisation of railwaymen was first initiated in 1905 with the formation of the Federated Associations of State Railway and Tramway Employees, with J.H. Catts as its secretary. Federal conferences were held in 1908 and 1911. An application for registration of the Federation under the Commonwealth Arbitration Act was refused, on the grounds that "the F.A.S.R. and T.E. was an association of associations and not an association of persons who were employees."⁶⁸ Subsequent attempts at registration foundered on the High Court's decision that the Commonwealth Arbitration Court had no power to make an award covering State instrumentalities and, as a result, it proved impossible to hold the

66. Interview with George Rymer.

67. Cf. Chapter 6.

68. *The Daily Standard*, September 30th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 10, 1966, p. 1.

Federation together, let alone make of it an effective organisation.⁶⁹

Throughout this period the Queensland leadership continued to press for amalgamation, arguing the case for a national standard as regards conditions of employment and other matters of concern to railwaymen, and pointing the necessity for a central authority, vested with power to speak on behalf of all States, to exert the utmost effort to this end. Amalgamation, not federation, was the hope of the A.R.U. for the former would produce a much stronger, more closely knit body than a federation and would be an important step towards the establishment of a national transport union. Amalgamation of existing State organisations would produce One Big Union, which, in time, hopefully, could be extended to cover all who earned their living within the railway services of Australia and in the wider field of national transport.⁷⁰

A ballot of Q.R.U. members in 1915 overwhelmingly supported amalgamation and the leaders continued to work towards this goal, only to be ultimately disappointed, for the national organisation which was hurriedly put together, ratified and registered under the Commonwealth Arbitration Act on February 8th, 1921 was a federation. A High Court

69. Cf. David B. Truman: *op.cit.*, pp. 119-129 for a discussion of the organizational elements affecting cohesion, where he suggests that "the problem of cohesion almost invariably arises where the constituent units antedate the federal body, as is usually true." *ibid.*, p. 120.

70. Moroney's belief in the possibility of establishing one union of all transport workers, and in the impetus that amalgamation of the State all-grades unions would give to this scheme was corroborated by Dr. Lloyd Ross, General Secretary, N.S.W. Branch of the A.R.U. in an interview with the writer, August, 1969.

decision in 1920⁷¹ upheld the right of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court to jurisdiction over disputes in which State employees were involved. This reversed previous trends, and as an organisation known as the N.S.W. Railway and Tramway Officers' Association moved immediately to apply for registration, the all-grades unions in the States were forced to act swiftly to forestall their rival.⁷² A federation was the most for which support could be generated, at that time and under those circumstances, and such was the type of organisation set up by the five State bodies, with Western Australia ultimately affiliating with the A.R.U. at the federal level.

Federation was a disappointment to the Queensland branch and its leaders, as it proved to be too weak an organisation to effectively promote industrial unionism. While on paper, the federal body appeared to have strength in that it had the right to go into a State branch, take it over and run it, as it did in N.S.W. in 1960, yet federal intervention was unwelcome, and unlikely, at least in the early days, when the State organisations were at their most powerful.

The major weakness lay in the retention of financial control in the hands of the branches, each of which pays quarterage to the national body of 5% of its dues, together with a levy to maintain an Industrial

71. *Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd.*, (July-August, 1920), 28 C.L.R. 129.

72. Cf. Geoffrey Sawer: *Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929*. Melbourne Univ. Press, Melbourne, 1956. For a full account of the attempts to set up a federal all-grades organisation prior to 1920, see *The Daily Standard*, September 30th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 10, 1966, pp. 1-2, and No. 11, 1966, pp. 3 & 7.

officer. Decentralization of finance and detachment of the federal officers from the rank and file membership are reasons for the comparative ineffectiveness of the federal organisation.

Strange as it may seem, even after the federation of the A.R.U. the railway industry in Queensland and Western Australia remained entirely within the State arbitration systems, so that these branches would seem to have gained little industrially from federation. Yet the Queensland branch felt it was achieving the best of both worlds by remaining under State awards. As the Commonwealth Arbitration Court extended its jurisdiction it came to be accepted that once a federal award had been determined, the State Courts automatically adjusted their own determinations in line with the federal decision.⁷³ In this way, the A.R.U. (Queensland Branch) members would gain any spin-off from federal awards covering railway workers, while at the same time retaining access to the State Industrial Court.⁷⁴ It was at the local level that more parochial matters were decided - district and divisional allowances, the number and duration of "smokos" and other things of importance to the rank and file - and it was here, at the State level and before the State Arbitration Court that the A.R.U. fought, and was seen to be fighting, for the rights of its members.

73. Though one of the industrial causes of the 1948 Railway Strike in Queensland was the failure of the Queensland Court to pass on to railway workers in this state the increases in hourly rates which had been granted, federally, some months previously by the Mooney award.

74. A.R.U. officials in Queensland were also deterred by what they saw as the excessive legalism of the Commonwealth Court and the time taken to hand down decisions.

However pertinent these reasons for remaining within the State arbitration system, they were over-ridden in importance by the fact that in 1921 a Labor government was in power in Queensland, and it was anticipated by all sections of the movement that such a government would look after its own. It had come to power in 1915 on a tremendous wave of enthusiasm which had even eroded (temporarily) the natural scepticism of Moroney and Rymer about parliamentary action as a means of achieving their rights for the workers.⁷⁵ For the most optimistic, Labor on the government benches meant socialism throughout the land.⁷⁶ Even those who understood the situation better anticipated that the Labor government would legislate to circumscribe the power of the "bosses" and improve the conditions and situation of the workers.

Six years later, while reforms had been implemented, the "first fine careless rapture" had, to some extent, passed. The government had decided that workers' industrial demands were to be channelled through an independent Arbitration Court, yet the hope still remained that railway workers in Queensland stood to gain more for themselves even

75. As Moroney was later to state "the damnation of the Australian Labor Movement lay in the fact that it had always placed the cart before the horse. It had spent most of its time, money and energy in political efforts because it had taken the advice of its opponents in the early days. At that time, Parliament did offer the workers a scope for working class activity that was not now available to them." *The Advocate*, April 15th, 1929.

76. "Well, now, the workers in Townsville, when they heard that a Labor government had gone in, thought that the socialist revolution had come and there was quite a lot of talk of declaring it and running Townsville. Well, of course it was pointed out to them by some of the speakers that the idea of taking control in Townsville and calling it a Socialist revolution was just too fantastic to be thought about, but that was the feeling and the indication at the time." George Rymer, Interview, August, 1967.

under these circumstances, than were they to place themselves entirely under federal awards.

Occasionally, the Queensland branch's connection with the national A.R.U. was disadvantageous to it. In 1933, the Queensland Railway Traffic Employees' Union lodged an application with the Industrial Registrar to amend its constitution in such a way as to change the union from a sectional one to an all-grades union to which any railway employee could belong. While in Moroney's view, the application was for no other purpose than to legitimize "body snatching", from the A.R.U.⁷⁷ the applicant union, while conceding that an all-grades union (the A.R.U.) was already operating within the railway service, made much of the fact that "the A.R.U. was a branch of a federal organisation, and its members might possibly be involved in an inter-state dispute."⁷⁸ In rebuttal, Moroney explained that

*so far as the A.R.U. are concerned we are a federal organisation and a state organisation both. We have to submit to the discipline of the State Court in respect of registration under this Act. We are bound by awards made by the Queensland Court and as for being embroiled in any interstate disputes, I have no recollection of ever having done it."*⁷⁹

The application was unsuccessful in its ultimate object of creating another all-grades railway union, though the Queensland Railway Traffic Employees Union was granted wide extensions of the number of callings it was permitted to cover and represent and consequently was able,

77. Transcript of Hearing in the Industrial Court of Queensland, before the Registrar, Brisbane, 28/7/1933. ...in the matter of an application by the Queensland Railway Traffic Employees' Union, to amend its callings. Industrial Court File, No. 57, p. 8.

78. *ibid.*, p. 4.

79. *ibid.*, p. 11.

legitimately, to make some inroads into A.R.U. membership.

It has been argued that, organisationally, both railway department and principal railway union were structured on a basis of decentralization but with a high degree of centralized control in policy and decision making. It has been further suggested that for this and other reasons discussed in this chapter the achievement of a mutually productive management-union relationship had been inhibited, and that this had been a factor in the growth of militancy within the A.R.U.

There was another element which contributed to this situation and to the development on both sides of attitudes which were counter productive. This was the fact that the railway service was a government instrumentality, the employer was the government of the day, and railway workers, even though specifically excluded from the public service, were government employees. As a consequence of this, both sides assumed that their relationship was not the same as that of employers and employees in the private sector.⁸⁰

On the government side, there was always the expectation that railway workers would be model employees, with permanency of employment,

80. "Government asserts that its relation to those who earn their livelihood in its service is different from the relation of private employers to their employees. ...It insists that, in order to preserve the integrity of public authority, it must possess the right of final determination in all its employment relations." Sterling D. Spero: *Government as Employer*. Remsen Press, New York, 1948, p. 1.

certain privileges,⁸¹ and, for many years, status among the working class compensating railway officers for the lower wages paid to them. Management took the view that its employees, in return, should willingly provide service of the highest possible standard. Management expectations of this kind were reinforced by continuing railway deficits and the criticisms which these engendered from outside the service.⁸²

Employee calculations were based on a view of government as an enlightened employer, setting a standard of treatment for its workers which would provide a prototype for private employers. The right to organise, to affiliate with the general labour movement and even to strike had been grudgingly conceded by non-Labor governments, and it was accepted by the workers as an article of faith that a Labor government would take a quite different view of the rights of its employees when it came to power. It was something of a shock to them, after 1915, to find the Labor government anxious to divest itself of responsibility for industrial matters and placing these in the hands of an independent Industrial Court.

81. In 1908, "the Government proposed taking a referendum of workshop employees on the question of foregoing railway privileges and concessions in favour of outside rates, but the unions objected, and the proposal was not proceeded with. One of the reasons urged against it was the difference in hours between workers in the railway service and those of similar employees outside. Most of the outside rates were daily rates, and it was urged that the privileges, which were estimated as being equal to 4d. per day did not compensate the railwaymen for the difference in hours." *The Daily Standard*, September 9th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 3, 1966, p. 2.

82. Railway management was frequently accused of giving jobs to the lazy and indolent, of allowing the railway unions "to featherbed", and finding places for political appointees.

It was even more surprising for them to find their own parliamentary leaders exhorting them to work harder, be more efficient, provide better service, and taking what had previously been thought of as a typically non-Labor view - that a challenge by railway workers to their employer, the government, was, in effect, a challenge to the very nature of the state, and a denial of the right of the wider community to an essential service, which right must over-rule the rights of a group within that community, i.e. the railway workers.⁸³

Such conflicting viewpoints on matters so basic to the conduct of industrial relations were difficult, if not impossible to compromise and were, themselves, exacerbated by the differences in philosophical and ideological belief held by the leaders of the government and the union. Together with other factors stemming from the organisational set-up on both sides, they formed an impediment to the creation of mutually productive union-management relationships within the railway services.

83. Theodore, for example, adopted a perpetually hectoring attitude to trade unionists, and not only to the militants, but also to members of his own union, the A.W.U. See Irwin Young: *Theodore His Life and Times*. Alpha Books, Sydney, 1971, p. 46 for an account of a special Conference in May, 1921, convened by the Q.C.E. to consider the unemployment problem, where Theodore "flayed them verbally, both as a body and as individuals, until the assembly sat in sullen silence." Young sees Theodore's desire to play the "strong man" in industrial disputes as deriving from some psychological factor which "drove him to accept a challenge rather than placate an opponent, and this was a defect in leadership." *ibid.*, p. 28.

PART II: THE AIRLINE OPERATORS AND THE FEDERATION

The pilots have devised for themselves an organisation not unlike that of the railwaymen in that it combines apparent grass roots democracy and decentralization with a high concentration of control at the centre. The Australian Federation of Air Pilots binds together approximately 2,400⁸⁴ highly skilled professionals with an intense dedication to flying. It admits domestic airline pilots, including those flying for small companies and for freight operators like Brown and Brain; New Guinea and overseas pilots; aero club instructors, agricultural pilots and those engaged in general flying.

The A.F.A.P. is a federation of branches, based on geographical and, to some extent, functional location and not on the employer company.⁸⁵ There are seven branches: Overseas (based in Sydney), New Guinea (Lae), Queensland (Brisbane), New South Wales (Sydney), Victoria (Melbourne), South Australia (Adelaide) and West Australia (Perth), together with a general aviation group. The head office of the A.F.A.P. is located in Melbourne and is separate from the Victorian branch office, though located in the same building.

The affairs of each branch are in the hands of a Committee of 12-20,⁸⁶ chosen annually by postal ballot, the results of which are

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- 84. The current breakdown of membership (approximate figures) is: Qantas - 640; Ansett Transport Industries (including subsidiaries of Ansett/A.N.A.) - 670; T.A.A. - 450; general aviation - 360.
 - 85. Unlike the railway union, the branches did not antedate the formation of the national body and this has assisted cohesion within the Federation. Cf. David B. Truman: *op.cit.*, pp. 119-129.
 - 86. With a minimum requirement of 10 members. Cf. Rule 4(f) Branches. Constitution and By-Laws of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots, p. 24.

declared at the Annual General Meeting of the branch. Each branch operates independently in day to day affairs but all matters of importance are dealt with at the federal office level. Centralization of finance undermines the significance of the branches. Unlike the A.R.U., annual membership dues of the pilots which are levied at the rate of 1% of gross salary, are paid to the federal organisation,⁸⁷ which returns a small annual sum to the branches.

The importance of the branch committees lies in their right to choose delegates to the annual convention. Each can select not less than two or more than five members,⁸⁸ according to branch size, to represent it at this meeting, and, in practice, approximately thirty people constitute the Convention.

This body decides all questions of policy and rules, controls affiliation with the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations and selects the Australian delegates to this organisation's annual meetings. The President, three Vice-Presidents (one of whom has to come from the overseas branch), a Vice-President (Technical), a Trustee, and a Secretary/Treasurer are elected by the Convention. The Executive Vice-President, who is a permanent officer of the organisation, is appointed by the President if and when the necessity arises, from among candidates selected by the Convention, as are the

87. This may in itself be an influence on militancy. With annual fees up to \$300 or more, there is likely to be pressure on the union to be "seen to be doing something". The wealth of the union enables it to employ staff of a high calibre, almost unlimited legal assistance, and, if necessary, to push disputes to limits beyond the capabilities of most other unions.

88. Rule 5 (7 a iv) of Constitution and By-Laws, A.F.A.P.

Director of Air Safety, Director I.F.A.L.P.A., and the Director of Accident Investigation.

The Executive Committee, which consists of all the above-mentioned Office Bearers of the Federation together with the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of each Branch Committee,⁸⁹ acts as day to day governing body of the Federation and has, amongst its powers and duties, the right to "make recommendations of policy to the Convention of the Federation."⁹⁰

On the face of it, it would seem that the pilots have created an organisation which is capable of being worked in such a way as to give each individual member a reasonably direct say in determining the policies of his association. Evidence in support of this includes the yearly meetings of Convention (as against triennial conferences in the A.R.U.), and the choice of Executive by the delegates of the branches meeting in Convention; the relatively small size of the membership, compared with most other trade unions; and the scheme devised and used by the Federation, by means of which all pilots in Australia, at any given time, can be polled for their opinions by the Executive.⁹¹

89. *ibid.*, Rule 6 (1)

90. *ibid.*, Rule 6 (2 d).

91. The scheme involves key members in each branch who telephone five members, each of whom in turn contact another five, and so on. The telephone system has become necessary owing to the impossibility of gathering together a majority of the pilots, because of the nature of their work, unless a stop-work meeting is called which temporarily grounds all aircraft. This system, like the use of the referendum by some organisations, could be described as another technique of internal political leadership. As Truman points out, "Policy determination, if it is not to reveal disunity, must be guarded by the active minority. The referendum in interest groups is an instrument of guidance rather than the reverse." *op.cit.*, p. 199.

Yet, in practice, policy initiatives are taken by the leadership, whether by the pilot Executive, the Federation's bureaucracy or a combination of both, taken as a result of their own appreciation of situations and evaluation of conditions rather than as a consequence of direct demands coming up to them from the pilots. In most instances, the Executive has been able to rely on the support of a majority of the pilots,⁹² when a case has been put to them, clearly, forcefully and frequently.⁹³

To some extent this support is uncritical. Pilots are dispersed occupationally, and although a close professional bond links men from all airline companies inside and outside Australia, they do not work in close contact with each other as do workers in many other industries. If the pilots are, in general, uninterested in taking the initiative within their own organisation,⁹⁴ this may be, in part, because they do not think of themselves as trade unionists, or see themselves as members

92. Except in the case of three men crewing of the DC9's when growing pilot resistance to the Federation's position on this question caused it to agree to arbitration by Professor Isaac on specific points not in conflict with the D.C.A. view. Professor Isaac found against the pilots.

93. This is done mainly through hard hitting Presidential addresses at conventions and the circulation of lengthy presidential memos, research results and case studies, e.g. "The Superannuation Story", 8/11/67 and "A Summation of the Case for Three Crew on the DC9-30 in Australia", 24/11/67.

94. "There have been many occasions when both your Federation officers and the Airline operator concerned could have done with a little more "senior" interest. It would be gratifying indeed to see the next Branch election nomination list indicate a willingness by the group to which I refer to seek office. It would show a willingness from those who take most out to give something back and would have short and long-term results of the highest order." *President's Report, Australian Federation of Air Pilots, 1967 Convention*, p. 9.

of an exploited class, in conflict with the "bosses". They view management from a level equal to if not above its own,⁹⁵ and although they should not be seen as a passive mass,⁹⁶ their inclinations are to look to their leaders for guidance and to leave policy initiation to their Executive.

In this kind of situation, the role of the leaders, and in particular, that of the President, is crucial for the Federation. This position, along with the three Vice-Presidents, is subject to annual election and yet it is noteworthy that the leaders have come from a small, stable, active minority within the organisation. Captain R.T. Holt, for example, has been Federal President on five occasions, 1959-61, 1965-66 and variously Queensland Branch committee chairman and delegate to Convention and Executive from 1954 to 1967. He is but one, though the outstanding example, of a handful of men who are prepared to make considerable sacrifices of money and time to lead the Federation. Their motivations will be examined subsequently,⁹⁷ but the possible extent of their sacrifices needs to be noted here.

It has been said that, in normal circumstances, "the President needs the third week in each month to cover his routine duties".⁹⁸ This should mean that, provided he is a senior pilot, under the new

95. Interview with N. Powell, Queensland Manager, Qantas, 16/7/71 who reminded the writer that with the exception of the very highest level positions, the majority of Qantas management received considerably less than the pilots in salary terms.

96. Cf. David B. Truman: *op.cit.*, pp. 153-5 where he argues against Michels' assertion that the rank and file are an "indifferent and apathetic mass" that has a felt need for leadership.

97. Cf. Chapter 6.

98. President's Report, 1967 Convention: *op.cit.* p. 10.

bidding system, he should be able to bid for a block which will allow him to devote that one week a month to Federation business, without dropping his gross salary level too much, though his opportunity for leisure and home life will be greatly circumscribed. When the Federation is going through stirring times, industrially, as in 1965-67, the organisation's activities may require the undivided attention of the President, because of the full-time negotiations required by the Industrial Relations Procedures Agreement; in these circumstances, he is unable to engage in flying duties, beyond those required to keep his licence operative. His company pays his salary and recovers it from the A.F.A.P., but he may lose some opportunities to build this up to his normal gross salary level by bidding for additional flying. He loses economically as well as in recreation, and would need to be highly motivated to continue in this situation for any length of time.⁹⁹

The growing power of the Federation's permanent officers may see to it that future Presidents are not called upon to make these sorts of sacrifices. The Executive Vice-President¹⁰⁰ is titular administrative head of the organisation, on a permanent basis. He works out of the Melbourne office where he is supported by a research officer, an

99. "You cannot expect from my successor the kind of activity in which I have indulged. I took office for the specific purpose of attempting to do what has been largely done, and to some degree I did this with my eyes open. I have in a sense abused my wife, my children, my friends, my interest in any form of civic activity, and I have, on your behalf, at times driven your staff at all levels almost to a point of desperation." *ibid.*

100. The present incumbent is B.I. Crofts, an ex-wartime pilot, who was, for a short time, Industrial officer for the Queensland Coal Owners' Association before being appointed to the Federation. The Industrial Officer in charge of the Sydney office is F.D.C. Caterson.

accountant and an expanding secretarial staff. The Sydney office is in charge of an Industrial officer, with a similar, though smaller, supportive staff. As the Federation has grown in membership and wealth,¹⁰¹ so, too, has its bureaucracy, and were the Executive Vice-President so inclined, he is in a position to "bend" his instructions, particularly if the President's flying duties take him out of the country.¹⁰² As Michels¹⁰³ and Truman¹⁰⁴ have pointed out, the emergence of paid, professional leadership, based in part on the acquisition of managerial skills, is one of the signs within an organisation of developing minority control, and, in the case of the Federation, may indicate a potential political struggle within the internal leadership at some future time.¹⁰⁵

101. "We are well aware that we are spending our all in the current effort - yes, a large amount of money \$40,000 plus or thereabouts." *Contract Negotiations, A.T.I.-T.A.A.* Australian Federation of Air Pilots, 1/7/66, p. 1.

102. The immediate Past-President, A.J. Smithwell, was a senior Qantas pilot and it was noticeable that during 1971 a majority of the official statements issued by the Federation were over the names of Crofts or Caterson, rather than the President. The present incumbent is Captain John Guggenheimer of T.A.A.

103. Robert Michels: *Political Parties*. The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, reprint 1958, pp. 40-45.

104. David B. Truman: *op.cit.*, p. 148.

105. Was there an inkling of this behind some of the remarks made by the President in his *Address to Extra-Ordinary General Meeting*, on July 11th, 1966? e.g. "For our permanent staff there is something I must say: Membership must become a little more adult in its appreciation of the place among us these people hold... They would, I think, appreciate my requiring of you, and it is a requirement, that in the future we refrain from any personal criticism whatsoever of permanent staff... While you elect the right type of Executive Officer to senior positions in the Federation you should have no difficulty in ensuring that the permanent staff are working for the Federation in the manner, you, the members as a whole, desire." p. 9.

Other problems, at present minor, which the Federation may have to face are ones arising out of the formation of the Air Pilots' Guild of Australia,¹⁰⁶ though now that the senior organisation is at last concerning itself with general aviation¹⁰⁷ and the achievement of agreements with operators for the benefit of pilots in this field, it is anticipated that the Guild will have difficulty in maintaining its initial membership figures. Incipient divisions within the Federation on the basis of geographical parochialism may also become cause for concern.¹⁰⁸

The Federation cooperates with other organisations within the industry and has derived great benefit from its association with the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations.¹⁰⁹ It has informal liason with the Australasian Airline Flight Engineers' Association, the Australian Airline Navigators' Association, the Flight Stewards' Association of Australia and the Airline Hostesses Association and is represented, together with these bodies on a Flight Crew Ground Crew Safety Committee.¹¹⁰

106. Cf. *supra*, pp. 127-129.

107. Cf. *President's Report*. Australian Federation of Air Pilots, 1967, p. 7 for account of agreement reached with East West Airlines on general aviation.

108. "On this and on other matters we say that partisanship on a geographical basis has no place within this Federation. The "Melbourne versus the rest" game must cease on this as on all other issues." *President's Address to Extra-ordinary General Meetings*, July 11th, 1966, p. 6.

109. The International Federation represents pilots' associations in 49 countries. Its resolutions are not binding on member associations until ratified by them. For the Australian Federation the I.F.A.L.P.A. is a valuable source of research material data and general information on matters of concern to pilots.

110. Cf. *President's Report*, 1967, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

Safety¹¹¹ is, of course, a major issue in the airline industry and one in which everyone, manufacturers, operators, flight crew, Department of Civil Aviation and passengers alike, have a vested interest.¹¹²

*"Pilots are of the opinion that they are in a position to make more knowledgeable judgments on operational matters than are Airline Operators, Manufacturers or Government Agencies, and the making of such judgments has historically been their role in air safety. They are in fact and in effect highly trained 24 hours-a-day monitors of what is happening and what is safe in the operational environment of air transport."*¹¹³

Certain standards and procedures for operational safety are laid down and enforced by the Department of Civil Aviation, and are adhered to by operators and pilots. It is within the grey area outside the black and white of D.C.A. rules and regulations, or in the on-the-spot operational interpretation of those rules that pilot-operator attitudes to safety can become abrasive. The pilot is sensitive to any attack, real or implied, upon his complete authority within the aircraft,¹¹⁴ even if done in the name of safety, though the Federation itself is not

111. "Air safety is the primary responsibility of each and every airline pilot and as night follows day it follows that air safety is of principal concern to the Australian Federation of Air Pilots." *A Summation of the Case for Three Crew on DC9-30 in Australia.* Australian Federation of Air Pilots, November 24th, 1967, p. 1.

112. "In struggling for greater safety in the air, the pilot is literally engaged in a fight for his own survival. It follows, too, that if the pilot survives, then most probably so will his passengers. In this respect, the pilot is the air safety spokesman for the air-travelling public." *ibid.*, p. 5.

113. *ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

114. "Pilots hold and always will hold a position to be looked up to in all matters of operational responsibility and by Air Navigation Regulations and Air Navigation Orders they hold certain unchallenged authority. The Captain of an aircraft is *meant* to have the last word. For 100% of his working life as a Captain he makes his own decisions - no one looks over his shoulder and he is at all times a symbol of confidence and assurance to his passengers and the world at large." *ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

above using safety to camouflage the real issues in dispute with the operators.¹¹⁵ For their part, the operators weigh the costs of extra safety measures against the need for them,¹¹⁶ but in the long run, safety and profitability, which to some extent stems from it, force cooperation on pilots and operators alike.

Except in very general terms little can be said about management organisation in the airline industry, because of its diversity. It ranges from a statutory corporation (Australian National Airlines Commission) through a fully government owned company (Qantas) to a number of privately owned or public companies of which Ansett Transport Industries is by far the largest and the most important.

A formalized procedure for handling pilot grievances has been evolved, beginning with the appointment by each operator of a Senior Regional Captain in every port as management representative with whom the Branch chairman of the Federation takes up the complaint. Should it not be resolved at this level, it is processed up the union chain of command to the Executive Vice President, who consults with the relevant company staff manager.¹¹⁷ Staff relations in the various companies are

115. E.g. the three man crewing of DC9's.

116. "What is the cost of "unsafety"? The shocking results of a jet accident in Australia - the appalling hue and cry which must ensue in this small country, population-wise!" *ibid.* p. 6.

117. One is given to understand that, in practice, a pilot with a grievance on arrival at a port is more likely to telephone directly to the Federation's industrial officers in Melbourne or Sydney, with his complaint than to start it through the formal grievance machinery lower down. Interview with N. Powell, Queensland Manager, Qantas.

in the hands of ex-flight crew personnel. While one would assume that this would be productive of a sympathetic relationship between operators and pilots, such does not seem to be the case.

Perhaps, indeed, the likelihood of poor union-management relations is actually increased by the practice of drawing senior management personnel from the ranks of flight crew. Although in these circumstances management will have first hand knowledge of the conditions under which pilots operate, there may also be factors which are counter-productive as far as harmony within the industry is concerned. Pilots, for instance, may well feel resentful when former colleagues are seen to be exercising managerial authority; and they may be suspicious of the use to which management may put their intimate knowledge of flying practices - a fear, in effect, that what has been done is to "set a thief to catch a thief".

On the other side, pilots now in managerial posts may also have their natural resentments: there is less "glamour" about their new role; managerial salaries are lower than those of senior pilots;¹¹⁸ there may be a tendency to resist demands for improvements simply *because* the manager himself flew under more adverse conditions; or

118. "The second factor was general feeling among Qantas management staff about the high salaries which pilots were getting in relation to their own salaries." "The Qantas Pilots' Super Wrangle: Why the Dispute must be Settled Soon." *The Australian Financial Review*, April 1st, 1971. "It is understood that senior 747B captains will get a guaranteed annual minimum salary of about \$25,250. A few top pilots will earn up to \$32,000 a year. The General Manager of Qantas, Captain R.J. Ritchie, earns "only" \$22,750 a year." *The Australian*, May 11th, 1971. This article also compares the salaries of Qantas 747 pilots with those of parliamentary leaders, top public servants and many chief executives of big companies and shows that these pilots will be among the highest paid salary earners in Australia.

perhaps more importantly, because the manager's knowledge is of past practice which in a highly technological industry may have changed significantly since his flying days.

With regard to the domestic airlines, there is a high degree of stability in industrial relations, caused, in the main, by the regulation of the industry by the Department of Civil Aviation and by the government, directly.¹¹⁹ Within this framework subtle differences of approach to industrial relations can be detected. The Federation's attitude to A.T.I. appears to be coloured to some extent by a sneaking admiration for the buccaneering personality of its head, Sir Reginald Ansett. The calibre of top level administration in this company is said to be mediocre, due to the comparatively low level of salary offered. For this reason, the Federation feels it can more than match A.T.I. in getting what it wants, though aware of the fact that Sir Reginald must be handled carefully, for he will fight, and fight hard if he deems it necessary. T.A.A.'s position vis-à-vis the Federation is seen to be much stronger, because of its direct government backing, and, for the same reason, relations between it and the Federation tend to be more rigid and formal.

It is with the international airline, Qantas, that a mutually

119. John M. Baitzell: *Airline Industrial Relations - Pilots and Flight Engineers*. Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, 1966. Chapter 2. In this work on industrial relations in the American airline industry, Baitzell points out that (as in Australia) the government formed the original patterns. "The government still provides financial support for and heavy regulation of this industry. These facts mean that many of the decisions made concerning this industrial relations system are either directly or indirectly made by the government or are tripartite in nature." p. 36.

productive relationship has been more difficult to achieve. Qantas, unlike the domestic airlines, operates in a highly competitive and unstable industry,¹²⁰ with, at present, uncertain profitability. The pilots¹²¹ have found in B.J. Hinchcliffe, until recently Director of Flight Operations, an abrasive personality, and these factors, together with the tendency of the Qantas Board to issue edicts through an Industrial officer rather than enter into discussions,¹²² have meant that relations between the union and this operator are represented, at best, by an uneasy peace. Yet taken overall, because the airline industry is a high risk one, both in terms of possible loss of life and of profitability it will always be to their mutual advantage for both operators and flight crew to establish a good industrial relationship

120. Though the Government endeavours to give it what protection it can through international agreements and the adoption of restrictive policies to foreign charter operators. Note the current (August, 1971) refusal by the United States Government to grant Qantas landing rights on its territory for the airlines new "jumbo" jets.

121. Re Qantas pilots, note that on April 22nd, 1971, the company announced "that it was giving 6 months notice of dismissal to 96 second officer pilots, 42 cadet pilots and 17 flight engineers. It also said it was stopping the recruitment of 800 ground staff and 156 cabin staff this year, to enable the airline to enter next year with 1100 less staff than originally planned. At the time of the retrenchments, Qantas had 623 pilots, 209 flight engineers, 82 navigators, 48 graduate cadet pilots, 746 stewards and 246 air hostesses." *The Australian*, April 30th, 1971.

122. The present Qantas board consists of six directors, only one of which, the general manager, Captain B. Ritchie has a background of executive airline administration. Chairman of the Board is Sir Roland Wilson, ex-permanent head of the Treasury and also Chairman of the Commonwealth Banking Corporation. It is widely held that under his chairmanship there has been constant pressure to force Qantas into the Public Service mould. Cf. *The Australian Financial Review*, April 1st, 1971; series of articles by Gavin Souter in *Sydney Morning Herald*, July 26th, 27th and 28th, 1971.

based on maximum cooperation between the two.

Union and management organisation and their internal procedures for decision making have been shown, in the case of the A.R.U. and the Australian Federation of Air Pilots to be a possible causal factor of militancy. In each union an organisational situation has been created whereby an active minority of the total membership - the leaders - can, to a large extent, decide policies and guide the membership to support them. In this respect it has been of interest to see the extent to which both unions conform to many of the criteria for elitism in organisations as enunciated by Michels and modified by Truman. The organisation has provided a functional relationship of a particular kind between leaders and members, but whether this is used to direct the union towards militant action or not, will depend upon the other elements which are being investigated in this thesis.

CHAPTER 4

THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL CONDITIONS
OF THE WORK COMMUNITY¹

Kerr and Siegel, in their attempts to explain "the apparently great impact of certain industrial environments on the propensity to strike,"² have hypothesised two factors, the location of the worker in society and the character of the job, as being the most important of a number of environmental elements in determining industrial behaviour. They argue that workers who are in close proximity to each other in their job and yet are isolated from the rest of the community and from management, such as seamen, miners and loggers, are more strike prone than those whose work integrates them more fully into the community as a whole.

Further, they suggest that jobs that are "physically difficult and unpleasant, unskilled or semi-skilled, and casual or seasonal and foster an independent spirit (as in the logger in the woods) will draw tough, inconstant, combative and virile workers and they will be inclined to strike."³ Together with other factors, they have used these two

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1. J.T. Dunlop: *op.cit.*, pp. 386-7.
 2. Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel: "The Inter-industry Propensity to Strike - an International Comparison", *op.cit.*, p. 191; ed Robert E.L. Faris: *Handbook of Modern Sociology*. Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, 2nd printing, 1966. Chapter 17, "Industrial Relations", pp. 619-679; K.G.J.C. Knowles: "'Strike-Proneness' and its Determinants", *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LX, No. 3, November, 1954, p. 218.
 3. *ibid.*, p. 195. Evidence to support this hypothesis may be found in the meat slaughtering industry, where Walker (Kenneth F. Walker: "Industrial Relations in Australia", *op.cit.*, Chapter 5) finds the seasonal nature of the work a factor causing militancy. Note also the extent to which waterside workers fit Kerr's and Siegel's description and the attempts of the Stevedoring Industry Board, by the introduction of attendance pay and long service leave, to counteract these effects, introduce continuity to the industry, and, hopefully, damp down militancy.

propositions as a basis for a general explanation of militant tendencies in one industry as compared with another. They could also be applied to unions within the one industry, to compare, say, the A.R.U. with the Queensland Railway Salaried Officers' Union. Yet these hypotheses, and, in particular, the second, should not be overemphasised as causal factors of militancy. It is too sweeping to suggest, for example, that jobs that are "physically easy and performed in pleasant surroundings, skilled and responsible, steady, and subject to set rules and close supervision, will attract women or the more submissive type of man who will abhor strikes."⁴

However, there is already considerable evidence to support the thesis that isolation, danger and hard, unpleasant physical conditions play a part in moulding workers' attitudes to their jobs and to management. Implicit in Gollan's writings on the coal industry⁵ and in Ross's history of the Miners' Federation of Australia⁶ is the proposition that the isolation of work at the coalface and the appalling physical conditions under which the coal was won were very real factors in the early demands for better working conditions and wages, and in the increasing militancy of the miners when these were not conceded by management. Walker, in his comparative study of industrial relations in some Australian industries⁷ produces similar evidence for the metal-

4. *ibid.*

5. Robin Gollan: *The Coalminers of New South Wales - a History of the Union 1860-1960*, Melbourne Univ. Press, Melbourne, 1963.

6. Edgar Ross: *A History of the Miners' Federation of Australia*. The Australasian Coal and Shale Employers' Federation, Sydney, 1970.

7. Kenneth F. Walker: *op.cit.*

mining industry at Broken Hill and cites the technical and physical conditions of production as one of the elements causing militancy in the meat slaughtering industry in Queensland.⁸

Research in the British coalmining industry, too, has shown that "bad conditions", i.e. unfavourable natural conditions, tend to instigate "bad work", which is the result of human shortcomings. When both are present there is "a tendency for circular causal processes of a disruptive character to be touched off,"⁹ which threaten to stop the production cycle. In its turn, the strain of controlling the cycle "tends to produce a group 'culture' of angry and suspicious bargaining over which both management and men are in collusion", and "there is displacement both upwards and downwards of the tensions generated."¹⁰

The transport industry has many of the same work attributes as mining. Its purpose is to carry passengers and freight over long distances and under all kinds of climatic conditions. This must go on at all hours of the day and night, so that many employees in this industry are permanently engaged in shift work, or, as in the case of airline pilots, are rostered to fly outside of what are considered to be normal working hours. For some groups such as the pilots and the running staff of the railway services, to difficult working conditions are added the responsibility for the safe arrival of passengers and

8. *ibid.*, pp. 195-6.

9. E.R. Trist & K.W. Bamforth: "Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the Longwall Method of Coal-Getting", *Human Relations*, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1951, pp. 20-21.

10. *ibid.*, p. 23. Cf. E.R. Trist, G.W. Higgin, H. Murray, A.B. Pollock: *Organisational Choice*. Tavistock Publications, London, 1963.

freight at their destinations and the danger inherent in flying or in driving a locomotive at high speed. Both groups work in isolation from the wider community, pilots in the aircraft cockpit, the footplate men in the even closer and less pleasant confines of the locomotive cabin. In sum, many transport workers fulfil roles which are similar to those of miners, in the high degree of stress which they promote.¹¹ For these reasons, a closer examination of the physical and technical conditions under which railwaymen and flight crew have performed their duties is warranted.

There have been two distinct groupings of workers in the railway service, those engaged in railway construction on behalf of private contractors, and the "regular" employees engaged in the tasks of operation and maintenance. The conditions of the construction workers cannot be omitted from this study, not only because these men are a part of railway history, but because many of them ultimately joined the permanent service, as gangers and fettlers in the maintenance section, some even rising to the more highly skilled positions on the footplate and in the traffic branch. It must be assumed that their experiences as navvies and labourers on construction work conditioned, to some extent, at least, the attitudes to industrial relations, which they were to exhibit as railway employees.

11. "All roles at the coalface are stressful, but the pattern varies with the different roles. The physical effort required, the liability of interference from factors beyond the control of the facework group, the cruciality of the tasks for cycle progress, the monotony or variety of tasks, the permanency of the roles and the shifts on which these are carried out, are all factors which contribute to the "stress pattern"." E.E. Trist, G.W. Higgin, H. Murray, A.B. Pollock: *ibid.* p. 23.

Railway construction in Queensland never reached the magnitude of that in England,¹² though it did provide employment, in numbers that were substantial by colonial standards, and for long periods of time. Section 4 of the North Coast Railway from Cooran to Yandina, for example, a very heavy piece of work, involving many cuttings deep in the Blackall Range, required the shipping of all the necessary material by sea from Brisbane to Maryborough and thence by rail to Cooran, and the establishment of the main camp for the offices and "staff" residences at Mount Eerwah for a period of twelve months.¹³ Work for the New South Wales Railway Department on the No. 2 Section - Mullumbimby to Murwillumbah - of the Lismore to the Tweed railway, undertaken by the same contractor, took 30 months and employed a daily average of 2,000 men.¹⁴

"Much of the glory [of railway construction] went to the engineers¹⁵

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12. "In 1845 there were 200,000 men working on about 3,000 miles of new line. In the eighty years from 1822 onwards, millions of navvies made 20,000 miles of railways in Britain, and thousands of miles more in Europe and the rest of the world." Terry Coleman: *The Railway Navvies*. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, revised edition, 1968, p. 20.
 13. George Henderson: *Reminiscences of Railway Construction and Public Works, carried out in South Africa and Australia from 1882 to 1916 - George Charles Willcocks - his Contracts and Work in Queensland, 1885-1916*. Brisbane, Xeroxed manuscript, 1920. (In possession of the Historical Society of Queensland) pp. 27-28. Henderson appears to have been Willcocks' personal assistant and managed many of his construction contracts for his employer.
 14. "Navvies arrived at Murwillumbah from all parts - North, South, East and West. What a conglomeration of men, horses and bullocks - I never saw before anywhere." *ibid.*, p. 31.
 15. Cf. Jacqueline Bell: "Robert Ballard, an Early Queensland Railway Engineer", *Queensland Heritage*, Vol. 1, No. 10, May, 1969, pp. 3-9.

and much of the profit to the entrepreneurs."¹⁶ One such person was George Charles Willcocks,¹⁷ who was finishing a railway construction job in South Africa, for Messrs. Peto and Brassey, the English contractors, when he learned that the Queensland Government had applied to London for a £10 million loan to build railways and other public works. Sensing that this could provide the right opportunities for a man of his experience, he took his family to Queensland, arriving on November 5th, 1885. Almost immediately he won his first railway contract, Gympie to Cooran, on which 1,000 men were employed, and from that time until his death in 1916, Willcocks won and completed contracts to a total value of £2,623,000, the majority of which were for railway construction.¹⁸

Yet, while the railway era brought reputation and wealth to contractors and engineers, it was based, in fact, upon the navy.¹⁹ Without him there would have been no railway age. "Never to be confused with the rabble of steady, common labourers, whom they out-worked, out-drunk, out-rioted and despised,"²⁰ the navvies were the

16. Terry Coleman: *op.cit.*, p. 20.

17. George Henderson: *op.cit.*

18. Willcocks also invested heavily, and, it would seem, profitably in Queensland mining. In addition to part ownership in the O.K. Copper Mine in North Queensland, he was "interested, more or less, in 15 Tin mines, 40 Gold mines, 25 Copper mines, 2 Coal mines, 1 Silver mine, 4 gold dredging properties, 1 gold mining concession and 16 investments, comprising Banks, Breweries, Sawmills and other properties, all requiring attention in a more or less degree, at least quite sufficient to keep our eyes skinned all the time." George Henderson: *ibid.*, p. 40.

19. "The word navvy itself comes from navigator. This was the name given to the canal builders of the eighteenth century and was inherited by the railway men." Terry Coleman: *op.cit.* p. 26. Cf. Michael Robbins: *op.cit.*, pp. 68-71.

20. Terry Coleman: *op.cit.*, p. 25.

specialists in excavating and tunnelling, in blasting and in bridge building, distinguished by their distinctive and colourful dress and their gargantuan appetites for food and drink.²¹

Considerable numbers of these men were brought from the United Kingdom in the early days of railway building in Australia, to be joined by indigenous labour. Much of the pattern of their lives in England was reproduced in Queensland; the drunkenness, rioting, the working and living together in emcampments by the line, and the movement from one length of construction to the next. A good deal of this life style was caused, as in England, by the harsh and terrible conditions under which they lived and worked.

Although by comparison with that of the Northern hemisphere the Queensland climate may have appeared mild, the sub-tropical and tropical zones produced their own particular hazards and difficulties. The regular summer "wet seasons" brought constant heavy rain. Often the camps were cut off by flooding for several weeks, and the men with no fresh rations available, lived on salt pork and damper. George Henderson described such a period in these words:

*"About this time the wet season was at hand. For fully a week it rained incessantly. Floods everywhere, which means a rotten time in the bush. No work being done. Just then we got news of a great washaway having taken place on Smith and Timms' section, just beyond Gloucester. The whole side of a mountain slipped into the river carrying everything with it, including bridges, culverts, rails etc."*²²

21. Possibly because they were fewer in number and their camps and work were frequently far from centres of population, the social customs of the navvies in Queensland did not impinge on the community at large to the extent that they did in England.

22. George Henderson: *op.cit.*, p. 61.

Having tunnelled their way through the Great Dividing Range, the wide, flat, treeless western plains, while making for easier construction gave no relief to the navvies from the climate. The gidgee flies crept into their eyes, mouths and nostrils in thousands, and the bitterly cold winds of winter gave way, all too soon, to the dust and heat of a Queensland summer, when shade temperatures of 120° were not unknown on these plains.

*"Sandy blight and bung eyes were the order of the day... all the time, too, the water was bad, also scarce and brackish. It was obtained by sinking into the bed of the creek ... So great was the heat the men platelayers with hard hands like horns, they could not (from eleven in the forenoon until three in the afternoon) handle the steel rails which felt just red hot. It became so bad, the works had to be stopped for three months, until the cooler weather came around."*²³

Two men went mad from heat and over-drinking while this sixty mile section from Charleville to Wyandra was being constructed.

It must be remembered that these railways were built with nothing except picks, shovels, barrows and gelignite, and the sweat and strained muscles of thousands of men.²⁴ Accidents were common, serious injury and death frequent.²⁵ Yet the worst problem of all was that of excessive

23. *ibid.*, pp. 37-38. "I often said none of us were ever nearer to purgatory."

24. As an example of what was accomplished with picks and shovels, on the 53 mile stretch from Dungog to Gloucester, 1,250,000 cubic yards of earth work had to be shifted, fully 10,000 casks of cement were required and 24,000 feet of piling of all sizes. To construct a large tunnel, 64,200 cubic yards of rock had to be removed, 18,000 casks of cement required, 600 tons of blasting powder, 200 tons of gelignite and some 50,000 detonators." *ibid.*, p. 58.

25. "During the building of the various tunnels there were many accidents, several deaths. The contractors had a hospital - really three four-room cottages - in charge of Dr. Hector MacDonald and two wardsmen. The hospital was more or less always full of patients from result of accident or sickness." *ibid.*, p. 36.

drinking and of the "sly grog" shops or "sheebeens" which sprang up wherever a permanent camp was sited. While loneliness, and the isolation of the railway camps, together with the monotony and harshness of their life and work were, no doubt, sufficient cause for drunkenness, a bad situation was made worse by those who sold the liquor to the men, preying on them until every shilling of their wages had been spent. Then,

*"the day following pay day - Sunday morning - the usual thing was to see the men lying about all over the place suffering a recovery from the night before. During Sunday, which was always a wild day, the men continued to fight amongst themselves - all day and right away until dark. In fact, I have seen them, many a time, fighting by candlelight. It was no use trying to stop them, even the policeman could do nothing. There was nothing else for it but to let them fight until they could fight no more. This occurred every pay day each month. Truly it was awful."*²⁶

The wages which drained away so quickly down the throats on Saturday nights were, in some cases, substantial for those days, although the amount varied considerably. Much of the work was done as piece work and "some men made good money, some making as much as £25 per month, while others handling the same stuff under the same conditions could not make £10 and many not even £8 per month."²⁷ The general wage rate,

26. *ibid.*, p. 28. Henderson also mentions that sometimes the beer had too much arsenic in it. Before the days of refrigeration, it was a commonly held belief in northern and western Queensland that the brewers placed arsenic in the beer, in summer, as a preservative and that this produced "fighting" beer. The writer has never been able to prove whether this was myth or reality.

27. *ibid.*, p. 48.

however, was from 6/- to 7/- per day²⁸ which meant that the majority of construction workers, particularly the labourers were not well paid.

It would seem appropriate to record a final word about the railway construction worker, his life and working conditions from William Morrow,²⁹ who was one of the early and outstanding leaders of the A.R.U. in North Queensland. Although the quotation is lengthy, it seems desirable to allow Morrow's words to stand unaltered for they provide a vivid picture of the conditions under which men were forced to work in constructing the railway system of the State.

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28. W. Morrow confirms the heavy drinking of the construction workers and says, "The sly grog shops were terrible things because they used to dilute the whiskey and rum, putting tobacco in the rum and arsenic in the whiskey. Well, the men would drink this stuff and it would send them mental. Now most of the engineers, though not all, encouraged the men to drink because if they didn't have them always broke they couldn't keep them there, because they were only getting 6/- a day for all this hard work." Interview with W. Morrow.
29. W. Morrow worked on the construction of the Chillagoe railway, the Mareeba to Atherton line and the Herberton line; then became a guard-shunter on the Chillagoe railway, a fireman, and finally an engine driver in charge of the locomotive used on railway construction. About 1908 in Chillagoe, with several others he started "a little union of our own for the railway men." This eventually became part of the Amalgamated Workers' Association (A.W.A.) and in turn, the A.W.A. amalgamated with the A.W.U. Leaving the A.W.U. Morrow, in time, became Secretary of the Charters Towers branch of the Queensland Railways Union (Q.R.U.), then Chairman of the Northern District Committee of the A.R.U. at the time George Rymer was its Secretary. When Rymer was transferred to Brisbane as Assistant State Secretary (shortly thereafter to become State President) Morrow became Secretary of the Northern Division. He later moved to Tasmania where he was State Secretary of the A.R.U. for ten years, ultimately representing that State in the Senate from 1/7/47 to 19/3/51 and from 28/4/51 to 30/6/53. Though he had previously won top position in the A.L.P. team, he lost the party endorsement in 1953, stood as an independent and was narrowly defeated.

"I came from an old railway family. My father held up the first sleeper in Queensland. That was on the Ipswich to Grandchester line. He then continued his career in the railways and we all followed him. There were six brothers and five of us were engine drivers. I went to work when I was very young, about ten years of age, as a nipper in the lifting gang, i.e. lifting the rails. I carried water for the men to drink and boiled their billies. At 16 I was a man, because I'd been mixing with them all the time, and I was in charge then of straightening the rails, after the lifting gang had finished with it, to make it straight for the train.

Well, the conditions we lived under were very primitive. They used to build half a mile of railway a day, lay it down - what they call plate-laying - and the lifting gang would come along behind. Every fortnight we'd shift our camps. They consisted of tents, no boarding houses. We had to cook all our own meals and I, at ten, used to cook mine. Our main diet was corned beef, bread and golden syrup, potatoes, tea and sugar. We'd hang our food up in a bag under the tent. You'd come home some nights and find your tent flattened by a "willie-willie" - and millions of ants. You couldn't have butter because it was too hot, it used to melt.

The men had to walk from the first morning they shifted their camp at the head of the road (i.e. the head of the line where it was built to). They'd build half a mile. Then they'd walk half a mile home, and next morning they'd walk half a mile to work and that night they'd walk a mile home. They'd repeat that operation walking an extra half a mile home at night until they got up to six miles. As a result, we had to get up very early in the morning - we worked 48 hours a week then - and every fortnight you'd shift and when you'd shift your camp you'd build your camp on the Saturday afternoon, and Sunday you'd clean things up.

The navvy was the man who was most looked down upon and yet, I think he was the most important man who ever came to Queensland. He was the most loyal of men, but he had no association with women, no association with the outside world, and the monotony of the job was such and conditions were so very very bad, that he drank a lot."³⁰

Until the advent of a Labor government, all railway construction was done by private contract, and in the early days the contractors had

30. W. Morrow, Interview with the writer.

little difficulty in keeping "labour agitators" at bay.³¹ By 1909 when Henderson was describing the situation in New South Wales on the Dungog-Gloucester section for which Willcocks had the contract, he had a different story to report, of labour scarcity pushing up the daily rate to 8/- per day, and of the men becoming very independent. "The Trades Hall representatives were never off the works, all the time stirring up strife and dissatisfaction. With N.S.W. now under a Labour Parliament, the men seemed to get it into their heads they could work just as they liked, and were more or less fractions (sic) all the time."³²

It was men like Morrow³³ who were doing the sort of organising among the workers which upset George Henderson so much, and the organisations they helped to create, like the A.W.A. and the northern division of the Q.R.U. were militant organisations because "the people were in revolt against these conditions which had lasted so

31. Cf. George Henderson: *op.cit.*, p. 49, for an account of how Willcocks dealt with an incipient strike.

32. George Henderson: *op.cit.*, p. 60. Ultimately, the N.S.W. government bought out the contractors working on this line, including Willcocks, and finished the work itself with day labour.

33. There were some recorded by Henderson who were to become the leaders of the A.L.P., both federally and in Queensland, e.g. "When I first met Andrew Fisher (later Queensland M.L.A. for Gympie and M.H.R. for Wide Bay and subsequently Commonwealth Prime Minister) he came from Gympie to work as a navvy, from the No. 4 North Phoenix Gold Mine and was camped nearby the Main Camp at Six Mile Creek." *ibid.*, p. 26. Also "while overseeing Mr. Willcocks' contract for the Mt. Garnet railway in North Queensland, I met Mr. Edward G. Theodore, also Mr. Wm. McCormack. ... They in time became members of Parliament, and later on one after the other became Premier of the State of Queensland." *ibid.*, p. 44.

long."³⁴ This militancy among the rank and file led them to support leaders who believed in direct action, not only as a means of alleviating present conditions, but as a political philosophy in itself. Consequently, these hard and difficult working conditions provided the situational setting within which a functional, cohesive relationship was able to develop between what Rymer called "the intelligent minority" and the mass of the workers.

When one looks at the permanent railway employees, those engaged in operation and maintenance, one finds, in some instances, that their conditions were little better than those of the navvies. This applied, in particular, to the gangers and fettlers of the "permanent way" branch.

For many of them, their jobs, too, were of an unskilled or semi-skilled nature. They worked in isolated areas, far from the comforts and companionship of the settlements and towns,³⁵ and lived in canvas or bag tents or galvanised iron huts. If they were married, their wives and families had to live under the same conditions, and schooling for their children was an ever present problem.³⁶

34. W. Morrow in interview with the writer. Cf. G.C. Bolton: *op.cit.*, p. 292, where he suggests "that hours and conditions, rather than wages, were the cause of most discontent". Cf. David B. Truman: *op.cit.*, Chapter 7.

35. It needs to be remembered that the three major railway systems of Queensland, the northern, central and south western, once they had crossed the Dividing Range, traversed hundreds of miles of sparsely settled country.

36. "The fettlers and gangers were compelled to eke out a black fellow's existence on the isolated railway tracks of this great State, without even a semblance of the human habitation and educational facilities boasted of in this land of democracy." *The Advocate*, October 10th, 1921, p. 27.

At the turn of the century, men in the traffic and maintenance sections were working a 54 hour week, while tradesmen worked 48 hours.³⁷ At that time, a maintenance inspector on the line earned £250 per annum, a sub-inspector 10/- per day, a ganger 8/- per day and a labourer 6/6 per day.³⁸ When, later, the Railway Department began periodic economy drives, it was the maintenance section which appeared to be singled out first for attack, by reducing the strength of gangs and increasing the mileage of lengths.³⁹ At the same time, because of great fluctuations in traffic, over a year, particularly on the Northern line, the men worked periods of excessive overtime, followed by long intervals of short time, or even "laying off".⁴⁰

In July, 1919, the Q.R.U. circularised all A.L.P. members on this question of "the abominable and disgusting conditions of habitation imposed upon and tolerated by the hardest worked railway employees and their families."⁴¹ The Department responded grudgingly, stating that, as far as possible, it was the practice to place single men at all the

37. Ernie Sampson in interview with the writer. He remembers this as a time when men were still expected to touch their caps to their "superiors" on the job.

38. George Phillips: "Pioneer Railways for Queensland", *op.cit.*, p. 51.

39. *The Daily Standard*, September 16th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 6, 1966, p.2.

40. Appendix 2. Annual Report of the Northern Division, Report of the Commissioner for Railways, year ended 30th June, 1921.

41. *The Advocate*, October 10th, 1921, p. 27. "The squatters and other employers of labour are rightly compelled by the provisions of the Workers' Accommodation Act to provide suitable barracks and quarters for their employees, but repeated requests for the Government's own employees to be extended the benefit of that Act have been received with that "which availeth nothing".

isolated points,⁴² though it slowly⁴³ began to erect cottages in unsettled districts for maintenance men. "The cottages were cut out in the maintenance workshops at Townsville, ready for erection, and fettlers charged 7% on capital cost by way of rental."⁴⁴

In the course of discussions between the A.R.U. and the Department in connection with accommodation problems of the fettlers and other railway workers in isolated districts, the matter of educational facilities for their children was also raised. Union representatives also met the Minister for Education and suggested the appointment of itinerant teachers to cater for lengthsman's children, but a shortage of teachers at the time was said to make this impossible.⁴⁵ The Department continued to be tardy in improving living conditions for maintenance men, and thirty years later (1949), was still housing those of its employees who were living away from home, in tents (though these now had floorboards provided) and in bondwood huts, 12' by 10', to accommodate two men. In its generosity, it was issuing meat safes to flying gangs in the proportion of one safe for each twelve men.⁴⁶

42. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for year ended June 30th, 1920.

43. For example, it erected five such cottages in the 1920-21 period. As the Department itself admitted, "the existence of such cottages enables transfers to be more readily effected." *ibid.*, Appendix 2. Northern Division Report.

44. *ibid.*

45. *The Daily Standard*, September 23rd, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 8, 1966, p. 2.

46. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for year ended June 30th, 1949.

Though the engine driver was considered by all in the service to be the aristocrat of the industry - he was better paid and had a higher status - both he and his fireman also worked under the most trying and arduous of conditions. Most of the work of the traffic section is done by shift⁴⁷ and the footplate men and train crews had the added disadvantage of spending much of their working life away from their homes and families.⁴⁸

"In the days of steam, almost every railway job was physically exhausting. Firing a main-line locomotive was generally accepted to be the most laborious of all railway jobs. On a long trip or in high winds, as much as six tons of coal would be shovelled into the locomotive firebox."⁴⁹ What is more it was a highly dangerous job, working in the confined space of the cab, and keeping one's feet on a moving platform which might be travelling at anything up to sixty miles per hour.

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47. "Shift work makes the domestic life totally chaotic. A man has to try to sleep two or three hours in the afternoon, he wonders when he goes to bed at seven o'clock at night if he can possibly get up again at three o'clock in the morning." The Life of a Railwayman, Frank McKenna talks to Michael Dean. *The Listener*, December 3rd, 1970, p. 777.
48. "In the old days the railwayman had no fixed shifts at all. He went out with his train, at whatever hour he was called, and came back home when the train returned to its depot. Men do not work such long hours today though I have known railwaymen having to work sixty, seventy or eighty hours a week during bad weather, especially on freight trains." Frank McKenna: *A Glossary of Railwaymen's Talk*. History Workshop Booklet No. 1., Ruskin College, Oxford, 1970, p. 6.
49. *ibid.*, p. 9. "Firing a steam engine demanded peak physical fitness and perfect eyesight. The moment a fireman stepped into the cab of the train he began a day of muscle-racking arduous labour." McKenna also tells of some exceptionally heavy engines of between 130-150 tons which were called "The Birth Control Locomotives" because the effort of firing them was so great that men were made impotent for weeks at a time. *The Listener*, *op.cit.*, p. 778.

Except for the clerical and supervisory staff, all jobs in the railway service were hard, tiring and dirty, whether in the workshops, on the tracks, in the cab or, worst of all, cleaning the engines.⁵⁰ For many it was also monotonous, and though, in theory, it was possible to rise through the ranks to the top, in practice this was unlikely to happen, particularly if one worked in the locomotive, permanent way or maintenance sections. Lad porters, trainee enginemen and all unskilled or semi-skilled grades were recruited from the top grades of primary school. Specific in-service training allowed them to qualify for advancement, though promotion was slow, due to the large number of classified positions, each with a narrow salary band, and consequently, of appeals.

The question of morale, therefore, has to be taken into account along with the physical conditions of work, as creating a total climate within which industrial relations develop.⁵¹ Nor, in the case of the railways, is morale improved by technological change, unless there is close cooperation between Department and unions and a concerted effort made to explain the extent of likely redundancy to the men, and plans devised to mitigate its worst effects.

50. Dieselization has considerably improved the situation.

51. Cf. R.T. Martin & T.C. Murray: "Morale Among Railway Workers", *Personnel Practice Bulletin*, Vol. XIV, No. 3, September, 1958. In this study it was found that while approximately half the respondent railwaymen were satisfied with the intrinsic nature of the work they performed, only 22.3% were satisfied with the physical conditions of their work. On the question of morale and the meaning of work, see also ed. Ronald Fraser: *Work*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1968 and ed. Ronald Fraser: *Work 2*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1969.

While to the layman, the dangers which appear to be inherent in flying and the stress and tension which these may generate⁵² would seem to be the crucial factors in an assessment of the working conditions of pilots, it must be assumed that the pilots themselves would not agree.⁵³ Because they enjoy flying pilots do not consider their profession a more dangerous one than most. This does not mean however that they are not safety conscious, and, indeed, there is a high degree of industry cooperation on this question. The Department of Civil Aviation, by laying down and policing strict safety standards has assisted in minimizing the dangers of flying, as have technological advances in aircraft construction and in methods of air and ground control.

Pilots would probably rate danger secondary to the discomforts and hardship of shift work and unstable rostering. Like the railway engine

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52. "A pilot is a control-system operator, albeit sophisticated, who is special because of his constant exposure to danger and because of his high responsibility for the safety of expensive equipment and the lives of others. The pilot is occasionally reminded of this profound responsibility by accidents to either himself or others, though how often he is aware of this when flying is unknown. He knows that an accident can be caused at any time by failure on his part to carry out his task appropriately as well as by factors beyond his control." R.C.B. Aitken: "Prevalence of Worry in Normal Aircrew", *The British Journal of Medical Psychology*, Vol. 42, 1969, p. 285. For their own assessment of themselves, Cf. "The desirable features of a pilot as noted by the A.F.A.P. in its submission in 1958 - 'character, courage, self-discipline, responsibility, physical and mental fitness, unremitting care in watching instruments, quickness, calm and ability to control emotions and capacity to handle a crisis. On the pilot's possession and exercise of these qualities and on his overall integrity, depend not merely the efficient functioning of the airline services but the safe return to earth of extraordinarily costly modern planes and their priceless cargo of human lives.'" Isaac Report, *op.cit.*, p. 26.
53. "Pilots have selected the occupation of flying with some idea of its attendant risks, and no doubt their choice of career is determined by certain personality traits. They experience a particular enjoyment in the thrills of flying and their tolerance of physical discomfort and frustration has often to be high." R.C.B. Aitken: *ibid.*

crews, they spend much of their working life in shift work, and away from their home port and their families. "Rosters rule both the working and private lives of the crew, and instability in rosters has far-reaching effects on themselves, their wives and their families. The effect on the family was noted as a serious source of stress."⁵⁴

While pilots still fly outside normal working hours, much of the instability of the rostering system and, consequently, its social and psychological by-products have been removed by the introduction of the North American bidding system in 1967.⁵⁵ Of greatest benefit to the senior pilots, it has meant however, that the majority, by bidding for their "block" a month in advance, can now plan their private and social lives with a degree of certainty which was absent in the past.

As Corkindale has pointed out,⁵⁶ all flight crew are likely, at some time, to be subjected to one or more of the following types of stress situation which may lead to a reduction in their efficiency: *dangerous duty stress*, where there is a constant threat of exposure to a dangerous situation and the possible danger due to equipment failure

54. *Human Engineering Technical Memorandum 8. Air-Crew Fatigue in International Jet Transport Operations.* A Report to the Director-General of Civil Aviation, April, 1965. Melbourne Aeronautical Research Laboratories, Australian Defence Scientific Service, Department of Supply, p. 62. "As a factor inducing pilot fatigue, the effect of roster instability, though indirect, appears important as it undoubtedly contributes substantially to the general stresses and strains of a pilot's occupation and may be expected to reduce his tolerance of the factors which have a more direct effect on fatigue." *ibid.*, p. 26.

55. Cf. *supra*, pp.121-124.

56. K.G. Corkindale: "The Effect of Environmental Stress on Performance" ed. J.A. Gillies: *A Textbook of Aviation Physiology.* Pergamon Press, London, 1965.

or human error; *confinement or isolation stress*, arising from physical confinement in a small cockpit, and involving sensory deprivation, among other things; *biological stress*, resulting from the long-term effects of sleeplessness, etc.⁵⁷ Pilots themselves testify to the tenseness which arises from delays caused by bad weather or mechanical break-downs which frequently force them to spend frustrating hours waiting at airports for take-off.

Overseas pilots continue to face difficulties arising from their working conditions which do not apply within the domestic airline industry. Fatigue amongst Qantas pilots has remained high and even increased with the introduction of pure jet aircraft on international routes.⁵⁸ A research study commissioned by the Director-General of Civil Aviation in 1965 found that the major cause of excessive fatigue in Qantas pilots was circadian dysrhythmia, i.e. disturbance of the circadian rhythm,⁵⁹ arising from rapid change of environment and alteration in their normal time schedule. In the case of the Qantas pilots the condition was intensified by the high percentage of late afternoon and evening departures (50% after 18.00 hours), night flying,

57. *ibid.* pp. 1061-62.

58. Air Crew Fatigue in International Jet Transport Operations, *op.cit.*, p. 4. "Revised schedules, shorter trips, high altitudes, altered cabin environment, rapid traversing of time zones, and high utilisation of aircraft, together with a substantial and continuing rise in passenger traffic, have combined to bring about a very great change in the working conditions of aircrew."

59. Circadian rhythm is the term in current use to describe physiological functions having a cyclic variation with a periodicity of about 24 hours. For the effects of circadian dysrhythmia on international jet passengers also, see the *National Times*, March 1st to 6th, 1971, p. 15.

particularly in the early hours of the morning (59% of hours were at night), and morning arrivals after night work, requiring day sleep and a temporary reversal of the light-dark cycles.⁶⁰

"The almost universal practice of "unwinding" after a trip and the frequency with which difficulty in sleeping when tired was reported, suggest that the degree of tension and anxiety among crew members is higher than would be expected among other occupational groups."⁶¹ Other physical factors conducive to fatigue were found to be frequent exposure in the cabin to low humidity and low barometric pressure which induced tiredness and irritability. At the same time the tension among flight crew on take-off and landing was thought to contribute to stress.

Finally, the fatigue study suggested that the stress situation caused by the abovementioned factors was heightened by management/pilot tension, some of which arose from the difference in "image" of the pilots as seen by management and as seen by the pilots themselves. "The pilots see flying as a profession for which they are paid professional salaries, while management inclines to the view that flying is a skilled technical job, with a high pay loading sufficient to compensate for any disagreeable working conditions - a loading similar perhaps to "penalty rates" in other occupations."⁶²

Many of these conditions can be and have been ameliorated by stable rostering, staging of crews at places and under conditions which will

60. Air Crew Fatigue in International Jet Transport Operations, *op.cit.*, p. 52.

61. *ibid.*, p. 59.

62. *ibid.*, p. 63.

lessen the "time lag" effects, and the time-tabling of overseas flights to minimize night flying, though, here, passenger convenience will take precedence over that of the pilots, because of the highly competitive nature of the international airline industry.

Sufficient evidence has been presented to support the contention that pilots and railwaymen in general, share the common ground of "stress patterns" in their work, the result of pursuing their occupations under conditions of danger, discomfort, fatigue and tension.

It cannot be said that these sorts of conditions, *in themselves*, are a cause of militancy in the workers who must submit to them. What is of importance is that they create an environmental climate in which other causal factors, under study in this thesis, can be brought to bear and operate more freely towards militancy; while at the same time they provide a basis for the development of a leader/rank and file relationship which is also essential if direct action is to have any hope of success.

THE IDEAS, BELIEFS AND VALUE JUDGMENTS OF THE DECISION
MAKERS IN UNION AND IN MANAGEMENT, AND IN THE COMMUNITY
AND IN THE INDUSTRY IN WHICH THE PARTIES OPERATE¹

Tim Moroney was born at Nundah, Brisbane, on the fifteenth of November, 1890. He joined the railway service as a lad porter in June, 1906 but it was soon apparent that involvement in the trade union movement and in the politics of his own union, the Q.R.E.A., was of more importance to him than preferment in his job situation. At the age of twenty-two, he took an active part in the General Strike, and by 1918 had been chosen General State Secretary of the Q.R.U., a position he was to hold until his death, in office, in September, 1944. He was Queensland delegate to the inaugural conference for the establishment of the Australian Railways' Union in 1920 and was subsequently Federal President of that body (1935-44).²

Over six feet tall, Moroney was a "big" man in every sense, with strong features and an acute mind. A vigorous speaker and writer, whether at mass meetings, as industrial advocate, or within the pages of *The Advocate*, he possessed a great deal of personal charm and an easy capacity to be "one of the boys".³ A practising Catholic, he was active in the work of his Church and its auxiliary organisations.⁴

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1. J.T. Dunlop: *op.cit.*, pp. 386-7.
 2. Biographical details taken from *The Advocate*, September 15th, 1944.
 3. The writer's personal impressions gained from photographs, speeches and writings and from the views of Moroney's colleagues and friends.
 4. He was buried from St. Stephen's Roman Catholic Cathedral, with a Solemn Requiem Mass, presided over by Archbishop Duhig who preached the panegyric.

The source of his personal philosophies and political commitment is not directly traceable at this point of time, but it must be remembered that at an early and impressionable age, he joined and actively participated in the affairs of a union which had been established and carried forward on the principle of industrial unionism. To this must be added the results of extensive reading and self education. The bookshelves in the A.R.U. office in the Trades Hall, Brisbane, still bear witness to this. They are all there - the "classic" authors of socialism - Marx and Engels, Kautsky and Kropotkin, Lafarge, Jack London, George and Bellamy and many others, all heavily annotated in Moroney's distinctive handwriting and with his name on the fly leaves.⁵

It must also be assumed that Moroney was aware of the situation within the railway industry in the United Kingdom where, by 1913, industrial unionism had progressed dramatically with the amalgamation of three major railway unions into the National Union of Railwaymen; a situation finally brought about by the "shining example of united action which was given by union leaders and eagerly followed by their rank and file in the national railway strike of 1911."⁶

Syndicalist influence was an important factor in this movement for union amalgamation. Tom Mann, through his journal *The Industrial*

5. It would have been unusual had the leaders of the labour movement at this time possessed a high level of formal education. What is striking is the extent of their reading and self education. Frank Nolan, for example, left school at thirteen and yet the breadth and depth of his reading would surpass that of many "educated" men. Cf. H.V. Evatt: *Australian Labour Leader. The Story of W.A. Holman and the Labour Movement*. Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1954.

6. Philip S. Bagwell: *op.cit.*, p. 325.

Syndicalist, expounded an amalgam of the ideas of the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.) and the French syndicalists, which combined an emphasis on the necessity for one big union in each industry with a demand for direct industrial action and workers' control. Many railwaymen were receptive to these ideas and "whilst it would be a mistake to over-emphasize the importance of the spread of syndicalism as an influence in the consolidation of railway trade unionism [in the United Kingdom], it would be just as much a mistake not to take it into account as a doctrine fervently held by a minority of active and influential members of the A.S.R.S. and N.U.R."⁷

In that he was a native-born Australian, Moroney was one of the exceptions to the statement that the leading advocates of the One Big Union (O.B.U.) in Australia were emigrants from the British Isles.⁸ George Rymer, however, came within this category. He had been a railway wagon builder in Birmingham, England, and a member of the Vehicle Builders' Union before emigrating to Townsville in 1914. Obtaining a

7. *ibid.*, p. 327.

8. Ian Bedford: "The One Big Union, 1918-1923". Ian Bedford & Ross Curnow: *Initiative and Organisation*. Sydney Studies in Politics, No. 3, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1963, p. 37.

With reference to the impact of migrants in the early labour movement Louis Hartz' work on cultural fragmentation is of interest. *The Founding of New Societies*. Harcourt Brace, New York, 1964. He suggests that beliefs transplanted from Europe, no matter of what kind, freeze into immobility in the new environment. John Power has advocated that this thesis be used as a basis for reappraisal of men like William Morris Hughes, viz. "The Egalitarian Tory", *Quadrant*, No. 33, Vol. IX, No. 1, pp. 68-71.

job in the railway workshops there, he immediately plunged into union activity⁹ and was chosen as Secretary of the Northern District Committee in 1917. Three years later he transferred to Brisbane as Assistant General State Secretary and the following year became the first full-time paid President of the A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch).

The other important personality within the union has been Moroney's protégé and successor, Frank Nolan. Though born at Wellshot, Central Queensland, he grew up in Rockhampton and worked there for many years in the railway service. He joined the Department as an apprentice clerk in 1912 and the Q.R.U. in November, 1914. Active in the affairs of the Central District Committee as Treasurer and Chairman, and in the 1925 and 1927 railway strikes, he was in the latter year, elected to the Council of the A.R.U. on a state-wide ballot, as clerical representative, and served continuously thereafter on that body, with the exception of one year (1936) when ill-health prevented his candidature.

In 1928, he opposed the sitting M.L.A. for Rockhampton, George Pritchard Farrell in a pre-selection plebiscite and lost.¹⁰ Although

9. Rymer was workshop delegate on the Northern District Committee and representative of the northern workshops to the "Dirt Money" Royal Commission in 1917.

10. "When the numbers went up, Mr. Farrell was declared the victor and it is too long ago to make any comment on the manner in which the plebiscite was conducted, suffice to say that the seat was lost to Labour at the election which followed in 1929." F.G. Nolan: *Report of the 24th State Conference of the A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch)*, October 27th, 1966, p. 32. Farrell lost his seat to an Independent, Thomas Alberto Dunlop in 1929. The 1932 elections which returned Labour to office brought Rockhampton back to the A.L.P. in the person of James Larcombe, later to become Assistant Minister for Transport, Feb.-Aug., 1939 and Minister for Transport, August 1939 - April 1944. Colin A. Hughes & B.D. Graham: *op.cit.*

other opportunities subsequently presented themselves, he never again sought to enter parliament. He made his first overseas trip in 1930-31, to Russia,¹¹ and moved to Brisbane in 1935. There he had to begin again to obtain an official position in the A.R.U. Nolan was elected Chairman of the North Brisbane Branch and went on to become District Treasurer and then State Treasurer. On Moroney's death he succeeded him as General State Secretary, Editor of *The Advocate* and arbitration advocate for the A.R.U.¹²

Even within the scope of these brief biographies a common denominator can be observed; the fact that all looked upon service within the union as a career, and spent the major part of their working lives as full-time trade union officials. Nolan has said that after being classified as chief goods clerk at Mount Morgan in 1922, he sought no further promotion in the Railway Department, being more concerned with union and Labor politics,¹³ while it is also clear that, as young men, Moroney and Rymer abandoned possible advancement in the service for careers within the union.

11. As well as his trip to Moscow in 1930 for an R.I.L.U. Conference, Nolan's association with the international labour and peace movements took him to I.L.O. Conference, Geneva, 1958, A.S.R.S. Conference, New Zealand, 1961; Transport Group of the W.F.T.U., Budapest, 1961; I.L.O. Asian Conference, Melbourne, 1964; Peace and Disarmament Conference, Sydney, 1965 and the Conference re French Nuclear Tests in 1966. See *Report of the 24th State Conference of the A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch)*, *op.cit.*

12. At the time of his retirement in 1970, Nolan held the offices of Vice-President, A.R.U. Federal Council; Vice-President Q'ld. Trades and Labor Council; Chairman, Combined Railways Unions' Committee; Delegate to the Q'ld. Central Executive of the A.L.P. He had previously been, on occasion, Q'ld. delegate to the A.C.T.U. and to both Federal Executive and Federal Conference of the A.L.P.

13. *Report of the 24th State Conference of the A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch)*.

This "professionalization" of trade union officials may be beneficial to their organisations and membership as, over time, they acquire expertise and experience. On the other hand, it can lead to bureaucratic inertia and a tendency to lose touch with the real wishes of the members, and with the conditions under which they work, particularly if the practical experience of the officials within the industry has itself been limited and of short duration.

The most important common factor in the careers of the A.R.U. leadership, however, has been their belief in industrial unionism, direct industrial action and workers' control of industry. As epitomized in the personal philosophy and ideas of Tim Moroney, the political, social and industrial were integrated into and encompassed within a whole social philosophy,¹⁴ not unlike the teachings of the I.W.W. and of its Chicago "school", which rejected political action as a means of changing the condition of the working class.¹⁵

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14. *Revolutionary Industrial Unionism, Tactics and Plan of The Workers' International Industrial Union*. The Literature and Education Bureau of the Workers' International Industrial Union, Melbourne, 1918, p. 4. "Industrial Unionism is not a name for any kind of economic organisation of workers; on the contrary, it is the collective designation of a *specific kind of workers' organisation*, with a different philosophy, goal, structure, and tactics than any previous union of labor. 'It is other than others'."
 15. Morrow, Sampson & Rymer see the I.W.W. as merely reinforcing an ideal and not as an originator. This is substantially true, as evidenced by the history of industrial unionism in the Queensland railway service. It is interesting to note that neither Sampson nor Rymer believe the teachings of the I.W.W. to have been influential beyond the encouragement for their own efforts from the O.B.U. movement in the South. Morrow feels the I.W.W. had a great influence, through its songs and good speakers in moving the rank and file away from what was purely an anti-boss attitude towards a more thoughtful one about the possibilities of industrial unionism, socialism etc.

Like the I.W.W., Moroney believed that between the working class and the employing class "a struggle must go on until the workers of the world organise as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of production and abolish the wage system."¹⁶ The foundation of his philosophy was recognition of this class struggle, and it was his sanguine expectation that this contest was coming to a crisis in Queensland in the late 1920's, where "the war upon trade unionism was being made by political action and by direct action. The State, as such, and its instrumentalities, like arbitration and the machinery of employerdom, were all in the fray, for the retention, exercise and development of monopolistic privilege and profit."¹⁷

The successful conclusion of the class struggle in favour of the workers would be reached only if "old unionism"¹⁸ were to be replaced by the new form of industrial unionism, uniting all workers within each industry, regardless of occupation, skill or craft alignment. "Industrial unionism regards industry as one comprehensive whole and organises

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16. The Preamble to the Constitution of the Industrial Workers of the World, Proceedings of the 1908 I.W.W. Convention, *I.W.W. Industrial Union Bulletin*, November 7th, 1908. Quoted in ed. Joyce L. Kornbluh: *Rebel Voices, an I.W.W. Anthology*. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1964, p. 13.
 17. Tim Moroney: "The Crisis in Trade Unionism", *The Advocate*, September 21st, 1927, p. 2.
 18. "Old unionism is that kind of organisation by which some workers are brought together as a particular craft or trade, for the sole purpose of immediate benefit to those workers, and those workers alone. They disregard the interests of all others, even of those engaged in the same industry, who are likewise organised as crafts in separate trade unions, with separate wage contracts with their employers, each expiring at a different time making it impossible for the various crafts to cooperate in their struggle against the employer for more wages and better working conditions." *Revolutionary Industrial Unionism, op.cit.*, p. 8.

accordingly, with a view to taking them over and conducting them for the use and benefit of all useful producers."¹⁹

Consequently, the A.R.U. leaders actively supported the concept of One Big Union (the O.B.U.) as the basis on which would be built the socialisation of industry and workers' control.

*"Out of the crisis of the time surely the One Big Union will appear. The task at hand is linking up the unions into departments under cemented control ... if, profiting by today's lessons we re-kindle the determination to get together for workers' control of industry, the actions of the Queensland branch of the A.R.U. will be splendidly justified."*²⁰

Writing in *The Militant*, the fore-runner of *The Advocate*, Morrow saw workers' control of industry as comprising "the determination of the kind and quality of goods produced; determination of the processes by which things are made; determination of the workers' pay and, finally, of the disposal of the product."²¹ Moroney himself argued for the establishment of a Supreme Economic Council, along Russian lines,²²

19. *ibid.*, p. 9.

20. Tim Moroney: *op.cit.*, p. 3. The attempted establishment of an O.B.U. in Australia has already been discussed in Chapter 2, pp. 87-89. Cf. Ian Turner: *op.cit.*; Ian Bedford: *op.cit.*; Irwin Young. *The N.S.W. One Big Union, 1918-1919. The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 6, No. 3, November, 1964, pp. 226-237.; ed. E.C. Fry. *Tom Barker and the I.W.W. The Australian Society for the Study of Labour History*, Canberra, 1965; Ian Turner: *Sydney's Burning*. Heineman, Melbourne, 1967.

21. *The Militant*, October 7th, 1919, p. 6. Cf. Revolutionary Industrial Unionism, *op.cit.*, p.16. "The Industrial Unions in the different industries are foundations upon which Industrial Democracy is building. Through their union the workers are to control and direct production in any given shop, industry, industrial department and central industrial administration."

22. Such a scheme was proposed at the Labour-in-Politics Convention, Townsville, 1928, but the motion proposing same was lost on the 'voices'. *Brisbane Courier*, May 16th, 1928.

to control the economic and industrial sectors, using the industrial unions as a foundation.

It was realised however that the achievement of Industrial Democracy in this fashion would not, of itself, produce a completely new social order, unless applied "logically and consecutively upward through all the grades of industrial organisation until it reached the culminating point of national executive power and direction."²³

It was at this point that the A.R.U. leaders parted company with those supporters of I.W.W. principles who conceived of at least a partial achievement of their goals, through political action. Moroney and his colleagues would have none of this. They agreed that "the Labor Party aims, not at a Republic of Labor, but only to reform the worst evils of capitalism. This means a bolstering up of capitalism for there is no real programme, no solution offered for the ills of capitalism by these loud talkers about *Democracy*."²⁴ It was not necessary for trade unionism to have an organised political expression, as all that was required for the achievement of workers' control of industry was the solidarity of the workers (as represented in the slogan "an injury to one is an injury to all"), their organisation into industrial unions and their tactical use of direct industrial action. In this way, "a strike conducted by the Industrial Union would no longer be an aimless blow, struck in the dark by men who knew not the real object of their attack, but an act of intelligent revolt, undertaken by

23. Revolutionary Industrial Unionism, *op.cit.*, p. 31.

24. *ibid.*, p. 15.

men who were clearly conscious of the nature and aim of the strife in which they were involved, and of the means whereby it is to be brought to a successful issue."²⁵

Thus Moroney rejected the notion that any government in its present form was capable, let alone desirous, of changing the capitalist system to one which gave control of its own destiny to the working class.²⁶ As the 1920's progressed, and it became clear that the political tide had turned and was running against the A.R.U. Moroney and his colleagues directed their fiercest criticism at the A.L.P.²⁷ They saw it as a party, not of the workers but of "publicans and the bourgeoisie",²⁸ whose representatives in Parliament "had settled down to a comfortable policy of class collaboration with Labour's enemies, with a view to keeping the Party in power, and themselves in place and power above all

25. *ibid.*, p. 19.

26. Addressing the State Council of the A.R.U., Moroney said that "he was not one of those who believed that it was necessary that they should have an Organised Political expression. They had got on fairly well without one during the last four years. However he was forced to recognise that his members desired some form of Political expression but he thought that it was not in their interests that it should take the form of support of the Labour Government ... Recent events had demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that Parliament as an institution was not necessary either for the maintenance of Capitalism or for the attainment of the Socialist Objective." *The Advocate*, April 15th, 1929.

27. As George Rymer expressed it, "The recent events in the South Johnstone and railway trouble must have convinced all workers who took the trouble to think for themselves that the time had arrived when the Labour Movement should be cleaned up. It was evident that Labor politicians were Tories in disguise. They had grown inept and were out of touch with the ideals of the movement." *Brisbane Courier*, September 12th, 1927.

28. George Rymer: *Brisbane Courier*, May 16th, 1928. Cf. V.G. Childe: *How Labour Governs*, Melbourne Univ. Press, Melbourne, 1964.

else."²⁹ By 1929 they were openly working against the return of the Labor government at the approaching elections.³⁰

Working class dissatisfaction with the McCormack Labor Government, and in particular, with his action of "locking-out" the railwaymen in the 1927 South Johnstone dispute, found two possible outlets at this time. The most effective was to vote out the Labor government at the election on May 11th, 1929 and it would seem that a sufficient number took this option to bring in a Country-Nationalist government under A.E. Moore.³¹ A minority, including Moroney, took the other course - support for the "Left Wing of the Labor Movement", set up on Communist Party initiative, which established local electoral committees in support of two communist and three Left Wing candidates which the Movement nominated for seats in Brisbane and Townsville.³²

29. *State Secretary's Report, 18th State Conference, A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch)*, 1948. As can be seen, Frank Nolan, for virtually the same reasons, also fulfilled the role of the A.L.P.'s sternest public critic.

30. "The defeat of McCormack would give the working class in this State a chance of re-organising their movement on a better basis than it had in the past. As a matter of fact, the defeat of McCormack was necessary for that purpose." *The Advocate*, April 15th, 1929.

31. Cf. A.A. Morrison: "'Militant' Labour in Queensland, 1912-27", *Proceedings of the Royal Historical Society* (1952-53); E.M. Higgins: *Queensland Labor Governments, 1915-29*, M.A. Thesis, University of Melbourne, 1954; D. Volker: *The Australian Labor Party in Queensland, 1927-35*, B.A. Hons. Thesis, University of Queensland, 1962; M. Bridson Cribb: *op.cit.* Part of A.L.P. dogma was that a worker, however dissatisfied he might be with his own party, would never "scab" and vote Tory. It would seem however, that a sufficiently large number broke with tradition in 1929. While the informal vote rose by only 0.33% from that of the 1926 elections, support for the Country-National Party rose by 5.02%, A.L.P. percentage of the total valid vote fell by 7.80% and independents polled 3.27% better than in the earlier election. Colin A. Hughes & B.D. Graham: *op.cit.*, pp. 520-21.

32. The five Left (Wing) Labor candidates together attracted 3,194 votes, 0.74% of the total valid vote. *ibid.*

The "Left Wing of the Labor Movement" was the end product of a change in Communist Party tactics, expressed as the *Queensland Resolution* and published by the Party on August 24th, 1928, in collaboration with the Executive Committee of the Communist International. The resolution laid down new political tactics for the Queensland State elections in 1929,³³ the essence of which was the branding of McCormack and his colleagues as "social fascists", abandoning their previous policy of support for Labor and capitalizing on the increasing radicalisation of the masses by the creation of a new industrial labour party.³⁴

The A.R.U. did not officially support the movement, though a number of A.R.U. sub-branches requested their Executive to throw its influence and assistance behind the "Left Wing Minority Movement." These requests were dealt with by the A.R.U. State Council where in spite of the impassioned advocacy of Frank Nolan and some others, no firm resolution in favour of the movement and its candidates was taken.

Moroney had opposed the motion for support in the A.R.U. Council, though he continued in an individual capacity to be one of the leaders of the Movement together with Charles Collins, Labour M.L.A. for Bowen,

33. "In 1926, the Communists, in their election manifesto, had said that any worker who did not vote for Labour was a scab - that Labour must be returned to office and the rottenness of its policies exposed from within. They had greeted with alarm any talk of forming a new party, as this would have weakened their own position as they saw it, of being the only alternative means of expression for the workers. Now they were in the process of executing a remarkable volte face." M. Bridson Cribb: *op.cit.*, pp. 129-30.

34. For a much more detailed account Cf. E.M. Higgins: *op.cit.*; M. Bridson Cribb: *ibid.*, Part V.

J.M. Durkin (ex-A.W.U. organiser), A Brown, Secretary of the Waterside Workers' Federation and E. Ellis of the Carpenters' Union. There were real and practical reasons why, at this time, Moroney did not wish to see the A.R.U. officially aligned with the Left Wing Movement.³⁵ Nor had he changed his view that there was no necessity for the formation of another political party, while the unions existed as a basis for all political activity by the workers. Furthermore through its members of whom there were many in the northern district of the A.R.U., particularly in the Townsville Branch, the Communist Party was exerting pressure within the union, to such an extent that both the State Executive and Council had to take firm measures to pull some of their rank and file back into line.³⁶

While these factors add up to a strong case for abstention on the part of the A.R.U. and Moroney from the activities of the new industrial labour party sponsored by the Communists it must be balanced against the fact that, as already pointed out, Moroney regarded the defeat of the McCormack government as crucial for the survival of industrial unionism and the concept of workers' control,³⁷ and was prepared to go a long way towards bringing this about.

It also needs to be stated that between the "syndicalist" philosophy

35. Cf. Chapter 6.

36. "Rank and file members of the A.R.U. who are members of the Communist Party will need to choose between the policy of their union, as definitely laid down by successive State Councils for years past, or the policy of the Communist Party, if they desire their loyalty to the A.R.U. to remain unchallenged." *The Advocate*, September 15th, 1928.

37. See p. 212 and Footnote 30, this chapter.

of the A.R.U. leaders and Communist Party ideology lay much common ground. The class struggle, industrial unionism, the use of direct action for political and social as well as industrial ends, workers' control of industry and ultimately of the State - there was little to divide them here. However, they disagreed on the vital question of the need to provide a vanguard for the proletariat in the shape of the Communist Party. By this time it was already clear that the Communist Party "saw only a limited usefulness for trade unions in the pre-revolutionary struggle,"³⁸ a belief which could be sensed as early as 1920, behind the apologia for the Party's role in Russia contained in the Special Message addressed to the I.W.W. from the Communist International.³⁹ The Communist Party's political role had no place in Moroney's vision of "a brave, new world". It is understandable, however, that the A.R.U. and the Communist Party could make common cause on industrial matters, and indeed the Communists often provided the stiffening in the A.R.U. ranks when the union was engaged in direct action, particularly in the Railway Strike of 1948 when much of the initiative came from Party members and the highly organised picketing which was a feature of this strike was under the control of the Party and its auxiliary, the Eureka Youth League.

Believing as they did that no government or its instrumentalities could usefully serve the purpose of the workers, it may also seem strange

38. Ian Bedford: *op.cit.*, p. 31.

39. *To the I.W.W.: A Special Message from the Communist International (Moscow)*. Proletarian Publishing Association, Melbourne, 1920. Many of the early members of the I.W.W. in Australia did swing over to the Communist Party, including Jock Garden and Tom Glynn.

that the A.R.U. leaders could continue to use the arbitration system. There were, of course, practical reasons for this which have already been discussed.⁴⁰ However, the explanation goes further than that. Seeing the Arbitration Court as an instrument of the capitalist class, coercing the workers into accepting conditions against which otherwise they would fight, they took the attitude that "there can be no agreement with the employers of labour which the workers have to consider sacred and inviolable."⁴¹ Thus the arbitration system was to be worked for what could be got from it, but "the workers were warranted in protecting themselves along other lines if arbitration etc. fail them. Even when arbitration etc. will suit them, the workers will find they suit them better if backed by economic might. If they do not suit them, economic might can possibly make up what they have lost."⁴²

Throughout the whole of his life as a trade union official, Moroney bent his considerable talents and energies towards the achievement of industrial unionism, and fought against the craft union concept, and every extension of sectionalism within the railway service. Though a less forceful personality, Nolan continued the struggle when his turn came to lead the union. His colleagues speak of Moroney as one of the few leaders within the trade union movement with a truly

40. Cf. *supra*, pp. 82-87.

41. *Revolutionary Industrial Unionism, op.cit.*, p. 25.

42. *The Advocate*, September 21st, 1927. "The fundamental principle of the A.R.U. was industrial action, and we had demonstrated effectively the fruits of industrial action in the 1914, 1917 and 1925 strikes." Interview with George Rymer.

international socialist view,⁴³ and a much wider vision than his job as secretary of the A.R.U., and his successful advocacy before the Arbitration Court required. He saw beyond the railway services to the transport system of Australia as a whole, and in the early days of flying in Queensland, spent many hours at Archerfield Aerodrome, talking to airmen, and attempting to interest them in his scheme for the unionization of all engaged in transport into the one organisation.

Though unsuccessful in this and in the achievement of the amalgamation of the railway service unions, he did bring off a lesser coup. He was able to persuade the majority of unions with membership employed in the railways of the need to combine to discuss the many problems of each which were common to all. As a result, the Railway Transport Council was set up for the purpose of unity of action of all railway unions, and Moroney was elected President of that Council. This was expanded, in 1936, into the Combined Railway Unions Central Committee (C.R.U.) with Moroney still at the helm.⁴⁴ Branches of the C.R.U. were ultimately established in all the larger railway centres. There is no doubt that some degree of cooperation has been achieved through the C.R.U. though it has not been able to speak with one unanimous voice on all matters concerning railwaymen. Though Nolan, in his turn, served as its Chairman, he was openly critical of its effectiveness. In

43. As against the narrow "nationalism" of the average Australian working man of the time, (Cf. Humphrey McQueen: *op.cit.*) Moroney stands out as an internationalist; one piece of evidence for this was the strenuous effort he made to have the teaching of Esperanto adopted in the labour movement.

44. For further details, see *The Advocate*, September 15th, 1944, p.4.

more recent times it does appear to have more cohesion, resulting, in part, from new leadership in some of the craft unions, in particular, that of F.E. Doyle of the A.F.U.L.E. whose views seem more in line with those of the A.R.U.

Reviewing the past history of the A.R.U., it must be admitted that its leadership failed to implement their basic philosophy, and to create a new industrial and social system for the working man. There are many reasons for this but the major stumbling block was always the A.L.P. and its organisation. By 1918, when I.W.W. influence and the impetus for One Big Union were at their height, the A.L.P. was firmly entrenched as an integral part of the social and political systems of Australia. Though at that point of time there were men of ability in the trade union movement⁴⁵ who supported industrial unionism and the O.B.U., even those, the majority, who accepted the continuing need for political action (of whom Moroney was not one), had not come to grips with the essential problem of how the A.L.P. was to be fitted into the new scheme of things.

Whether the O.B.U. meant the end of the A.L.P. was never made clear, even though some of the O.B.U.'s staunchest supporters, men like A.C. Willis and Jock Garden, were high in the party hierarchy in N.S.W.⁴⁶ The A.W.U.'s support for the O.B.U. had been less one of principle than of expediency, as it saw in the industrial union movement a rare opportunity to extend its hegemony, and when, in the end, in alliance

45. Irwin Young: *op.cit.*, p. 234.

46. *ibid.*

with the "moderates" in the A.L.P. it broke the O.B.U., many of the nearest thing to true "socialists" that the labour movement in Australia ever produced left the party. Had the impulse for industrial unionism quickened much earlier in its history the results might well have been different, a fact which Moroney recognised quite clearly.

For men like Moroney and Nolan, who denied the effectiveness of political action in assisting the workers in the class struggle, coming to terms with a Labor government became less likely as the years passed. From the time the Theodore government took office in October, 1919, to be followed, up to 1950, by the McCormack, Forgan-Smith, Cooper and Hanlon Labor Ministries⁴⁷ (with a short inter-regnum for the Country-Nationalist Moore government), the alliance between the A.W.U. and the A.L.P. in both its parliamentary and organisational wings was forged and cemented.⁴⁸ There were practical reasons why this association was detrimental to the interests of the A.R.U.,⁴⁹ and was seen to be so by its leaders, but the very real gulf which opened and widened between them was one of ideas and basic philosophy.

To state it bluntly and in very general terms, Labour, in Queensland, as elsewhere in Australia, decided early in its history to work within

47. Omitted is the Gillies Ministry of 8 months - February 26th, 1925 to October 22nd, 1925. Gillies, though popular, was considered a weak leader, and for having allowed the A.R.U. to win the 1925 Railway Strike was "kicked upstairs", as a member of the Board of Trade and Arbitration by the A.L.P. caucus, on October 21st, 1925. Caucus immediately replaced him with W. McCormack.

48. So much so that in many of the electoral districts of Queensland, the A.W.U. organisation *was* the A.L.P. machine.

49. Discussed in Chapter 6, following.

the framework of the capitalist system.⁵⁰ Evidence for this is provided by the decision to select parliamentary candidates and contest elections, and reinforced by the performances of successive Labor governments. This is not to suggest that Labor did not have those among it with radical aspirations, but that the party was not "socialist"⁵¹ in the sense of wishing to replace an existing order with a new social and political system based entirely on the working class.⁵² "The absence of a coherent theory [of socialism] meant that "measures of a socialist character" which were effected by Labor governments were in no sense an assault on the citadels of capitalism."⁵³ As many observers have noted, even the State socialism of the T.J. Ryan government was meant to be competitive with private enterprise and not to exclude it.⁵⁴

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50. The subject of this thesis precludes an analysis of the extent of "socialism" in the early labour movement. Reference should be made to the standard works on the A.L.P. and the trade union movement cited in the bibliography: Childe, Fitzpatrick, Crisp, Gollan, Turner, Rawson et al., and McQueen's recent interpretative study. In the Queensland context, reference should be made to books and theses under the authorship of Murphy, Higgins, Bray, Thompson, Dalton, Cribb et al.
51. In answer to the writer's question: "What do you mean by socialism?", George Rymer replied, "The ownership and the control of industry for the people in the interests of the people. The generally accepted term of socialist control of the State."
52. "Theodore never failed to remind us when we brought these matters of socialisation of industry, distribution of wealth to his attention, that after all a Labor government was administering the capitalist State and it had to continue to do so until such time as the people determined otherwise; and any effective socialist State could only come about, not by the existing type of political institutions but by revolution, and he was not prepared to render any assistance in that direction." Interview with George Rymer.
53. Humphrey McQueen: *op.cit.*, p. 198.
54. Cf. D.J. Murphy: *The Establishment of State Enterprises in Queensland, 1915-1918*. Unpub. B.A. thesis, University of Queensland, 1965.

The A.L.P. was prepared to tinker with the system but not to eradicate it, to reform it gradually, not to remove it.⁵⁵ The *Socialisation Objective*⁵⁶ passed at the Federal A.L.P. Conference at Brisbane in 1921, which appeared with hindsight, to be less of an expression of genuine belief and urgent requirement than a sop to union opinion and general dissatisfaction with the A.L.P., did, however, give temporary heart to the genuine socialists within the labour movement, who believed that Labor, in office, would move to implement the Objective.⁵⁷ As Rymer tells it, disillusionment, for him, set in at the Labour-in-Politics Convention at Emu Park in 1923:

"The A.R.U. was responsible for placing on the agenda paper a resolution that the Government be instructed to restore the basic wage to £4.5.0. Theodore took the view that the Conference had no authority to instruct the government on such matters. We pointed out that it was a matter of Labor policy and industrial policy, and we had every right. Finally, we did get the resolution discussed. A lot of ill feeling was shown in the debate. Theodore and McCormack and one or two others spoke, and their strong point was that one of the government's functions was to assist in the development of the State, they must get money from the loan market, they had to trim their sails accordingly, the economy of the State couldn't stand it, and so forth. Finally, Theodore said that he was about to go to London to float a loan and that he

55. "I think the political advantage in the A.L.P. to the working man is merely in the field of palliatives, such as social welfare." George Rymer.

56. The socialisation of industry, production, distribution and exchange.

57. As early as 1917 at the Toowoomba Conference of the A.R.U., it was generally expected that the Ryan Labor government would do this. "The Conference opened with the singing of "The Red Flag" - every candidate carried a red flag medallion on his lapel, and the general talk then was socialism, how to introduce it, what part the Labor government would play; and it was generally expected at that stage that the Labor government would embark on steps towards implementing socialisation of industry and re-distribution of wealth." George Rymer.

would not go with that millstone around his neck, that instruction to restore the basic wage cut."⁵⁸

To this intrinsic cleavage over capitalism and the class struggle, and all its ramifications, was added divisions between particular Labor governments and their supporters on the one hand, and the "industrialists" or "militants" on the other, over the lack of government regulatory and legislative action to assist the working man. Labor leaders were accused of working the capitalist system so as to benefit, not the workers, but the middle and upper classes. Under the guise of governing in the interests of all, Labor was said to be governing in the interests of a few - the employing class. Though in their criticisms of the performance of A.L.P. governments, or more precisely, of their lack of same for the workers' benefit, Moroney, Rymer and Nolan indulged in a form of verbal overkill, there was much in the public statements of leaders like Theodore and McCormack, and, later, Forgan-Smith and Hanlon, to provide ammunition for the A.R.U.'s heavy artillery. This was all the more surprising in view of the radical union backgrounds of some of these men.

To take as examples those at the beginning and the end of the period 1920-50, Theodore and McCormack were working men who knew what

58. Interview with George Rymer. In reply, Rymer said "that if ever there was a clear statement from a Minister of the Crown as to who was the real government of the State, we have had it from the words of Theodore when he admits that he has to go to the Jews in Lombard Street to raise a loan, and that he won't go with this millstone around his neck." Rymer and his colleagues must have been supreme optimists to have expected anything else from Theodore, in view of his bitter and vigorous opposition to the socialisation resolution at the Brisbane Conference. Cf. Ian Turner: *Industrial Labour and Politics*, pp. 222-25.

harsh working conditions were like, having been employed in the mining industry and on railway construction in North Queensland. Henderson remembers them as "working mates on Jerry Tuites' platelaying gang, "spiking" on the Mount Garnet railway construction, and two real good workers, they were most creditable to both."⁵⁹ Both were actively engaged in founding and organising the Amalgamated Workers' Association (A.W.A.), which was reputationally militant, and took it into amalgamation with the A.W.U. which in turn they came to control. Yet Theodore, as Premier, could say, "Are we not a government representing the whole of the people of the State? Are we here merely to provide higher wages and improved conditions to a privileged class of employees?...Every time I have addressed a union at the Trades Hall, I have taken up the attitude that they have no right to assume the Government is in office to tax people to reap in revenue to create privileged positions for them."⁶⁰

Theodore and McCormack were the first of a series of tough, autocratic leaders of the A.L.P.⁶¹ in Queensland, of whom V.C. Gair was the last, all excepting Hanlon and Gair, with a background of close personal association with the A.W.U. Gradual reformism was their policy

59. George Henderson: *op.cit.*, p. 44.

60. *Daily Standard*, August 6th, 1924.

61. Cf. P. Bray: *E.G. Theodore and the Queensland Labor Movement (1909-1925)*. Unpub. B.A. thesis, University of Queensland, 1958; Irwin Young: *Theodore: His Life and Times*. Alpha Books, 1971; M.J. Thompson: *The Political Career of William Forgan-Smith as it influenced economic and political developments in Queensland*. Unpub. B.A. thesis, University of Queensland, 1965.

and their belief,⁶² even though, in Hanlon's case, in a relatively short career in the railway service, he had been President of the Railway Strike Committee in the 1912 General Strike, and prominent in the Q.R.U. until he left the railways to become a grocer. Indeed, at the time of the lock-out of the railwaymen by McCormack in 1927, Hanlon entered the debate in the Assembly in support of his former work-mates, yet, in 1948, as Premier, in another strike situation, he introduced legislation which had a much more repressive effect on trade unionism than any action of McCormack's.

While it is clear that the A.R.U., representing a minority viewpoint in the trade union movement, expected far too much from any Labor government, there is evidence to suggest that Labor leaders, particularly in the period 1920-29, in attempting to govern in the interests of all, paid too little heed to the genuine desires of their original clientele, the workers. Possible reasons for this have been canvassed elsewhere,⁶³ but it would seem that leadership and the power that went with it had led these men far from their working backgrounds, and from a sympathetic understanding of the aspirations of their

62. McCormack: "We believe that the policy of gradual economic change and gradual betterment of the great mass of the people is the right line for Australia to move on." *Brisbane Courier*, February 24th, 1927.

63. Cf. E.M. Higgins: *op.cit.*; M. Bridson Cribb: *op.cit.*, p. 41; Irwin Young: *ibid.*

former work-mates.⁶⁴

In their ideological conflict with the A.R.U. the leaders of the A.L.P. could confidently rely on the support of the A.W.U. and of the majority of the railway unions, in particular that of the A.F.U.L.E. and of the sectional unions. While the relationship between the A.R.U. and these unions will be explored in the following chapter it needs to be emphasised here that the cleavage between the A.R.U. and Labor governments over ideas and beliefs extended also to the above-mentioned unions.

The close working alliance between the A.W.U. and government leaders has already been noted. While there were sufficient practical political reasons on both sides for the continuation of this partnership, it was firmly based on a mutual belief in the principle of moderate and gradual reformism and unswerving support for the arbitration system as the only proper instrument for resolving industrial conflict and

64. Bernays, a not unbiased observer, says of McCormack: "McCormack, once in government, and associated with big things, became a devotee of golf - the recreation mostly of the idle rich - and this brought him where he wanted most to be, amongst "the people who count" as he expressed it himself." C.A. Bernays: *Our Seventh Political Decade, 1920-30*, p. 292. McCormack's political enemy W. Morrow, shows more understanding: "When you're outside fighting along with the workers, naturally to get the support of the workers you become like he [McCormack] did; he was one of them and he worked honestly for them. That's one class of society. But when they put you into Parliament, you serve another class of society. It is the exploiter and the exploited. When he's there he's got to administer capitalism in accordance with what's laid down. He's going to be loyal to the Governor and the Governor represents the Queen and he's going to be loyal to Imperialism and he gets into a different category altogether. And finally he has to consider the financial position, he has to depend on the banks or the financial institutions to continue in government." Interview with W. Morrow.

achieving better conditions for the worker. The A.F.U.L.E., at this time, was the most staunch supporter of the government among the railway unions, with its leaders opposed to industrial unionism and the use of direct action to determine the outcome of industrial issues. McCormack's lock-out of the railwaymen in 1927 brought these opposing forces into alliance but it was only a temporary one, and the antagonism between the A.R.U. and the A.W.U./A.F.U.L.E., based at least in part on uncompromising ideological beliefs, continued to affect relationships within both the political and industrial wings of the A.L.P.

Community attitudes to this clash of ideological viewpoints within the labour movement have become difficult to assess accurately with the passage of time but some general statements can be made. Though their share of the total vote fluctuated⁶⁵ to the extent that electoral redistribution, weighted in the government's favour, became necessary to protect their position,⁶⁶ Labor governments remained in power, and only once in this period were their traditional supporters sufficiently aroused against them to vote them out of office. At the same time much was gradually done for the working man, particularly in public health and housing, though in the industrial field as early as 1916, a Labor government had set the pattern for the future by refusing to legislate directly on wages, hours and working conditions, directing unions' claims on these matters to an independent Arbitration Court.

65. 1920 - 47.77%; 1923 - 48.13%; 1926 - 47.96%; 1929 - 40.16% (lost); 1932 - 49.89%; 1935 - 53.43%; 1938 - 47.17%; 1941 - 51.41%; 1944 - 44.67%; 1947 - 43.58%; 1950 - 46.87%. Hughes & Graham: *op.cit.*, pp. 517-28.

66. Cf. The Electoral Districts Act 1949, *ibid.*, p. 502.

One must assume, then, that a majority of workers were satisfied with the performance of these governments and that support outside the working class was forthcoming once it became clear that no radical changes were contemplated by Labor-in-office. As Rymer has emphasised also, many workers were prepared to continue to sustain Labor governments for fear that they might be replaced by non-Labor ones. At the time when the A.R.U. was leading the campaign for the restoration of the basic wage cut made by Theodore, Rymer claims he received hundreds of letters from railwaymen pleading with him not to force the issue on that matter for the sake of the Labor government.⁶⁷ Others were concerned that leaders like Moroney and Nolan were trying to take them too fast and too far along a road which could only lead to their ultimate isolation from both the trade union and labour movements.⁶⁸

As has already been indicated, militancy among railwaymen sprang, to some extent at least, from the harsh working conditions of earlier days. As union organisations, mainly through the arbitration system, won reforms from employers, and placed the workers in the position where they were much better off than previously, most of the rank and file lost their militancy because they no longer had to endure the very real hardships of the past.⁶⁹ On the whole it is fair to say that the ideas, beliefs and values of the leaders on both sides of the union-management

67. They were prepared to sacrifice the basic wage rather than the government. Interview with George Rymer.

68. Cf. Chapter 6.

69. "We had no holidays, no sick pay, no compensation, nothing like that at all. In fact, sometimes you'd work on Sunday for nothing in the early days; but the "thinking few", the leaders, won a lot of reforms from the employers." Interview with W. Morrow.

relationship were, as Rymer states it, only those of "the intelligent and thinking minority" within the Labor movement, for the majority of the workers had very little knowledge of or interest in doctrinaire socialism.⁷⁰

To this point discussion has been oriented towards the railway service and evidence has been produced to indicate that conflicting beliefs and attitudes between the A.R.U. on the one hand, and Labor governments, the majority of railway unions and the A.W.U. on the other have been a divisive element in industrial relations within the industry and a major cause of militancy in the A.R.U. As this is a comparative study of two reputationally militant transport unions, it now becomes necessary to evaluate the extent to which clashes in ideology between operators and pilots may have affected their industrial relations relationship.

An answer to this can be given quickly and in the negative - ideological beliefs have played little or no part in industrial relations in the airline industry. The Federation has no acknowledged political philosophy or alliances. Nor is there evidence to suggest that members' attitudes to Federation policies or those of the operators are

70. "They were all honest to God good workers with very little knowledge or understanding of the social system as such. A terrible lot were anti-boss. They felt the boss was their natural enemy, but they didn't discriminate between the man who was forced into the position and the one who was really exploiting. In my opinion, the mass of the people don't think." Interview with Ernie Sampson.

conditioned in any way by their personal political beliefs.⁷¹ The pilots, as an organised body, have no social philosophy, in the sense of wishing to see changes brought about in present society; furthermore they take no official stand on social issues of the day. The nearest they approach a philosophy in terms of their attitude to industrial relations is in their determination to maintain their relative salary/status position near the top of the Australian work force, and in this their views harmonise with an increasing number of white collar and professional unions. For this purpose they are prepared to use the tactics identified with manual unions, e.g. compulsory unionism and direct industrial action.⁷²

As Encel has pointed out, "one of the major features of social history in the past 150 years has been a growth in the number of occupations which can claim professional status, and the emergence of successive professional groups,"⁷³ one of which, in their own estimation, being the Australian Federation of Air Pilots. Professional status implies legal recognition of belonging to a select group, social prestige, the opportunity to press for higher salaries because of this special status, and the ability to influence or determine standards of

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71. It has not been possible to poll the pilot membership to ascertain their political beliefs. Conversations with a cross section of pilots using Brisbane as their home port give the impression that as a group they are not politically conscious though virtually all of those with whom the writer had discussions were Liberal voters.
72. The Federation claims that so tough are the operators that without the implied threat of direct action to be used as a club in their hands, the pilots would not be able to get the operators to talk to them on industrial matters. Interview with Captain R.T. Holt.
73. S. Encel: "Social Implications of the Engineer's Case." *Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 6, No. 1, March, 1964, p. 61.

professional education.⁷⁴ In the case of the pilots, standards of physical fitness and of technical skill and competence are laid down and regularly tested by the Department of Civil Aviation, which alone has the power to issue, withhold or cancel a pilot's licence, and the degree to which the Federation has been able to influence these standards has been limited.

Unlike those in most other professional occupations the pilots have not found an unqualified acceptance of their status as such by their employers, who consider commercial flying as a highly skilled occupation and no more.⁷⁵ The high loadings on pilot salaries are seen by the operators as margins for skill and advanced technical competence rather than as an acknowledgement of professional status. A desire for recognition on this latter basis may be a factor, however subconscious, in the pilots' use of industrial action to achieve what are by the average standards of the Australian work force, very high salaries.

Since the Association of Professional Engineers of Australia, in a series of cases in the early 1960's, succeeded in having the Arbitration Commission recognise "the right of professional groups, *as such*, to a special economic and social status,"⁷⁶ similar groups, including the pilots, have been able to base their salary claims on the concept of "work value" and to do so with considerable success. The pilots' continuing concern, however, is to maintain their position

74. *ibid.* Cf. Everett C. Hughes: *Men and their Work*. The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1958.

75. Cf. *supra*, p. 200.

76. S. Encel: *op.cit.*, p. 65.

relative to that of other levels of the work force⁷⁷ and to hold open the salary gap between professionals and non-professionals.⁷⁸

The major motivation behind the militancy of some white collar unions in recent years has been their realisation that the skilled manual workers have drawn level with and in some instances out-paced them in such matters as annual and long service leave, superannuation and security of employment,⁷⁹ and that the advantages of white collar occupations have been largely eroded as the result of the national wage cases and margins for skill. The pilots' awareness of this phenomenon has been in respect of their position vis-à-vis other professions, and their leaders have fought with skill and determination to hold the line of their economic break-through in 1966-67.⁸⁰

That they have been able to use direct action or its threat with such success has been due, in part, to the Federation's tactical position within the airline industry. It has also been due to the acute perception of just such tactical advantages on the part of men like R.T. Holt, past President of the Federation and its leader at the time when it was making its substantial gains in the mid-1960's.

Captain Holt's background is typical of commercial pilots of his age in that he is an ex-service flier who entered the domestic airline industry post-war and has been flying ever since - in his case, with

77. Cf. *supra*, p. 7.

78. "The Commission's judgment [in the Engineer's Case] made it clear that disputes could be created under the relevant section of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act by "professional, semi-professional or craft organisations". S. Encel: *op.cit.*

79. Cf. R.M. Martin: "White Collar Unions in Australia", *op.cit.*

80. Cf. *supra*, p. 123.

Ansett/A.N.A. The initial impression is one of supreme physical fitness, reinforced at later meetings by a realization that toughness of body is matched by toughness of mind. Extremely able and personally highly organised, it is obvious that Captain Holt has all the complicated functioning of the industry at his fingertips. In keeping with the Federation's attitude to industrial relations, he impresses one as a supreme pragmatist who has had considerable influence on the approach and tactics of the Federation in their industrial dealings. It could almost be said that in recent years the Federation has become what it has in response to his ideas of what it should be, and of the pilots' place in the wider community.

The vulnerability of the operators to strike action has strengthened the hands of the Federation. This is particularly so in the case of Australia's international airline, Qantas, where it has been found that many passengers lost through strike action transfer their allegiance permanently to competitors. The pilots' strategic position within their industry is no longer matched, however, by the railwaymen within theirs.

The increasingly widespread ownership and use of the private motor car and of road transport for many kinds of freight haulage have meant that in the case of a railway strike the inconvenience suffered by potential suburban and long distance passengers, and by those who wish to ship or receive mail and freight is by no means as acute as it would

have been prior to the last war.⁸¹ Generally speaking, with regard to loss of government revenue, the railway department is now likely to suffer more from strikes in other industries which use the railways extensively, such as coal and other mining, or from the effects of prolonged drought in the pastoral industry, than it is from strike action of its own employees.

This is not to suggest that there will be no reaction to strikes from the general public, but community response will vary according to the reasons for the use of direct action, the degree to which these can be clearly explained through the mass media,⁸² the extent and duration of the strike and a host of other more intangible factors.⁸³

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81. The 1948 railway strike would be an exception to this statement as, although the war was over, petrol rationing was still enforced and new motor vehicles were not yet readily available. Cf. Neil W. Chamberlain & J.M. Schilling: *The Impact of Strikes. Their Social and Economic Costs*. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1954, Chapters 7 and 8. Note also Sterling D. Spero: *Labour Relations in British Nationalised Industry*. New York Univ. Press, New York, 1955, p. 45, where, in commenting on the national rail strike in England in May, 1955, he says "that this strike demonstrated that the railway workers owing to the development of alternative modes of transportation, no longer have the power they once had to tie up the country."
82. Extensive use of the mass media for publicity purposes and to put their case before the public was made by the railwaymen in the 1919 Railway Strike in Great Britain and this appears to have been responsible for a loss of public support by the government. Cf. Philip S. Bagwell: *op.cit.*, pp. 392-6. Note also the black-out of the mass media with respect to all Disputes Committee and Labour Council decisions, speeches etc. imposed by the Hanlon government during the 1948 Railway Strike.
83. V.L. Allen: *Trade Unions and the Government*. Longmans, London, 1960 p. 213 makes the point that when the Government is the employer, a strike against it is more than a trial of economic strength, and in such a case the outcome of the strike will depend to a large extent on the public impression created during the strike. Allen believes that, in Britain, the public react against anything likely to damage the system of parliamentary democracy and "thus, they protect the Government from unconstitutional pressure, such as strike action."

It is clear, however, that unions contemplating direct action should also include a possible hostile public reaction in their pre-strike calculations. If "the parties [to a strike] have assessed the likely costs of an adverse public sentiment and have decided to incur them rather than accept, as the only prospective alternative, the costs of conceding to the other's demands then the sanction [of public opinion] is ineffective because it has already been anticipated."⁸⁴

Insufficient work has been done in Australia in investigating the attitudes of the workers themselves to the use of direct action in industrial disputes. Dufty in his studies of small groups of skilled manual workers and white collar unionists⁸⁵ has shown that there are differences in the views held by each group as to the use of the strike weapon⁸⁶ and that "the white collar workers were more inclined than the blue collar workers to think that strikes were only used as a last resort."⁸⁷

Little as these preliminary studies tell us, they appear to be in

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84. Neil W. Chamberlain: *Social Responsibility and Strikes*. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1953, p. 252. "Only in the event that unforeseen sanctions are encountered, imposing costs of unexpected magnitude, will the resolute parties be shaken from their predetermined positions."
85. N.F. Dufty: "The Skilled Worker and his Union", and N.F. Dufty: "The White Collar Unionist", *op.cit.*
86. Over one third of white collar unionists were of the opinion that the strike weapon should never be used, as against one quarter of the skilled workers. Three quarters of each sample gave the arbitration system their approval, even though in some cases this was qualified. *ibid.*
87. Dufty: "The White Collar Unionist", p. 155. "The skilled worker, of course, had more personal experience of and involvement in strikes than the white collar unionist."

line with differences in attitudes and aims between manual and white collar workers and unions as considered by Rawson⁸⁸ and Martin.⁸⁹ The difficulties of categorizing organisations of employees have already been discussed⁹⁰ and this study, dealing as it does with only two unions, cannot offer sufficient evidence to tip the scales either way. Certainly, the A.R.U. fulfils most of Rawson's criteria for a trade union; affiliation with Trades and Labor Council and the A.L.P. (though not to the latter between 1926 and 1957); broader aims than mere economic self interest and a strong sense of being part of the working class. To the extent that it does not fulfil any of these, the Federation would fit Rawson's requirements for a non-trade union - an association of independent employees. Beyond this point of agreement, neither the manual union nor the white collar Federation match Rawson's model precisely, though the A.R.U. does follow it more closely.

The Federation is confined in its coverage to people working for a very few employers, but the number of its full-time officials would be comparable with those of the A.R.U. (on a national basis) and their membership dues are probably the highest of any organisation of employees in Australia, while those of the A.R.U. (Q'ld.) are extremely low. The Federation does however follow Rawson's model in that it eschews political commitment of any kind and although affiliated with A.C.S.P.A.

88. D.W. Rawson: "The Frontiers of Trade Unionism", *op.cit.*

89. R.M. Martin: "Class Identification and Trade Union Behaviour: The Case of Australian White Collar Unions", *op.cit.* in which Martin disputes Rawson's line of argument.

90. Cf. *supra*, Chapter 1.

it considers this link to be of the most tenuous and prefers to operate independently of other white collar unions.⁹¹

Therefore, while these two unions do not strictly conform to Rawson's classifications to the extent of supporting in their entirety his claims for a clear demarcation between manual unions and white collar organisations, they do not stray far enough from them to give unqualified support to Martin's arguments. For the purpose of this study and of this chapter, the important distinction between *one* manual union and *one* white collar organisation within the transport industry lies in the fundamental difference between them over long term aims. Both the A.R.U. and the Federation have used direct action as a tactical weapon and part of their overall strategy of industrial relations; but while the Federation's purpose has always been confined to furthering the narrow economic interests of its members, the militancy of the A.R.U. has been part of a long term campaign, not only to alter the composition of the trade union movement to one of industry-based unions, but to build on this foundation a new social and political order, in which the worker would emerge triumphant.

91. D.W. Rawson: *op.cit.*, p. 203.

CHAPTER 6

THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SETTING OF THE PARTIES, WHICH INCLUDES THE RELATIONS OF THE UNION TO OTHER UNIONS [AND TO THE AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY]; AND THE MANAGEMENT TO OTHER MANAGERMENTS, BOTH GENERALLY AND IN ITS LABOUR RELATIONS POLICIES.¹

Within any industry, relations between unions and management will be affected by continuing disharmony among the unions whose members constitute its work force. It can also be hypothesized that the greater the number of unions represented, the more difficult it will become to establish agreement on all points in question, and the number of incidents and issues in dispute requiring resolution will multiply in proportion to the number of unions likely to be involved. Moreover, the quality of industrial relations depends to some degree on the interpersonal relationships between management and unions and on the establishment of effective lines of communication between them, and this becomes harder to achieve when there are twenty or more unions than when there are only two or three.² On the other hand, a multiplicity of unions, operating within the one industry, provides an excellent opportunity for a management, so inclined, to employ the classic "divide and rule" strategy and offers a greater temptation to do so rather than to take the more laborious course of attempting to establish good relations with all.

When the employing side of the relationship is vested in agents of

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1. J.T. Dunlop: *op.cit.*, pp. 386-7.
 2. Writing in *The Daily Standard*, September 16th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, 1966, p. 2, Moroney cited 43 unions represented within the Queensland railway service.

the government of the day, as it is in the Railway Departments in each State and the Commonwealth, and when, in turn, the A.L.P. forms that government, then the relative position of the union within the wider context of the political labour movement will have a direct bearing on industrial relations within its own industry. These propositions emerge from a study of the A.R.U.'s association with its fellow railway unions, with the A.W.U. and with the A.L.P.

There was a time, early in its history, when the A.R.U. (then known as the Q.R.E.A.) actively sought a place within the political labour movement, and when railwaymen, individually, and collectively through their union, gave vigorous and strong support to the infant A.L.P. and to the task of getting the working man into Parliament. The early secretary of the Q.R.E.A., Jimmy Wilkinson, who resigned from the railway service to place the union's chief office beyond the vengeance of the Railway Commissioner,³ became, in 1893, the first railwayman elected to the Queensland Parliament.

When Premier Philp expressed his intention, in 1903, of giving railwaymen direct representation in the State Parliament as had been effected in Victoria by the Constitution Act 1903, repealed in 1906, the union met this proposal head on, with protest meetings in Ipswich and other centres,⁴ and was instrumental in having it dropped. "While direct representation would have been very helpful to railwaymen in those days, Philp's offer was seen through as an attempt to curtail

3. Cf. *supra*, p. 70.

4. At the protest meetings, the Q.R.E.A. demanded instead the extension of the franchise and all other political rights.

Labor representation in Parliament by cutting the railway vote out of the different electorates."⁵

The Q.R.E.A. itself planned to run candidates on the Labor ticket in many electorates, "thus securing representation not only of railway interests but of general Labor interests as well,"⁶ but found a stumbling block in Rule 18 of the Regulations governing the conditions of employment in the railway service and of the conduct of railway employees. Rule 18 prevented railwaymen from participating in politics, and while they could resign, as J.S. Hardy did, to contest unsuccessfully the seat of Bundamba for Labor in 1904,⁷ they were liable to dismissal if they openly engaged in party politics while in the service. The union pressed the Railway Commissioner for the deletion of Rule 18 from the Regulations, and although he denied this request, J.F. Thallon, Commissioner from 1902 to 1911, promised not to enforce it, provided certain conditions were met.⁸ While he kept his word, his successor did not, and "in July, 1912, Albert Welsby was dismissed for having participated in the Labor candidate's campaign at Ipswich."⁹

5. *The Daily Standard*, September 9th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 2, 1966, p. 1.

6. *ibid.*

7. *ibid.*

8. Thallon is reported to have said, "So long as a man does not appear on a public platform in uniform, or use his citizen rights so far as to be disloyal, I will not interfere with him irrespective of what party is in power." *The Daily Standard*, September 16th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, 1966, p. 1.

9. *ibid.* The union was convinced "that others equally as active in the opposing camp had their actions overlooked."

The involvement of railwaymen in Labor politics continued¹⁰ and was strengthened when, following a recommendation of the Q.R.U. Annual Conference in 1914, several branches of the union affiliated with the Central Political Executive (C.P.E.), to be followed by the union as a whole in 1915.¹¹ The increasingly close association of the Q.R.U. with political Labor was part of a general pattern of growing participation by the unions, which culminated in the formation of a Labor government in Queensland in 1915, and, after the 1916 Labor Convention, in the reorganisation of the party administration so that henceforth affiliated unions, in proportion to their membership would be directly represented at both the Convention and on the C.P.E.¹² In March, 1916, Tim Moroney became the Q.R.U.'s delegate to the C.P.E. and at the Labor-in-Politics Convention in January, 1918, the union had direct representation for the first time. This shift in emphasis in the organisation of the party towards the trade unions and away from the branches most probably stimulated inter-union rivalry, in that it now became important for unions to maintain and, hopefully, increase membership figures as it was on this basis that the number of their delegates to the party's policy making bodies was allotted.

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10. Four railwaymen contested the State elections in 1912: M.J. Kirwan (railway porter), W.V. Heffernan (machinist), J.H. Sherry (labourer) and G. Walden (railway clerk), of whom Kirwan, in winning the seat of Brisbane, was the only one successful. *ibid.* and D. J. Murphy, R. Joyce & C.A. Hughes: *Prelude to Power*, Appendix I, pp. 317-24.
 11. "It was the first railway organisation to affiliate with the C.P.E. immediately political rights were granted railwaymen." Moroney: *The Daily Standard*, September 30th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 12, 1966, p. 3.
 12. Cf. D.J. Murphy: "The Changing Structure of the Party", Murphy, Joyce & Hughes: *ibid.*, pp. 89-107.

With Labor in office, the right to share in the party's policy making accorded to it through affiliation, and its own membership increasing, the Q.R.U. appeared well placed to play an influential role in both the industrial and political wings of the A.L.P. Yet its position was challenged from the beginning by a stronger rival, for, as Murphy has noted,¹³ Theodore, through amalgamation, had already forged a powerful political instrument in the A.W.U. with a ready-made propaganda machine available to it in the *Worker* newspaper; more crucially for the Q.R.U., "by 1914 the largest single group of members on the C.P.E. were members of the A.W.U."¹⁴

It was not until after 1920, however, with Theodore as Premier and Moroney established as General State Secretary of the A.R.U., that conflict and rivalry became overt so as to threaten the stability of the party and the existence of the union. When it did come, the clash was not simply one over ideals and aspirations between the government and a radical "industrialist" union,¹⁵ though that provided a solid basis for the antagonism. Overlaid upon the mutual distrust of each other's intentions and beliefs were the complications of inter-union rivalry between the A.R.U. and the government's major source of support, the A.W.U., and also between the A.R.U. and other unions in the railway service, notably the A.F.U.L.E.

There were various reasons for this rancorous competition; some

13. *ibid.*, p. 105.

14. *ibid.*

15. Cf. *supra*, Chapter 5.

of them have already been canvassed in this study: the clash of ideological beliefs, the effects of preferential unionism and bracketing which encouraged "body snatching" and demarcation disputes between the industrial union and the craft organisations.¹⁶

Another factor may have been the number of small unions, organised on the basis of a certain class of work, like the Guards, Station Masters etc., some of which had splintered off from the A.R.U.¹⁷ It is strange that sectionalism has been endemic in the railway service in Queensland, when it is largely absent from those of the other States and of the United Kingdom.¹⁸ It has been argued frequently that "the Queensland Railways' Union [A.R.U.] is unwilling to grant recognition to sections of employees in particular Branches of the Railway Service, and as at present constituted, is too large and unwieldy a body to care properly for the interests of employees in such Branches where questions arise which affect only the employees in a certain Branch,"¹⁹

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16. Note somewhat similar factors at work in Great Britain where the syndicalist philosophy of the National Union of Railwaymen (an industrial union) has led it "to oppose the other unions, particularly the Engineers and Firemen (A.S.L.E.F.), not merely as competitors for membership but also as disrupters of the unity of railway workers. The rivalry between the N.U.R. and the A.S.L.E.F. has at times degenerated into open hostility." Sterling D. Spero: "Labour Relations in British Nationalised Industry", *op.cit.*, pp. 36-37.
17. Cf. *supra*, pp. 80-82.
18. It exists in other services but only on a small scale. The N.U.R. in New South Wales, while a break-away union from the A.R.U., is itself an industrial and not a sectional union.
19. J.B. Harding, Secretary of the Queensland Railway Traffic Employees Union, in a sworn affidavit, dated 17/9/1917 and submitted to the Industrial Court of Queensland. *Industrial Court File No. 37.*

but even if there was truth in this statement, though the A.R.U. is organised on a job basis as well as on area,²⁰ it does not account for the relative absence of sectionalism in railway services which contain large all-grades unions such as that of the United Kingdom. Was the A.R.U. leadership more aggressive in Queensland and therefore more frightening; was it more active in the practice of direct industrial action than unions elsewhere led by "syndicalists" and therefore to be shunned? One cannot tell with any certainty.

A feeling did exist that a union like the A.R.U., a large part of whose membership was drawn from the semi-skilled and unskilled ranks had nothing to offer to the more "elite" sections of the service, and indeed, might neglect their interests in favour of those of the majority.²¹ As Frank McKenna has pointed out with respect to the British Railways - and there are no indications that a similar situation did not exist in Australia - "Railwaymen are notoriously divided across the board of the industry by their different grades. Each man believes that without his particular section the industry would grind to a stop. Footplate men believe that the "desk men" and the "station men" are not really railwaymen at all because they have nothing to do with the real

20. Cf. *supra*, p. 151.

21. It is interesting to note that some members of the administrative staff of the Queensland Railways to whom the writer has spoken, acknowledged membership in the A.R.U. in the early part of their career but said they had left the union "because it was only looking after the interests of the engine-drivers." Discussions at the *No. 4 Review Course in Railway Administration*, The Institute of Management, University of N.S.W., November, 1971.

job of getting the trains on the track."²² At the other end of the scale, a vast gulf yawns between the "aristocracy of labour" and the men in the dead-end, unskilled jobs. What is more, "railways are a conglomeration of skills and talents, very few of which are interchangeable,"²³ so it can easily be seen that small group exclusiveness is a natural by-product of the organisation of tasks and duties in railway services and this may well flow on into union organisation.

There is no doubt, also, that some of the moderate and conservative unions, those that were not radical in their beliefs, made no secret of their dislike for the philosophical and political idealism of Moroney, Nolan and their colleagues,²⁴ and their own loyal adherence to the arbitration system led them to deplore the use of direct action except as a last resort, and to be fearful of what they saw as the "spoiling" tactics of the A.R.U. in industrial matters.

22. Frank McKenna: "A Glossary of Railwaymen's Talk", *op.cit.*, p.vii. "These divisions have deep historical roots. The early railways were organised on a military basis, with grades replacing ranks. The companies relied on the different grades to discipline and keep a check on one another."

23. *ibid.*, p. viii.

24. J.B. Harding: *op.cit.* "The said Union [Queensland Railway Traffic Employees] consists of Railway Employees, the great majority of whom were formerly members of the Queensland Railways Union, and who resigned therefrom because of the decision of a majority of the delegates to the Conference of the said Queensland Railways Union to vote from the funds of the said union a sum of £10 to the Workers Defence Committee in aid of certain members of an organisation known as the 'International Workers of the World', and because of the actions of an official organiser of the said Queensland Railways Union, who was the duly accredited delegate of the 'International Workers of the World' to a conference of employees employed by the government, in advocating the adoption by such employees of a 'go slow' policy, which is believed by me to be recognised as one of the principles of the said organisation."

Unquestionably, Moroney's leadership *was* combative and forceful, and the probable domination of this man and his views within any proposed amalgamation of railway unions threatened to overwhelm not only their own desires to support the government, its policies and its instrumentalities, but also their own positions of power and influence as leaders of independent, though often numerically small, unions.

Another possible cause of friction may have been that the A.R.U. did not go quietly about its business, holding to its "different" ideas but abstaining from the missionary role. George Rymer was a good proselytizer through the *Advocate*, though Moroney was a more fluent and rousing speaker in public. Between them they kept up a ceaseless educational and propaganda campaign, which was continued by Nolan, and although *The Advocate* could not compare with *The Worker* in the size of its circulation and the extent of its reading public, the message of solidarity, industrial unionism and direct action was carried to railwaymen in most areas of the State.²⁵ Books and pamphlets, many of them part of the literature of the I.W.W., went the same way, "to educate the railwaymen to the need for industrial unity, and as to its bearing upon working class emancipation."²⁶

For these sorts of reasons, it is not surprising that inter-union solidarity was not easily achieved in the Queensland railway service.

25. After the 1927 strike, McCormack cancelled the right of free carriage on the trains for *The Advocate*, an action which the A.R.U. viewed as one of pure spite.

26. *The Daily Standard*, September 23rd, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 7, 1966, p. 2. Cf. *Railwaymen and Unionism: a Case for Amalgamation*, Australian Railways Union (Q'ld. Branch), n.d.

It was attained in the 1925 railway strike,²⁷ but only because the issues were plainly industrial, and the case for the restoration of the basic wage cut was widely supported by rank and file workers. Furthermore, Premier Gillies acceded to the railwaymen's demands within a week which gave the "united front" little opportunity to crumble. When Gillies was moved almost immediately from the Premiership to the Board of Trade and Arbitration, a more worthy opponent for the "militant minority" was found in the new Premier, W. McCormack.

Cohesion among the railway unions was more difficult to sustain in 1927 when they were drawn into the South Johnstone sugar workers dispute, even though McCormack outraged large sections of the labour movement, and the Labor press, too,²⁸ by his lock-out of the railwaymen. Firstly, the strike dragged on for some weeks and the issues, as they affected railwaymen, were not clear beyond the need to sustain other workers in their attempt at direct action, viz: the northern sugar workers, who belonged to the A.W.U.

Moreover, solidarity was never possible once T. Kissick of the A.F.U.L.E., supported by some of the small, sectional unions, made it

27. For a more detailed account of the 1925 and 1927 railway strikes, see M. Bridson Cribb: *op.cit.*

28. "If the Government wanted a single handed scrap with the A.R.U., anyone of a dozen issues could have been selected, none of which would involve a basic principle, but this issue, which strikes at the very root of industrial organisation, strangely enough seems to suit a Labor Premier and a Labor Cabinet as well as any other." *The Worker*, August 31st, 1927, p. 6.

clear that his union had no quarrel with the Government,²⁹ even after it had locked out A.F.U.L.E. members along with those of the other railway unions. At Kissick's request, a South Johnstone and Railways Dispute Committee was set up which he and his colleagues came to control; at the same time he refused to be publicly associated in any way with Moroney and Rymer.³⁰ Under these circumstances, the strike was settled on McCormack's terms, which included the requirement that the men sign a pledge to obey the rules and regulations of the Railway Department before they could be reinstated in the service.

In the period under review in this study, the longest and most important exercise in the use of direct industrial action, as applied by railway workers, was the 1948 railway strike. This strike was in operation from February 2nd to April 6th, and during that period a remarkably high and constant level of solidarity was maintained. On this particular occasion, the industrial issues centred upon the workshop and running shed tradesmen, who had not received "the additional marginal increases of 16/-, 13/- and 11/- already paid under

29. T. Kissick: *Brisbane Courier*, September 8th, 1927. "Up to the present his organisation had no quarrel with the Government. As the Premier had stated, the issue of the ultimatum was, in effect, to bring the matter to a head quickly and the most important reason was to put the members who had already been dismissed in exactly the same position as those who were employed... He was quite satisfied that the Government and his union sympathetically agreed that railwaymen could not be the buffer in every industrial dispute."

30. *Brisbane Courier*, August 27th, 1927. Kissick stated that members of his union did not want to be addressed at meetings by either Rymer or Moroney, and that he himself would not sit on any platform with them. For these and other actions, Kissick was expelled as a delegate of the A.F.U.L.E. to the Trades and Labor Council. *The Advocate*, November 15th, 1927.

the Mooney Award to rail workers in other States, and to thousands of metal workers throughout Australia including employees in private industry in Queensland."³¹ Thus the original impetus for the withdrawal of labour came, not only from members of the A.R.U., but also from the powerful Amalgamated Engineering Union (A.E.U.), supported by its federal organisation, together with other workshop craft organisations, such as the Federated Ironworkers' Association, the Blacksmiths' and Boilermakers' Societies, the Electrical Trades Union and the Vehicle Builders' Federation.

The A.F.U.L.E. representative was a member of the Central Disputes Committee which unanimously called the strike for midnight, February 2nd, 1948 and Theo. Kissick, still leader of the union, is recorded as one of a team of trade union speakers who, "working day and night, week after week - kept striking railwaymen informed of each development and the tactics necessary to carry the dispute further stages towards victory."³² Yet a perusal of the Railway Dispute Fund, managed by the Queensland Trades and Labor Council, shows that out of a total amount of £6,236.6.4 raised by unions in Queensland alone,³³ the A.F.U.L.E. contributed only £66 and there is no record of the railway sectional unions providing one penny of finance for the strike. On March 15th,

31. *The Queensland Railway Strike: Report and Balance Sheet.* Queensland Railways Central Disputes Committee, February, 1949, p. 6.

32. *ibid.*, p. 12.

33. *ibid.*, pp. 68-71. The total receipts to the strike fund from throughout Australia were £35,084.12.7, but this did not include substantial amounts paid out by individual unions to their members as strike pay.

the A.F.U.L.E. Divisional Council ordered its members back to work, and this was the only break in the united front until the miners, who had come out on a solidarity basis only, returned to work on March 23rd. Once again the A.F.U.L.E. and the sectional unions had not stood together to the end with other railway workers in a strike action.

It is true that in 1948 the issue of tradesmen's marginal increases did not directly impinge on A.F.U.L.E. members, or guards, shunters, station-masters etc., but there was a much more cogent reason why they found it difficult, and eventually, impossible to make common cause with other workers in this strike. A number of union representatives on the Disputes Committee were known Communists, and the A.E.U. which was spearheading the action was, federally, a Communist controlled union; its Federal Councillor, E.J. Rowe, who provided much of the dynamism and tactical leadership of the strike was also a Communist. As the strike rolled on, control of it passed to these men together with their comrades J. Healy and E. Englart of the Waterside Workers' Federation, while the overt activity of the Communist Party itself, along with some of its auxiliary and front organisations e.g. Eureka Youth League, Militant Women, was stepped up to such a degree that the Party, together with its members in the unions, was, to all intents and purposes, in command of the strike.

The A.R.U.'s long and close association, both personally on the part of its leaders, and collectively through its membership, with men like F.W. Paterson, Communist-M.L.A. for Bowen, had been an issue between itself and the less radical unions at the time of the 1927

strike and much had been publicly made of this, then and later,³⁴ by its opponents in the Government and the A.W.U. As has been stated previously, while Moroney and Rymer were not Communists, though branded as such,³⁵ their ideological beliefs were of such a kind that little separated them on the principles of industrial unionism and the use of direct industrial action. The A.R.U. was not bound by the dictates of International Communism and could, therefore, be more flexible with regard to the timing and tactics of industrial action. In 1948 the strategy of the Communist Party impelled strike action,³⁶ which, for different reasons, was in accord with A.R.U. desires.

Disregarding the A.F.U.L.E. and the sectional railway unions, there are several explanations for the high level of united action achieved in 1948. Firstly there is no doubt that once the Communists gained control they brought efficiency, expertise and tactical skills to the day-to-day management of the action. This applied particularly to the well organised picketing which must have intimidated many waverers, and to the skilful and continuous use of pamphleteering and panels of speakers to keep in close communication with the workers, and for general propaganda purposes. Even Hanlon's mass media blackout did not prevent them from informing the workers of what was going on. The Government's introduction of the State of Emergency and its use or abuse, depending

34. See *Q.P.D.* for 1927.

35. Rymer was invariably spoken of in debate and in the press as "Red" Rymer. Moroney did not suffer attack on the same scale, evidently because it was well known that he was a staunch and active member of his church.

36. Cf. *supra*, pp. 95-97.

on one's viewpoint, of these powers would also have contributed to the closing of ranks among the strikers. Finally, as has also been previously argued,³⁷ harsh and difficult working conditions are a factor in creating militancy, and railway workers, throughout the war years, had been operating in a work environment of under-staffing, extremely long hours, and with depleted and worn rolling stock and locomotives.³⁸

It should be remembered that from 1941 to 1945, "Queensland's geographical position made it the battlefront State,"³⁹ and that the brunt of the transport within Australia of the war requirements of the Australian and Allied armies was borne by the Queensland railway service. The misguided⁴⁰ decision taken by "the federal authorities to build, for wartime use, a number of locomotives on the Garratt principle,"⁴¹ brought the first of these into service in late 1943. By 1945, pre-war stocks of carriages, wagons and locomotives had been operated far beyond their normal capacity and the service was forced to rely heavily on the Garratt locomotives. Both the Commissioner⁴² and the men who drove them⁴³ attested to their danger in operation e.g.

37. Cf. *supra*, Chapter 4.

38. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for the years ended June 30th, 1945-1948.

39. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for the year ended June 30th, 1945.

40. This was the view of the Railway Commissioner, *ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

41. *ibid.*

42. *ibid.*

43. *ibid.* "For several weeks past all of the Garratt engines have been laid up, due to the refusal of enginemen to operate them, following a series of derailments."

the lifting of one of the driving wheels clear off the road when the engines rounded sharp curves.

The situation was made worse by a series of accidents and derailments, culminating in the Camp Mountain rail disaster in May, 1947, "when 16 persons, including the driver and fireman of the train lost their lives and 38 others were injured."⁴⁴ While the report of the subsequent public inquiry stated that "the accident was caused by excessive speed, and was not attributable to any defect in locomotive, rolling stock or permanent way,"⁴⁵ railwaymen were not convinced, and it continued to be widely rumoured throughout the service that the locomotives and rolling stock operated by train crews were death traps.

These feelings of disquiet were exacerbated by the fact that the Department appeared to be doing nothing to relieve the situation. Long range forecasting by the Department of post-war needs had been slow and hesitant and the manpower shortage meant that the Ipswich Workshops, fully engaged in locomotive repairs, and carriage and wagon construction and repair, could not build new locomotives, orders for which had to be placed with outside firms. Of 74 new locomotives previously ordered up to and including 1947, only four were received and placed in service in that year.⁴⁶ Understandably, such dangerous working conditions, continuing on much longer than anticipated or promised, produced stress and tension and more of a mood to countenance strike action over another

44. Report of the Commissioner for Railways for the year ended June 30th, 1947, p. 27.

45. *ibid.*

46. *ibid.*, p. 23.

issue than might have been present in a more normal situation.

The A.W.U. was not involved in either the 1925 or the 1948 strikes and although in 1927 the strike had begun with A.W.U. members, the union's role became peripheral once the railwaymen had been locked out. The A.W.U.'s rivalry with the A.R.U. took other forms and it was in a much better position to initiate conflict and to inflict wounds upon its opponent than were the railway sectional unions, because of the size of its membership, relative to the A.R.U.,⁴⁷ and its position of power, arising not only from its place in the labour movement but also from its membership, directly and indirectly, in the organisational "machine" of the A.L.P., in the parliamentary party, and among the leaders. "Body snatching" and encroachments on each others preserves were more likely to hurt the A.R.U. with its smaller and exclusively railway service membership than any raid in reverse by the A.R.U. upon the A.W.U.

The A.W.U. launched a two-pronged attack on the A.R.U. in 1926. In the industrial field, it announced the formation of a Railway Section within its own organisation,⁴⁸ and though the oft-trumpeted number of 5,000 members did not secede from the A.R.U., Moroney admitted that at least 400 had done so. The situation became quite critical for a time with the defection to the enemy camp of the South-

47. Cf. Table IX, p. 255. The marked drop in 1927 in A.R.U. membership from that in 1925 when it reached a peak never achieved before or since should be noted. Though there was a comparable increase in membership figures for the A.W.U. there is no way of knowing to what extent these were recruited from the A.R.U.

48. *The Advocate*, April 12th, 1927.

TABLE IX

Year	A. R. U. Australian Railways Union	F. E. D. F. A. Federated Engine- drivers & Firemen	A. F. U. L. E. Australian Federated Union of Loco-engine- men	Queensland Railway Traffic Employees	Queensland Railway Mainten- ance	Queensland Railway Salaried Officers	Queensland Railway Stn. masters Asst. Stn. masters & Night officers	A. W. U. Australian Workers Union
1922	9094	2059	1580					31910
1923	9037	2587	1513	595		567		32694
1924	10361	2652	1513*	518		585		39472
1925	13190	2628	1809	853		588		45816
1926	13190*	3046	1809*	847		619		56000
1927	8972	2734	2271	1020		1100		58244
1928	7153	2691	2265	1429				53000
1929	7455	2869	2239	1429*				51331
1930	7033	2884	2102					45180
1931	6176	2650	2010					31874
1932	5789	2792	2023					26862
1933	5845	2609	1987	1502	1108			33500
1934	5885	2849	1938	1456	1238			44156
1935	6287	3071	1800	1479	1222	920		53547
1936	6434	3279	1890	1591	1253	996		52277
1937	7015	3751	1892	1565	1299	979		55216
1938	7059	3405	1915	1598	1359	977		57856
1939	7251	3761	1916	1603	1448	1018		64711
1940	7524	3932	1948	1809	1639	1011		66017
1941	7847	4061	1979	1914	1773	1093		59624
1942	8450	4556	2097	2018	1809	1136		63110
1943	8647	4874	2231	2269	1771	1142		49879
1944	9221	5108	2349	2110	1746	1158		47632
1945	10038	5021	2279	2242	1863	1140		43534
1946	10038*	4138	2077	1950	2272	1059	815	52425
1947	9748	3881	2305	2206	2447	1062	869	57610
1948	9311	4006	2520	2614	2637	1019	878	65516
1949	9523	4075	2694	2753	2972	1035	945	67479
1950	9358	3850	2977	2735	2796	1074	1049	73131
* Figure not available - previous year's figure repeated.								

Source: *Queensland Year Book.*

A.B.C. of Queensland and Australian Statistics - compiled by
George Porter, Registrar General, Government Printer, Brisbane,
1928-34.

eastern Divisional Secretary of the A.R.U., Jack Hayes.⁴⁹ This forced a reorganisation upon the union and the disciplining of the South-eastern Executive; confirmation of Hayes' expulsion was sought and obtained from the A.R.U. State Conference of that year.⁵⁰

The formation of a railway section within the A.W.U. was most likely meant as a provocation to its opponent. Skirmishes of this kind cannot have been important to the larger organisation, conscious as they were that in the wider field of labour politics they could humiliate the A.R.U. and negate its influence because of their increasing control of the A.L.P. "machine", where they "had the numbers". Accordingly, the A.W.U.-Government alliance moved against the A.R.U. at the Labor-in-Politics Convention at Southport in 1926 and in the process wiped out their own humiliation at the previous Convention at Emu Park, where the parliamentary leaders had come close to defeat by the "industrialists" and their allies.

For the purpose of implementing the 1924 Federal A.L.P. Conference resolution on Communists,⁵¹ the Q.C.E., in 1925, had demanded that all

49. State Secretary's Report, State Conference, A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch), 1926 and General Secretary's Report, Australian Council of A.R.U., 1926.

50. A re-organisation of the duties of A.R.U. officers had been undertaken in 1920 and Hayes, who had been Branch secretary, became District Secretary of the South-eastern Division. *The Daily Standard*, September 30th, 1922, p. 8, reprinted in *The Advocate*, Vol. XLVI, No. 9, 1966, p. 2. Hayes' defection must have rankled for Nolan mentions it in his Report to the 24th State Conference of the A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch), October 27th, 1966, p. 32.

51. This resolution of the 1924 Federal A.L.P. Conference declared itself against affiliation with the Communist Party of Australia and laid down the ineligibility of Communists for membership in the A.L.P. L.F. Crisp: *The Australian Federal Labour Party 1901-51*, Longman Green & Co., London, 1955, pp. 176-7.

party members sign a pledge affirming that they were not members of the Communist Party. The A.R.U. delegates, Rymer and Moroney, refused to do so on the grounds that the Q.C.E. had no right to instruct a member of an industrial union to sign such a pledge, and this stand was endorsed by every District Council of the union. However, after discussion within the A.R.U. State Council it was decided that the pledges would be signed and endorsed to the effect that this was done on the instructions of the Council.⁵²

Some months later, at the Labor Convention, the Premier (McCormack) moved the suspension of standing orders to discuss the pledges of the A.R.U. delegates, which, in his view, were unacceptable as they were not unconditional.

*"As a result, the whole matter came up for discussion and there were quite a lot of arguments taking place about it, and we saw the spectacle of Cabinet Ministers going around amongst A.L.P. branch representatives and public servants, and evidently private discussions were taking place all around the hall. We learned afterwards that pressure was being put on them that they must vote in the right direction - and when the numbers went up we were passed out from the Southport Convention."*⁵³

After a lengthy but futile correspondence between the A.R.U. and the Q.C.E., the union disaffiliated from the A.L.P. and did not return until 1957, when, at the time of the split, the Trades Hall group, including the A.R.U., gained the ascendancy, and the A.W.U. itself subsequently left the party.

52. Cf. *Brisbane Courier*, November 30th, 1925 and February 9th, 1926. Also M. Bridson Cribb: *op.cit.*

53. Interview with George Rymer.

The isolation of the A.R.U. within the labour movement was thus accomplished, and this must inevitably have affected its industrial position and the extent of its following within the railway service.⁵⁴ Though ideologically opposed to parliamentary action and believing that unions would gain only what their power and strength enabled them to take, Moroney himself conceded that many A.R.U. members wished to be part of some political organisation, preferably the A.L.P.

From the evidence presented above, it would seem that inter-union rivalry did affect industrial relations in the Queensland railway service and, furthermore, that power struggles within the political labour movement had their repercussions industrially when the A.L.P. was in office. It would also appear that sustained militancy, unless used as a tactical weapon only, as the pilots use it, can be counter-productive. Where militancy forms part of the total corpus of belief of a union's leadership and is directed to long-term social changes as well as short-term industrial issues, its continuing use may, in time, be destructive of the union itself, in terms of loss of membership, finance, etc., unless these beliefs reflect those of the majority of the wider industrial community. In a similar manner, sustained support for militant action at the rank and file level to which leaders fail to respond may, in turn, lead to the defeat of the leaders themselves.⁵⁵ Finally, from what has been seen of the Queensland railway service, if

54. Cf. Table IX, p. 255.

55. Cf. Lloyd Ross: "A Campaign for an Industry Allowance - Some Sociological Aspects", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 1, April, 1961, pp. 64-67.

direct industrial action is to be successful inter-union rivalry has to be overcome and solidarity maintained; this suggests that industrial issues must be present of sufficient importance to elicit sustained response from the majority of workers.

The Australian Federation of Air Pilots has been fortunate in that it has not had to concern itself in any meaningful way, until recently, with countering the claims of rival unions, and, consequently, to be able to speak on behalf of *all* pilots has been one of its strengths in industrial bargaining with the operators. While the ground staff in the airline industry are covered by many different unions, and cabin crew by the Flight Stewards Association and the Airline Hostesses Association, the pilots share the flight deck with only one other group - the Flight Engineers, organised in the Australasian Airline Flight Engineers Association.⁵⁶ As no one other than a currently licenced pilot may take an aircraft off the ground, the Federation need not fear that if it calls out its members, the Flight Engineers will replace them and keep the aircraft flying.⁵⁷

Until 1968, with the occasional and very rare exception, all pilots employed by the Australian domestic operators and by Qantas were

56. There is one other group, all of which are employed by Qantas - the Australasian Airline Navigators' Association. This body is not and never has been registered under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act because it has insufficient members to qualify for registration.

57. Overlapping membership in railway unions does pose a problem, e.g. the A.R.U. and the A.F.U.L.E. both represent engine drivers and unless solidarity is maintained, a strike by one union may be broken by members of the other union continuing to work.

members of the Federation. The situation changed, but only marginally, with the advent of the Air Pilots' Guild of Australia in that year.⁵⁸ Soundings taken early in 1971 had indicated that Guild membership had contracted to a mere handful, and even that assessment may have been optimistic.⁵⁹ There were several pilots who belonged to neither organisation at that time.⁶⁰

The Federation had been disturbed by the existence of the Guild and although the latter was in its dying throes, moved to hasten its demise by blacklisting Guild members and instructing Federation pilots not to fly with them.⁶¹ It also extended this edict to cover all non-Federation pilots, which, in effect, meant that it was trying to enforce a closed shop within the industry.

When used by manual unions, the principle of compulsory or preferential unionism usually signifies that workers must take out trade union membership, otherwise their workmates will refuse to work with them. In adopting a characteristic of "trade unions", using Rawson's definition, the Federation advanced this a step further, for there is more than a semantic difference between enforcing membership in an *appropriate* trade union, and enforcing membership in *one* particular union - the Federation.

58. Cf. *supra*, p. 127-128.

59. *Courier Mail*, October 6th, 1971, where it is stated that the Guild had only two members, both employed by Ansett Airlines.

60. *ibid.* There were three pilots who did not belong to either the Federation or the Guild, all employed by Airlines of South Australia.

61. *ibid.*

Rank and file pilots with whom this latest development was discussed, supported the Federation's contention that because pilots pay very large amounts in membership fees to the Federation, it is unfair to expect that those who do not have this monetary outlay should still reap the benefits obtained for all pilots by the Federation. They were disturbed however by other implications of the rigid enforcement of membership in the Federation. A pilot not prepared to join, or expelled⁶² by the organisation would be unemployable within the domestic airline industry in Australia and by Qantas, and more than likely compelled to leave altogether the profession which used the only skills he possessed; or else leave the country, if he wished to continue as a commercial pilot and was forced to seek employment overseas.

The conflict between the Federation and the non-Federation pilots came to a head in mid-October last when Captain Ian Cameron, President of the Guild, submitted a log of claims on behalf of his members to the Flight Crew Officers' Industrial Tribunal, at the same time appealing

62. Under Rule 2, 7 a to c, pp. 17-19 of the most recent edition of the *Constitution and By-laws of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots*, provision is made for the suspension or expulsion from the Federation of any member "whose conduct has in the opinion of a majority of those present at such a Convention, been a breach of the code of ethics or proved detrimental to the interests of the Federation." Also under Rule 2, p. 13b, provision is made in the membership for what is called an Agency Client - "a pilot with conscientious objection to full membership or if he is rejected for full membership". An agency client has to pay an annual subscription equivalent to that of a full member, will be represented by the Federation in contract negotiations with his employing company, has automatic provident fund cover, and legal representation in event of aircraft accident or incident. An agency client cannot vote, attend Federation meetings, hold elective office or receive Federation publications. He is not bound by rules and by-laws of the Federation except in matters of contractual agreement, but is subject to any levies or payments required from time to time of full members.

to Mr. Justice Coldham (the Tribunal) against the decision taken by Ansett Airlines to dispense with the services of non-Federation pilots after December 8th, 1971.⁶³ The Federation had been increasing its pressure on the operator and also on its own members to enforce the union's ban on "crewing" with non-Federation pilots.⁶⁴

The Tribunal was unsuccessful in its attempt at mediation,⁶⁵ and as a direct consequence of Ansett's "notices of dismissal", Captain Cameron and his fellow-Guild member, Captain E.H. Boorman, were left with no alternative if they wished to remain in the industry but to join the Federation as "agency clients".⁶⁶ Captain Cameron was quoted as saying that the Guild would continue for it still disagreed with many of the Federation's policies and had its own industrial issues to fight, including new logs of claims for agricultural and helicopter pilots.⁶⁷

The Guild had appealed, initially, to the pilots in general aviation because this was a field largely neglected by the Federation and it could conceivably continue to represent their interests effectively in the future, though the Federation is also stirring itself at last on

63. Cf. *The Age*, October 29th, 1971, November 9th, 1971.

64. *The Australian*, October 16th, 1971. "Union ban 'caused pilots to fly under stress'."

65. Mr. Justice Coldham was severely critical of Ansett Airlines and the Federation for not trying to resolve the dispute arising out of A.F.A.P.'s policy of compulsory Federation membership. *The Australian*, *ibid.*

66. For an explanation of "agency client", see *supra*, footnote 62, p.261. The three pilots who were members of neither organisation had joined the Federation the previous week.

67. *The Age*, *ibid.*

behalf of general pilots. As a force within the Australian domestic and overseas airline industry, however, the Guild is dead. The Federation's policy of enforcing a "closed shop" has been completely successful. Yet, by adopting a rigid and authoritarian attitude on this question as it has tended to do on occasions, with the operators, the Federation could cause to happen eventually what this particular policy was obviously introduced to prevent - the creation of more than one union representing commercial pilots and the intrusion of inter-union rivalry into industrial relations in the airline industry.

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No management which produces, sells or distributes goods or services can afford to disregard competitors in the same or contiguous fields, but if it is in a monopolistic position, the question of inter-management relations becomes of much less importance. The Railway Department has such a monopoly of transport by rail in Queensland, but the service is open to competition from sea, road and air transport, which introduces an element of conflict into relationships between the four.

Coastal shipping kept alive the first settlements in what is now Queensland, and maintained their only link with Sydney. As more of the State was opened up, the steamers plied further north and by 1870 Cleveland Bay (Townsville) "had its regular steam service with Brisbane and Sydney; and within the next few years, this had been extended, first to Cooktown and then to Cairns."⁶⁸ Thereafter, and until the

68. A.G. Davies: "Pioneer Steamships in Queensland Waters", *Journal of the Historical Society of Queensland*, Vol. III, No. 1, December, 1937, p. 23.

linking of Townsville and Cairns by through rail with Brisbane in 1924, the main ports and the coastal ships which serviced them occupied a position of strategic importance in the development of Queensland.⁶⁹

In the following years, the existence of the coastal railway, with its convenience and special rates to get payable traffic and back loading, together with more intangible influences like the uncertainties of waterside troubles, general changes in shipping conditions and the government's policy of assisting industries through low railway rates, all contributed to check the growth of traffic through some of the ports.⁷⁰

69. Cf. The Bureau of Economics and Statistics: *Report upon the Enquiry into Railway Competition with Ports*. Government Printer, Brisbane, 1931, p. 12. "They were the only channels through which the ordinary trade with the South could flow, and through which overseas exports could be despatched directly or indirectly. But the very process of extending lines from the ports was bound in time to link them all together and to destroy the position of virtual monopoly which the ports enjoyed." The effect is clearly shown in these two *Appendixes to the Report of the Commissioner for Railways, 1919-20. Appendix I: Annual Report of the Central Division*. "Owing to coastal steamers not running for some time and scarcity of shipping space subsequently, there was considerable increase in railway traffic from Southern states and Brisbane to Central Division ... which caused substantial increase in revenue." *Appendix 2: Northern Division Report*. "The irregularity of arrival of shipping had a very disturbing effect on our earnings ... It is noticed that in case of loss of shipping the loss in traffic to the railway is not overtaken and as shipping has a great effect upon our railway traffic, owing to our isolation, the shipping hold up meant a very much reduced revenue to us."

70. In the past decade, with the exploitation of the mineral deposits of Central Queensland, especially coal, the establishment of an alumina plant at Gladstone, the increased export trade in meat to the American market and other developments, many of the old established ports like Bowen, Gladstone and Townsville have boomed and new ones have been established, such as Hay Point, outlet for the Goonyella coalfield. This study does not incorporate these new developments as the period under review, with regard to the Railway Department, closes at 1950.

At the same time,

*"individual ports were increasing their capacities to handle more traffic and to cater for the requirements of modern vessels. They were doing this without regard to the new situation created by the railways, or to one another, and as the State was their financier, without much anxiety as to the increase in their capital liabilities."*⁷¹

The points of emphasis here are that this expansion by both Railway Department and Harbour Boards with its consequent over-capitalization was quite uncoordinated, the losses on both sides had to be borne by the community as they were both public utilities, and any attempt by the Railway Commissioner to attract business, such as the wool trade, away from the ports, brought an immediate reaction of group pressures upon the Government of the day to restrain him. Whatever solutions were found, they were political, and not based on the premises of rationality, economy and business principles.

Parallel with the uncoordinated development of the railway system, ports and coastal shipping went the equally uncoordinated growth in road traffic and transport, first publicly noted with alarm as a potential rival to the railways by the Commissioner in his Report for 1924. There is hardly a year thereafter within our period when he does not warn of the inroads which road transport was making into railway

71. Report upon the Enquiry into Railway Competition with Ports, *op.cit.*, p. 14. Cf. The Bureau of Economics and Statistics: Railway Economics, *op.cit.*, pp. 55-57.

profits from the haulage of freight.⁷² In 1945, another serious rival was thought to be entering the field.

*"It is inevitable that in the near future the railways will be subject to much greater competition from air transport than ever before. Already there is evidence of growing air movement, while many road services which were temporarily banned during most of the war period have now been relicensed. Further, a substantial volume of transport previously handled by coastal vessels which was diverted to the railways owing to wartime shortage of shipping is certain to be conveyed by sea when ships become available. It must be apparent that unless some extraordinary new development, of which there is as yet no evidence, occurs, railway revenues will decline seriously, whereas expenditure cannot be reduced in the same ratio."*⁷³

If successive Commissioner's, each in his turn, played Cassandra to their Ministerial masters their warnings did not go entirely unheard. Both the Moore Government⁷⁴ and the following A.L.P. Government⁷⁵ in the period 1931-32 passed legislation "to create transport boards for the purpose of coordinating all forms of transport services" and through licencing, to regulate and control the expansion of road transport in

72. For example, see *Report of the Commissioner for Railways* for year ended June 30th, 1926, where, after stating that motor transport has been seriously affecting the economic working of the railways, he states, "It is to be regretted that the individual overlooks the fact that he is part owner of the railways and avails himself of a small saving in freight charges by patronising motor transport, thereby tending to reduce the revenue of the railways, the loss on which he has to make up in another direction, and, at the same time, pay increased rates for road maintenance."

73. *Report of the Commissioner for Railways* for year ended June 30th, 1945.

74. 22 Geo. V. No. 48. The State Transport Coordination Act of 1931.

75. 23 Geo. V. No. 24. The State Transport Act of 1932.

Queensland.⁷⁶ Though this was strenuously denied,⁷⁷ the legislation was seen as an attempt to protect the railways from the encroachment of road transport, and that something of that purpose was achieved was attested to by the Railway Commissioner in his Report to Parliament in the following year.⁷⁸

Succeeding governments have continued the policy of regulation of road transport intra state, by licence and permit, with the imposition of a ton-mile tax on journeys competitive with railways,⁷⁹ but since 1954, with a change in interpretation of the relevant section of the Constitution, interstate road transport has been removed from the regulation and control of the States. While the regulatory tactic has reduced competition from road hauliers within the State, it has by no

76. *Q.P.D.*, Vol. CLX, 1931, p. 2534.

77. The Secretary for Railways (Hon. Godfred Morgan, Murilla): "It has been said that the Bill is introduced for the purpose of protecting the Railways of this State. I want to give that statement a most emphatic denial. This Bill will protect all modes of transport, including the Railways." *ibid.*

78. *Report of the Commissioner for Railways* for the year ended June 30th, 1933. "Road motor competition in both passenger and goods traffic continues to seriously affect the railway revenue, although a considerable measure of coordination of road and rail transport has been achieved under the provisions of the *State Transport Act of 1932* which became operative in April, 1933. The more efficient regulation of road motor services has enabled the railways to regain portion of the traffic of which they have been deprived by reason of uneconomic competition." [In the short space of two months!]

79. H.M. Kolsen: *The Economics and Control of Road-Rail Competition*. Sydney University Press, 1968, p. 142. At the present moment, "regulation is through the *State Transport Facilities Act 1946-59*, the *State Transport Act 1960*, and the *Roads (Contribution to Maintenance) Act 1957-8*. The controlling body is the Department of Transport as set up by the *State Transport Facilities Act 1964*. There are three principal executives: the Commissioner (who is subject to the direction of the Minister), the Deputy-Commissioner, and the Secretary."

means eliminated it.⁸⁰

As Kolsen has pointed out,⁸¹ the intention has clearly been the retention of traffic by rail and no attempt has been made to guide traffic into the "best" medium. Lack of coordination of all forms of transport is the nub of a problem which is not endemic to Australia but is world wide. The present situation is a misuse of the two forms of transport from the community viewpoint, and "encourages the road haulier to concentrate selectively on the full-load, high grade traffic between main centres", - what the Commissioner for Railways calls "picking the eyes out of the trade" - "to the exclusion of the low transport volume of sparsely populated areas" which is left to the railways, but "which, in the interests of national transport economics, could be road served with far greater frequency, effectiveness and economy."⁸²

Little genuine effort appears to have been directed towards a proper coordination of national transport and because each respective system "just grew", like Topsy, it would not be easy at this stage to re-define areas of operation and re-deploy forces. There are very real obstacles in the way, including "a complicated, illogical, and unwieldy division of responsibilities between particular governments, Federal, State and local."⁸³ Men of experience and professional expertise such as the

80. *ibid.*, pp. 132-3.

81. *ibid.*, p. 142.

82. Australian Institute of Political Science: *Australia's Transport Crisis*. Angus & Robertson, Melbourne, 1956, p. 69. Cf. A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch): *24th State Conference Report*, October 27th, 1966, pp. 1-2.

83. *ibid.*, p. 6.

members of the Commonwealth Transport Committee, have met from time to time, deliberated, laid down general principles and made recommendations,⁸⁴ but so far there are few results to be noted.

Regulation of road haulage in Queensland has barely touched the problem of rationalization of the whole transport system,⁸⁵ a problem made intractable by the fact that transport has always been and still is a "political football" in this State. All governments have been subject to pressures from a variety of sources: road hauliers, pastoralists, grain growers, Chambers of Commerce and other merchant associations, shipping and mining interests, Harbour Boards and local authorities.⁸⁶ While they have basically adopted protection of the railways as their main guideline in policy, this has been subject to change at times in a quite arbitrary manner for political reasons. Consequently the

84. For example, *Summary of Report on the Co-ordination of Transport in Australia by the Commonwealth Transport Committee*, Government Printer, Canberra, May, 1929.

85. Cf. Summary of Recommendations and Conclusions contained in the Report of Ford, Bacon and Davis, Inc., on the Organisation, Facilities, and Operations of the Queensland Railways. *op.cit.* Though commissioned to examine, in the main, the internal organisation and operation of the Department, Ford, Bacon and Davis, Inc., did investigate competition from other forms of transport. They estimated (p. 2) that in 1961, road hauliers, exclusive of inter-state carriers diverted about 6% of increased ton-mile traffic. The corresponding railway revenue would have amounted to more than \$2 million in 1961. They also note a noticeable increase over the period 1951-61, in interstate tonnages carried by coastal shipping, and that "with an expanding interstate traffic both by sea and via the Uniform Gauge Railway, the Queensland Railways have been unable to increase their tonnage." (p. 2.)

86. Cf. Report upon the Enquiry into Railway Competition with Ports, *op.cit.*

Commissioner in attempting to place the service on a business footing and offer competitive rates,⁸⁷ has had his own planning subject to Ministerial direction. Thus, competition within the transport system between the railways and other carriers has had a lasting effect upon railway economics, and this is ultimately reflected in industrial relations within the service.

With regard to the domestic airline industry, the government has been of the opinion, for some years, that as a consequence of its two-airline policy, it has removed, through rationalization, possible sources of management conflict over aircraft types, routes, fares etc., while at the same time retaining the essential spirit of competition within the industry.⁸⁸ In fact, rationalization covers such a wide area, including time tables, that the airlines compete for the very small percentage of potential customers, as yet uncommitted to either operator, on the insubstantial grounds of courtesy, service and the style and

87. *Report of the Commissioner for Railways* for the year ended June 30th, 1929. "Not only do the railways because of their developmental character fail to secure a full return in revenue, but they have not freedom of action in securing all the traffic available, because policy has to be considered, and the effect of this must be reflected in the balance sheet." There is no doubt that the Railway Department because of its rigid organisation and antiquated methods has not exploited all its potential in competition with other carriers. This point was made also by Ford, Bacon and Davis, Inc., *op.cit.*, and many of their recommendations for overcoming this have now been adopted, e.g. containerisation, setting up of a railway sales organisation.

88. As noted earlier in this thesis, in Chapter 2, Part III, the constitutional basis for much of the Federal Government's airline policies has been its "customs and excise" power, controlling the import of new aircraft, and also its financial power. The recent High Court's ruling on corporations, it is believed, will give the Federal Government direct control over airline operations in the future. Cf. *Australian Financial Review*, September 6th, 1971.

colour of hostesses' uniforms. However, there is a spirit of rivalry, if not of genuine competition between the two companies, and through the machinery of the rationalisation system and through public relations exercises⁸⁹ they continue to probe for chinks in each other's armour.

Qantas is in a quite different position, exposed to all the vicissitudes and instability of the international airline industry, and the intense competition between the operators, though regulated to some extent by inter-governmental agreement, has a profound effect on the economic viability of Qantas, and thus on its industrial relations policies.

The fact that Ansett/A.N.A. is the only major private enterprise company has had a marginal influence on the relationship between the operators with respect to their labour relations policies. Because by government regulation the domestic airline industry is restricted to two major companies, and the withdrawal of labour by the pilots from one airline would give its only competitor a substantial advantage, however temporary, cohesion and cooperation between them is highly desirable in this area. For their part, the pilots, believing that Ansett/A.N.A. is

89. Cf. *The Australian*, December 13th, 1971, p. 1. "Ansett group wet nursed says Scherger", where the Chairman of T.A.A., Sir Frederick Scherger strongly attacked Sir Reginald Ansett, Chairman and Managing Director of Ansett Transport Industries over the benefits Sir Reginald's non-aviation enterprises were receiving indirectly from the two-airline policy.

economically in a slightly more vulnerable position than T.A.A.⁹⁰ direct their industrial relations policies towards both companies, but on many issues push harder on Ansett/A.N.A., knowing that once Sir Reginald has reached an agreement with them, T.A.A., unless the circumstances are exceptional, must follow suit.

90. This belief is more psychological than factual, as the essence of the two airline policy is to equalise the position of Ansett/A.N.A. relative to T.A.A., and to assist the former to maintain this.

CHAPTER 7CONCLUSION

This study has had one main objective; to investigate two major groupings of employees within the transport industry, both reputationally militant, and using Dunlop's criteria for understanding union-management relationships as a framework for the inquiry, to establish the causes of militancy in these unions.

This has been done, and with respect to a manual trade union, the A.R.U. (Q'ld. Branch), and to an organisation of white collar employees, the A.F.A.P., evidence has been presented to call seriously into question the proposition that militancy arises from a single cause.¹ Militancy has been shown to have many roots and this conclusion is applicable not only to the organisations under review, but also to the great majority of conflict situations arising within a union-management relationship.²

Beyond this basic precept one cannot go with the same degree of certainty because although the multi-factoral basis of militancy has

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1. Cf. *supra*, Chapter 1. Desmond W. Oxnam: "Issues in Industrial Conflict. Australian Experience, 1913-63", *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 9, No. 1, March, 1967, p. 13. "Industrial conflict is a complex phenomenon which is not the product of any single cause. A distinction must be made between the incidents which precipitate a crisis and the underlying complex of factors which render the parties vulnerable to conflict over such incidents."; K.G.J.C. Knowles: "'Strike-proneness' and its Determinants", *op.cit.*, pp. 224-29.
 2. For additional supportive evidence, see Lloyd Ross: "Case Studies in Conflict", *Conflict and Cooperation*. Industrial Relations Society of N.S.W., Seminar, 1960; also *supra*, Chapter 1.

been established, it has also been obvious in the course of this study that militancy in each union does not spring from identical sets of causes. What can be asserted with some confidence is that militancy expresses itself in response to a combination of factors, and that this combination will vary from union to union and according to the economic, social and political circumstances of the times.

Compared to the A.F.A.P., the A.R.U. has had a long history, and ample opportunity for its relationship with management to develop into a set pattern, one characterized, at best, by a guarded hostility and a lack of understanding of and respect for each other's viewpoint and beliefs. That the lines of development of this relationship have scarcely diverged from those established at the outset has been due mainly to the permanence of other factors leading to militancy. The Railway Department has been slow to improve conditions of work, to change its own organisational structure to make it more flexible and responsive to potential conflict situations, and to set up adequate machinery for continuous consultation with the railway unions; politics has continued to intrude upon railway management and industrial relations, and major decisions continue to be made less from the standpoint of railway economics than as a result of group pressures and the expediencies of party politics.

On the union side the situation has been even more static.³ For over fifty years the affairs of the A.R.U. have been in the hands of but two men, Tim Moroney and Frank Nolan, both of whom after their initial election to office were never seriously challenged. Nor did they have to face their rank and file at frequent elections. While their virtual life tenure can be seen as a possible counterweight to other factors causing militancy, in that it has been suggested that union leaders elected for a finite term need to be more responsive to pressures from below and more "militant" than those with greater security of tenure,⁴ this must be balanced, in its turn, against the philosophical attitudes and beliefs of Moroney and Nolan. These beliefs were themselves militant in that they denied the ability of

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3. Though beyond the limits of this study, it should be noted that changes have occurred since 1950 in the combination of factors productive of conflict situations within the A.R.U.-Railway Department relationship. There has been a decline in the relative importance of the railways vis-à-vis other means of transport; working conditions have improved particularly within the construction and maintenance sections, due mainly to increased mechanization, which has, in turn, created further problems of redundancy; the membership level of the A.R.U. has dropped from 9,358 in 1950 to approximately 7,000 and the leadership of the Combined Railways Unions has clearly passed from the A.R.U. to F. Doyle of the A.F.U.L.E. Since the split within the labour movement in Queensland in 1956, the A.L.P. has been in opposition, and the Trades Hall group of unions, of which the A.R.U. has now become a prominent member, has replaced the A.W.U. as the dominant union influence within the party. Nolan's successor as General State Secretary, R.J. Patterson, though newly appointed and therefore something of an unknown quantity appears much more the union bureaucrat than the ideologue. A superficial assessment of these changes would suggest that on balance, the A.R.U. is likely to be less militant in the future than it has been in the past, but a closer examination, over time, would be necessary before a precise evaluation could be made.
 4. V.L. Allen: *Power in Trade Unions*. Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1954.

representative, parliamentary government, even that representative of the workers, to gain for the working man anything which he could not gain for himself, using the power of his labour combined with that of all other workers, in direct industrial action.

Consequently, as has been seen, the "syndicalist" views of the A.R.U. leaders have been a major cause of militancy in that union, but it is doubtful whether Moroney and Nolan could have retained the support of their rank and file for direct industrial action over such a long period had not other factors also been operative; in particular, those relating to the harsh and often dangerous conditions under which many railwaymen worked, together with the problems of redundancy, arising from technological change.⁵

In the course of this study other elements contributing to conflict situations in the railway service have been identified, one of which, the extent of sectionalism and inter-union rivalry, may be more pertinent to industrial relations in Queensland than elsewhere. In this State, compulsory unionism, together with the practice of "bracketing" does seem to have reinforced and perpetuated internecine rivalry arising from other causes, and to have been responsible for numerous demarcation disputes within the industry. Amalgamation as desired by the A.R.U. would have eliminated this rationale for militancy, though this is not

5. The signalmen have become a noticeably militant section within the South Australian railway service in recent years and this has been attributed to the fact that technological change is in the process of eliminating most if not all of their jobs. The South Australian delegates, in discussion at the No. 4 Review Course in Railway Administration, *op.cit.*

to say that it would have decreased militant action overall, for size, in itself, does not make a union "militant" or "non-militant", but only a more formidable opponent for management if the union is determined to pursue a course of direct action.⁶

Militancy in the A.F.A.P. has been shown to be the outcome of a quite different combination of factors from that created within the A.R.U.-Railway Department relationship. Working conditions and the stress, tension and danger associated with flying have been major contributory factors, allied with a powerful desire for recognition as a professional and élite group with commensurate status and salary. The Federation's organisational structure, its wealth and its leadership have been other elements in the combination producing militancy. A tactical appreciation of the pilots' strategic position within the airline industry has also been of importance, though the operators are less vulnerable at a time of high unemployment in the industry, such as at present, than they were during the acute pilot shortage of the mid-1960's, when substantial gains were made through direct action by the Federation.

The arbitration system as a framework within which the majority

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6. The impending merger of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the Sheet Metal Working, Agricultural Implement and Stonemaking Industrial Union and the Boilermakers and Blacksmiths Society into the 162,000 member Amalgamated Metalworkers Union will create Australia's largest union. While employers are reported to be anxious to see the amalgamation take place, as a solution to the numerous demarcation disputes within the metal trades industry, there is also much trepidation as it is alleged that the merger will create "one of the most militant left wing unions in the country." *The Sunday Australian*, January 2nd, 1972, p. 1.

of union-management relationships have developed in Australia has been a stable element in industrial relations, as they have concerned the A.R.U., throughout the period encompassed by this study, i.e. to 1950. Though ideologically antagonistic to arbitration, the A.R.U. like the other railway unions, continued to work the system and consequently no in-depth investigation of arbitration as a variable factor in militancy has been necessary.

In the case of the A.F.A.P., the arbitration system has not been a constant, with the result that changes in the methods of achieving agreement with the operators over a wide spectrum of issues and demands have had to be examined and their effects, if any, on pilot militancy noted. As has been suggested, recent alterations in the composition of the Flight Crew Officers' Industrial Tribunal and other developments make it possible that the Federation, given the right circumstances, will react militantly to any further attempts to force it back completely into the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration system.

The pilots have consciously chosen the weapons usually associated with manual unions to achieve their narrow, mainly economic, industrial goals. While the A.R.U. has also been interested in gaining economic advantage for its members, and would have had difficulty in retaining the support of its rank and file had this not been so,⁷ its militancy

7. Victor Allen: "The Paradox of Militancy", ed. Robin Blackburn & Alexander Cockburn: *The Incompatibles: Trade Union Militancy and the Consensus*. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1967, p. 242. "Trade unions are compelled to pursue short term aims whatever their value because they have to try to provide material evidence to their members that they are always acting in their interests."

has had the more far-reaching aims of ultimate social and political change, because their leaders believed as part of a wider philosophy that "trade unions alone were the chosen instruments for achieving socialism."⁸

In this belief they have stood comparatively alone among Australian trade unions since the failure of the O.B.U. movement in the early 1920's. Actually, until the last decade, workers' control enjoyed only intermittent support in this century, both in the United Kingdom and in Australia. After the failure of the British General Strike in 1926, guild socialist and syndicalist ideas which had contributed to an earlier workers' control movement were no longer influential in the labour movement, though industrial unionism and workers' control remained fundamental beliefs for some unions such as the National Union of Railwaymen which continued to reaffirm its demand for nationalization and to declare that "no system of State ownership ... will be acceptable to the organised railwaymen which does not allow them a due measure of control and responsibility in the safe and efficient working of the railway system."⁹

Ultimately, reformism within the European socialist movement¹⁰ found its British counterpart in the commitment of a majority of trade

8. Perry Anderson: "The Limits and Possibilities of Trade Union Action", *ibid.*

9. Sterling D. Spero: "Labour Relations in British Nationalized Industry", *op.cit.*, p. 6. Spero cites the Union of Post Office Workers as the only Civil Service union at that time formally on record in favour of workers' control; see Sterling D. Spero: "Government as Employer", *op.cit.*, pp. 485-6.

10. Cf. Peter Gay: *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism - Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx*. Collier Books, New York, 1962.

unions to parliamentary democracy and to the fortunes of the British Labour Party.¹¹ In the years prior to and after the victory of the party in the 1945 General Election, the objectives for a democratic socialist government were thrashed out,¹² to include a rationally planned economy, producing for use rather than for private profit, and the freeing of the worker from his bondage to the exploiting employer, "as expressed in such slogans as 'public ownership under democratic management', 'industrial democracy' and 'workers' control'."¹³ When, as the Government, the party found itself responsible for the implementation of its policy of public ownership, it was faced, as Spero has pointed out, "with the potential contradiction between workers' control and social planning ... The employees of an industry were, after all, a special interest whose particular objectives might well clash with the interests of the public for whose benefit the industry was to be run."¹⁴ In the event workers' control became, when implemented, workers' participation and even that went little beyond the appointment by the government of working class representatives to the boards of the nationalised industries.

A further term in office for Labour in the sixties did little more

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11. "The reformist version was simply the belief that trade union wage demands could ultimately lead to a transformation of the conditions of the working class, without any change in the social structure of power." Perry Anderson: *op.cit.*, p. 264.
 12. See, for example, Socialist Union: *Twentieth Century Socialism. The Economy of To-morrow*. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1956; C.A.R. Crosland: *The Future of Socialism*. Jonathon Cape, London, abridged and revised edition, 1964 and the extensive writings of R.H.S. Crossman.
 13. Sterling D. Spero: "Labour Relations in British Nationalised Industry", *ibid.*
 14. *ibid.*, p. 7.

to convince disenchanted socialists that their objectives could be achieved through legislation. At the same time, general dissatisfaction with so many aspects of present day society found expression in a revival of the idea of participation. As applied to the trade union movement, this discontent manifested itself, in one way, in the rediscovery of the concept of workers' control, and the establishment of a movement around it which is now providing an aggressively militant element within the British trade union movement. Its organising centre is the Institute for Workers' Control in Nottingham and among its supporters are influential trade union leaders like the new President of the Amalgamated Engineering Federation, Hugh Scanlon, and Jack Jones, head of the 1.5 million strong Transport and General Workers' Union.

Like Moroney and Nolan in years gone by, though on a much larger and more sophisticated scale, the Institute turns out a stream of pamphlets and books on the problems of each industry and the solutions workers' control can offer.¹⁵ While the A.R.U. leaders, trapped in the practical difficulties arising from sectionalism in the railway service concentrated most of their energies on the attempted achievement of industrial unionism, and took the concept of workers' control little beyond a continual re-statement of general principles, the contemporary converts have enunciated their ideology in some depth.

Generally speaking, they are concerned, in the short term, to demand

15. Cf. ed. Tony Topham: *Democracy on the Docks*. Institute for Workers' Control, Nottingham, 1970; ed. Ken Coates: *Democracy in the Motor Industry*. Institute for Workers' Control, Nottingham, 1969.

control of (not participation in) some of the less important decision-making areas in industry viz. hiring and firing, allocation of jobs, speeds of work, etc. From here control would escalate to the higher levels of authority, so that ultimately a situation of "impasse" will be reached, one of "dual power" held conjointly by workers and the leaders of capitalism.¹⁶ What, in the long term, would be the natural consequence of this "dual control" is not made clear, as yet, for like the earlier syndicalists the new breed do not seem to have solved the problem of how to reconcile capital and labour when the fundamental aims of each are basically irreconcilable - short of revolution.

Though not of the same dimensions, there has been a similar dusting off and re-emphasis of the concept of workers' control within the Australian trade union movement, but in this instance, the impetus has come from the Communist Party. In line with recent Party Congress demands that the trade unions more vigorously pursue through increased militant activity, their dual role, which is seen as "defending the workers' immediate interests and as a training ground for the revolutionary transformation of society,"¹⁷ Communist trade union leaders like Jack Munday of the Builders Labourers Federation¹⁸ and

16. Cf. ed. Ken Coates & Tony Topham: *Workers' Control*. Panther Modern Society Series, London, 1970; ed. Ken Coates: *Can the Workers run Industry?*. Sphere Books, London, 1968; Richard Fletcher: *Problems of Trade Union Democracy*. Institute for Workers' Control, Nottingham, Pamphlet Series No. 21; Hugh Scanlon: *Workers' Control and the Transnational Company*. Institute for Workers' Control, Nottingham, Pamphlet Series No. 22.

17. *Modern Unionism and the Workers' Movement*. Communist Party of Australia, 22nd Congress, March, 1970, p. 3.

18. Cf. Jack Munday: "Towards New Union Militancy", *Australian Left Review*, No. 26, August-September, 1970, pp. 1-8; Building Workers' contribution to Seminar on Workers' Control, A.B.W.I.U.-Plasterers' Education Committee Project, August, 1969, pp. 1-14.

Laurie Carmichael of the Amalgamated Engineering Union have been vigorously propagandizing industrial unionism and workers' control as ultimate goals for the trade union movement. However, unlike the "syndicalists", workers' control, for Communists, is not the final end in itself, because they have never seen trade unions, in themselves, as vehicles of advance towards socialism.¹⁹ In their view workers' control has a practical, though limited application only.

"The demand for workers' control has revolutionary implications. It is an important means of advancing the fighting capacity and political consciousness of the working class. Correctly approached it is a demand that cannot be fully absorbed, yet which is realistic, sensible and which can gain mass support.

*It carries with it some of the features of the new socialist society we aim to create. It prepares the workers today for their role in such a future society. The practical challenge lies in the articulation of specific radical demands covering the whole field of trade union activities and militant methods of action which further develop the traditional means of struggle based on mass participation."*²⁰

As it lies outside the scope of this thesis it would be injudicious to speculate as to the extent to which this revival of the movement for workers' control has been a factor in the recent increase in the use of direct action by some Australian trade unions, though there is clear evidence of a substantial rise in the number of industrial disputes in the engineering, metals, vehicles group and also in the building and construction industry (see Table X); groups within which some Communist union leaders are known to be providing militant

19. "Trade unionism, in whatever form, was an incomplete and deformed variant of class consciousness, which must at any cost be transcended by a growth of *political* consciousness, created and sustained in a *party*." Perry Anderson: *op.cit.*, p. 264.

20. Modern Unionism and the Workers' Movement, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

leadership. However, even a superficial examination points to a multiplicity of causes for the present escalation.

From 1969 to date, the number of instances of direct industrial action taken by trade unions in many industries has shown a marked increase over the period immediately preceding. Yet the most recent figures available, as set out below, (Table X) do not tell the whole story. Firstly they are incomplete for 1971, a year when it is known from newspaper reports that there was a further upsurge of militant activity in the building trades and in vehicle manufacturing, amongst others, and an outburst in the transport industry, with a lengthy strike of bus employees in N.S.W. Second, the figures shown refer only

TABLE X

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES(a): INDUSTRY GROUPS: AUSTRALIA

Period	Mining and quarrying		Manufacturing		Building and construction	Transport		Other groups	All groups
	Coal mining	Other	Engineering metals vehicles, etc.	Other		Stevedoring	Other		
Number									
Year									
1966	212	17	385	260	248	49	62	40	1,273
1967	192	32	448	231	185	103	71	78	1,340
1968	205	32	455	313	235	298	101	74	1,713
1969	235	39	543	391	273	291	137	105	2,014
1970	191	83	822	579	291	444	149	179	2,738
Quarter ended -									
September 1969	66	14	165	128	78	60	36	26	573
December 1969	54	7	152	96	57	86	52	38	542
March 1970	53	9	201	119	83	104	25	49	643
June 1970	32	24	201	154	57	109	33	44	654
September 1970	62	23	230	160	79	134	49	38	775
December 1970	44	27	190	146	72	97	42	48	666
March 1971	52	17	196	108	81	98	25	53	630

(a) Refers only to disputes involving a stoppage of work of ten man-days or more.

TABLE X (Continued)

Period	Mining and quarrying		Manufacturing		Building and construction	Transport		Other groups	All groups
	Coal mining	Other	Engineering metals vehicles, etc.	Other		Stevedoring	Other		
Number									
Total Workers Involved (Directly and Indirectly) ('000)									
Year									
1966	46.7	8.4	115.9	90.3	77.2	9.0	28.5	18.9	394.9
1967	40.9	7.2	242.1	49.8	26.6	28.3	48.4	40.0	483.3
1968	46.2	11.4	271.7	80.2	81.1	105.6	51.4	72.5	720.3
1969	53.7	20.8	366.9	169.7	187.7	151.9	205.0	129.6	1285.2
1970	63.7	26.4	361.0	253.9	227.8	192.0	116.4	126.0	1367.4
Quarter ended -									
September 1969	9.6	6.4	36.7	37.5	22.1	23.3	4.0	3.2	142.8
December 1969	9.4	1.6	41.8	23.1	40.8	37.9	10.1	35.6	200.4
March 1970	26.5	1.2	62.0	22.5	24.8	50.4	7.5	28.0	222.9
June 1970	7.7	8.2	64.5	39.0	82.9	47.3	46.4	22.9	319.0
September 1970	20.8	7.4	189.9	160.6	81.8	60.2	44.3	32.5	597.5
December 1970	8.6	9.7	44.7	31.8	38.3	34.1	18.2	42.6	228.0
March 1971	21.6	2.3	35.1	18.6	83.6	39.6	5.6	45.1	251.5
Total Working Days Lost ('000)									
Year									
1966	67.9	19.6	150.3	211.3	144.5	4.8	112.5	21.3	732.1
1967	48.4	10.6	259.3	157.7	84.5	17.9	70.6	56.4	705.3
1968	61.1	67.7	423.5	130.3	119.5	77.3	77.0	123.0	1079.5
1969	76.1	76.9	643.6	320.7	276.4	136.2	283.2	144.9	1958.0
1970	178.4	76.5	625.9	464.0	642.6	148.3	120.1	137.9	2393.7
Quarter ended -									
September 1969	13.3	11.0	82.7	88.4	47.9	17.3	17.9	6.4	284.8
December 1969	18.2	16.7	125.6	96.7	44.9	19.8	10.8	38.9	371.6
March 1970	46.6	2.6	137.7	48.3	41.9	69.1	7.2	35.1	388.5
June 1970	84.2	14.4	149.7	85.5	330.8	31.7	39.7	23.4	759.4
September 1970	33.8	25.9	224.9	211.5	58.9	31.0	42.8	38.2	667.1
December 1970	13.7	33.5	113.6	118.7	211.1	16.6	30.4	41.2	578.8
March 1971	53.5	5.3	90.7	41.7	106.8	16.7	43.3	45.0	402.9

Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra.
Quarterly Summary of Australian Statistics, September, 1971,
No. 281, p. 23.

to disputes involving a stoppage of ten man-days or more, and also cannot record other instances of direct action which have not required the withdrawal of labour.²¹

This substantial increase in direct action generally, together with other reasons of a party political nature has prompted the government to propose legislation which it hopes will go a long way towards curbing "industrial anarchy".²² While this attempt at greater control over industrial relations and unions - a proposed ban on political strikes and extended provision for secret ballots in relation to strikes, for example - may, in the short term induce some degree of industrial peace, in the long run it could be a factor inspiring further industrial action. Of much greater importance, however, is the fact that measures of this kind do nothing to get at the root causes of militancy, such as have been examined in this study.

Legislation will not solve the problems of industrial relations; indeed some elements in the labour-management relationship are basically incompatible and as such may well defy the best efforts at reconciliation. However, the number of instances of militant action can be substantially reduced, though it is unlikely that it can be

21. For example, the Amalgamated Postal Workers' Union has for the past month, "imposed a ban on all overtime in the P.M.G. lines section, together with a work-to-regulations campaign, a ban on the installation of new telephones in business premises and on all private contract work." *The Courier-Mail*, January 6th, 1972. To this has now been added a ban on the processing and delivery of telephone accounts.

22. Cf. Professor Keith Hancock: "The Real Price of Industrial Peace", *The Sunday Australian*, December 12th, 1971.

entirely eliminated except under a totalitarian system; even then the experiences of Eastern European communist states since the mid-1950's show that direct action by industrial workers is possible if conditions become sufficiently unsatisfactory. For this reason, a minimal degree of militancy may be a healthy sign in any democratic community.

Much can be done, however, to minimize conflict situations once the real causes are recognised, provided there is a determination and will to do so on both sides.

*"The whole field of industrial relations is essentially a part of human relations. Every action that is taken, is by people and will affect people. The quality of industrial relations depends a good deal on the interpersonal relationships between management and workers, management and unions and unions and workers. Both management and unions have a significant contribution to make in the development of cordial interpersonal and industrial relations."*²³

23. White Paper on Improving Industrial Relations in Australian Government Railway Systems, No. 4, Review Course in Railway Administration, *op.cit.*

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APPENDICES

	<u>Page</u>
A. Summary of Construction of the Main Lines of Queensland.	313.
B. Map of Railway Construction in Queensland.	316.
C. Royal Commissions - Queensland Railways 1860 to 1950.	317.
D. Select Committees on Railways 1860 to 1950.	321.
E. Certificates of Registration of the Queensland Railway Union and of the Australian Railways Union (Queensland Branch)	327.
F. Registration under The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act: Railway Unions.	328.
G. List of Industrial Unions Bracketed with the Queensland Railway Union.	340.
H. The Composition of the Queensland Railway Union, Southern Division, as stated in its Application for Registration under "The Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916".	342.
I. Developmental and Rural Subsidies.	345.
J. Rationalisation Committee.	347.
K. Licensing of Flight Crew.	349.
L. Safety in the Airline Industry.	353.

APPENDIX ASUMMARY OF CONSTRUCTION OF THE MAIN LINES OF QUEENSLAND

The Southern and Western railway, begun from Ipswich in 1865, reached Toowoomba 1867, extended to Dalby in 1868 and Warwick in 1871: connected to Brisbane 1875, reached Wallangarra on New South Wales border in 1887, Charleville in 1888, Goondiwindi in 1908, and Dirranbandi in 1913.

The Great Northern (later Central) Railway, from Rockhampton to Westwood, 1867. Gradually extended after 1874 to serve Peak Downs copper field. Reached Emerald 1879, Clermont 1884, and Longreach in 1892. A branch from Rockhampton to Mt. Morgan was opened in 1898.

The Great Northern Railway, built at first to serve the Charters Towers goldfield. Opened from Townsville, 1880, reached Charters Towers 1882. Extensions to Hughenden 1887, and Winton 1899. Minerals prompted further extensions to Cloncurry in 1908 and Mt. Isa in 1929. The Central and Great Northern lines were also connected by an inland link from Longreach to Winton, completed in 1928. The Great Western Railway Act of 1910 provided for a north-south trunk line across western Queensland, joining the western extremities of the three main inland lines, but only a few sections (to Quilpie, Yaraka and Dajarra) were completed.

The Maryborough Railway built to serve the goldfield at Gympie and opened in 1881.

The Bundaberg Railway, opened from Bundaberg in 1881 and connected to the Mount Perry copper mines in 1884.

The Mackay Railway, opened in 1885 to serve the sugar lands in the Pioneer River valley. Extended to Netherdale, at the top of the Pioneer Valley in 1910, incorporating two shire-owned lines.

The Cooktown Railway opened in 1885 with the goal of reaching the Palmer goldfield; it reached Laura in 1888, by which time completion was unwarranted.

The Cairns Railway commenced 1887 to connect with the Herberton tin fields. This line, involving the difficult construction up the Barron Gorge, opened to Mareeba in 1893 and Herberton 1910, and Ravenshoe 1916. The Chillagoe Company connected its Chillagoe copper fields to it by a private line, 103 miles long, in 1900.

The Emu Park Railway, opened from North Rockhampton in 1888 and connected to Broadmount, an early attempt at a deep water port for Rockhampton, in 1898.

The Normanton Railway was originally intended to connect the Cloncurry gold and copper field with the Gulf of Carpentaria but was built instead to the Croydon goldfield between 1889 and 1891.

The Bowen Railway opened to Wangaratta in 1890.

Connections between these lines were gradually provided. A coast line, providing a through connection to Brisbane opened to Bundaberg in 1891, Gladstone 1897, and Rockhampton 1903. Under the North Coast Railway Act of 1910, a coastal trunk line was authorised and work on this

through coastal route, 1,043 miles, was completed in 1924. It absorbed the Shire lines built to Proserpine, Ayr and Babinda in its length. This left only the Cooktown and Normanton lines isolated.

The Kyogle Railway, the 4'8½" connection of 69 miles from South Brisbane to the Border Tunnel, built by agreement between the Commonwealth, New South Wales and Queensland opened in September, 1930.

Branch Lines

The first true branch line was the line to Fassifern, the first section of which was opened from Ipswich to Harrisville in 1882. Between 1885 and 1894, 491 miles of branch line was constructed out of a total building of 1,182 miles. The most intensive period of branch line building was between 1905 and 1924. Out of 2,983 miles built, 1,728 were branch lines. Most of the branch lines were built in the south-eastern part of the state to aid agricultural development.

Collated from *Queensland Railways, 1865-1965*, Railway Historical Society, Q'ld. Division, 1965, no publication details; and J.W. Knowles: "One Hundred Years of Railways in Queensland", *The Australian Railway Historical Society*, Bulletin No. 338, Vol. XVI, New Series, December, 1965.

APPENDIX B: MAP OF RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION IN QUEENSLAND

QUEENSLAND RAILWAY SYSTEM

1.7.1965


40 0 40 80 120
SCALE OF MILES

Gulf of
Carpentaria

REFERENCE

Construction First Half Century shown ———

Construction Second Half Century shown - - - - -



NORTHERN
TERRITORY

South
Pacific
Ocean

SOUTH
AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES

Source: Commissioner of Railways: *A Century of Service. The Story of the Queensland Government Railways, 1865-1965*, Brisbane, 1965. The Hayes Collection, Fryer Library, University of Queensland.

APPENDIX CROYAL COMMISSIONS - QUEENSLAND RAILWAYS 1860 TO 1950Q'ld. Parl. Papers

Re Extensions to Southern and Western Railway	1871	- p. 675.
Railway construction	1872	- p. 1327.
Extending the Southern & Western Railway to navigable water	1878	- V.2, p. 319.
On the allegations contained in Mr. Hemmant's petition and all matters connected therewith	1881	- V.2, pp. 403 & 781.
Traffic Departments	1883-4	- p. 1611.
Timbers used on the Cairns Railway	1887	- V.3, p. 1241.
Proposed railway extensions, St. George, Nanango, Bowen.	1900	- V.3, p. 85.
Proposed railway between Beaudesert (Q'ld.) and Kyogle (N.S.W.)	1916-17	- V.3, p. 509.
Proposed railway between Nanango and Yarraman or Tarong and Yarraman	1916-17	- V.3, p. 781
Railway from Jundah to Taroom	1916-17	- V.3, p. 959.
Payment of "Dirt money" to employees of the Q'ld. Railway Department.	1916-17	- V.3, p. 1067.
Proposed railway from Oona to Mount Oxide.	1916-17	- V.3, p. 1297
Extension of the Mount Molloy line.	1917	- V.3, p. 245.
Proposed railway between Kingaroy and Bell via Kumbia or between Tarong and Cooyar.	1917	- V.3, p. 401.
Proposed railway from Jandowae to Proston or Mundubbera.	1917	- V.3, p. 541.

Q'ld. Parl. Papers

Proposed branch line from the Townsville-Bowen railway (Haughton River).	1917 - V.3, p. 631.
Proposed branch line from Gargett to Owens Creek.	1917 - V.3, p. 663.
Railway administration.	1918 - V.2, p. 159.
Proposed branch line from Brooloo to Kenilworth.	1918 - V.2, p. 1563.
Proposed line from Mulgowie to Thornton	1918 - V.2, p. 1659.
Proposed line from Woodford to Peachester	1918 - V.2, p. 1623.
Proposed line from Peeramom to Boonjee	1919-20 - V.3, p. 611.
Proposed deviation from Owanyilla through Tinana to Maryborough; removal of railway workshops, Maryborough; establishment of electric light plant, Maryborough; loop line to eliminate dead end at Maryborough.	1919-20 - V.3, p. 661.
Proposed line from Mount Larcom to Bracewell.	1919-20 - V.3, p. 735.
Proposed tramway from Pikedale to the main Southern Railway.	1919-20 - V.3, p. 767.
Proposed line from Dunwinnie to St. George	1919-20 - V.3, p. 823.
Proposals for railways in the Gulf districts	1919-20 - V.3, p. 859.
Proposed railways to open up the North Burnett and Callide Valley.	1919-20 - V.3, p. 995.
Proposed removal of the locomotive depot from Toowoomba to Willowburn.	1919-20 - V.3, p. 1105.
Proposed Dirranbandi extension.	1919-20 - V.3, p. 1137.
Proposed tramway from the iron mines at Mount Biggenden to the Gayndah line.	1919-20 - V.3, p. 1153.
Construction of the Railway from Goondoon to Kalliwa Creek.	1919-20 - V.3, p. 1177

Q'ld. Parl. Papers

Proposed railway from Charleville to Blackall	1920	- V.2, p. 875.
Proposed branch railway from the Mount Mulligan railway to Wolfram Camp.	1920	- V.2, p. 985.
Proposed railway from Croydon to Forsayth.	1920	- V.2, p. 1013.
Proposed extension of the Mount Molloy railway to Port Douglas.	1921	- V.2, p. 1131.
Proposed railway from Springsure to the terminus of the line north from Roma	1921	- V.2, p. 1193.
Proposed extension of the Dawson Valley railway from Baralaba to Castle Creek	1922	- V.2, p. 1307.
Proposed extension of Belmont tramway to Mount Cotton; proposed branch from Sunnybank to Mount Cotton.	1922	- V.2, p. 1345.
Proposed extension of the Innisfail tramway from Nerada.	1923	- V.2, p. 1353.
Proposed conversion of portion of Innisfail tramway from 2ft. gauge to 3ft. 6 in. gauge.	1923	- V.2, p. 1393.
Proposed extension of Alton Downs railway to Louisa Creek.	1924	- V.2, p. 1257.
Proposed extension from Yeppoon to Byfield.	1924	- V.2, p. 1277.
Completion of section D of the Great Western Railway; proposed railway to Mount Isa mineral field.	1925	- V.3, p. 595.
Proposed railway from Inglewood to Texas and Silverspur.	1928	- V.2, p. 1083.
Railway workshops.	1929	- V.2, p. 1185.
Extension of Great Northern Railway to Camooweal.	1936	- V.2, p. 1035.
Railways generally.	1939	- V.1, p. 1105.

Q'ld. Parl. Papers

Construction of an inland railway system
between the Central and Southern railway
systems.

1939 - V.1, p. 1149.

Extracted from: Royal Commissions held in Queensland, 1860-1966.
Queensland Parliamentary Library (unpublished).

APPENDIX DSELECT COMMITTEES ON RAILWAYS 1860 TO 1950Q'ld. Parl. Papers

On Mr. John Bourne's contract for the Dalby railway.	1872	- p. 1371.
On Roads, Tramways and other feeders to the railway lines.	1874	- Vol.II, p. 775.
On working and management of the Southern and Western Railway Department.	1877	- Vol.III, p. 473.
On route of railway line from Warwick towards Stanthorpe.	1878	- Vol.II, p. 459.
On railway workshops.	1879	- Vol.II, p. 535.
On contract for and carriage of steel rails - Mr. Hemmant's petition.	1880	- Vol.II, p. 737.
On Gympie Agricultural Society claim for compensation.	1882	- Vol.II, p. 987.
On the proposed railway from Hughenden towards Winton.	1895	- Vol.III, p. 791.
On the proposed extension from Mirani to Cattle Creek (Mackay line).	1895	- Vol.III, p. 849.
On the proposed branch railway from Mayne to Enoggera.	1895	- Vol.III, p. 905.
On the sale of pastoral lands and the construction of railways in the Western interior.	1902	- Vol.III, p. 77.
On the proposed low-level deviation, North Coast Line, Gladstone to Rockhampton.	1902	- Vol.III, p. 619.
On the proposed Redbank and Bundamba loop line, Southern & Western Railway, and portion of McQueen's Branch Line.	1902	- Vol.III, p. 639.
On the proposed extension of the Gayndah branch line from Degilbo to Wetherton.	1904-5	- Vol.II, p. 645.
On the proposed branch railway, Western Line, from Dalby to Cattle Creek.	1904-5	- Vol.II, p. 655.

Q'ld. Parl. Papers

On the proposed extension of the Goondiwindi branch line from Thane to Goondiwindi.	1905	- Vol.II, p. 939.
On the proposed extension of the Northern Line from Richmond to Cloncurry.	1905	- Vol.II, p. 951.
On the proposed branch railway from Blackall to Jericho.	1905	- Vol.II, p. 963.
On the proposed extension of the Gayndah branch line from Wetherton to Gayndah.	1905	- Vol.II, p. 973.
On the proposed extension of the Northern line from Richmond to Cloncurry (Section No. 2).	1906	- Vol.II, p. 1051.
Caboolture to Woodford Railway, North Coast Line.	1908	- Sess.1, p. 585.
On the proposed Boyne Valley Branch Railway.	1908	- Sess.1, p. 595.
New Zealand Gully to Yeppoon Railway, Emu Park Line.	1908	- Sess.1, p. 605.
On the proposed extension of the Atherton Railway, Cairns Line.	1908	- Sess.1, p. 617.
On the proposed railway extension from Kannangur to Blackbutt, Brisbane Valley Branch.	1908	- Sess.1, p. 629.
On the proposed branch railway from Dalby towards Tara, Western Line.	1908	- Sess.1, p. 639.
On the proposed extension of the Blackall Branch Railway, Central Division.	1908	- Sess.1, p. 651.
On the proposed railway extension from Goondiwindi to Talwood.	1908	- Sess.1, p. 661.
On the proposed branch railway from Tolga to the Johnstone River, Cairns Line.	1908	- Sess.1, p. 671.
On the proposed Railway from Warwick to Maryvale.	1908	- Vol.III, p. 383.

Q'ld. Parl. Papers

On the proposed branch railway from Kingsthorpe to Goombungee and Main Range.	1908	- Vol.III, p. 393.
On the proposed railway extension from Pittsworth to Milmerran.	1909	- Vol.II, p. 759.
On the proposed extension from Kingaroy to Nanango.	1909	- Vol.II, p. 771.
On the proposed extension of the McGregor Creek Tramline towards Silent Grove and the Cattle Creek Tramline towards the Eungella Range.	1909	- Vol.II, p. 783.
On the proposed railway from Mt. Morgan to the Dawson River.	1909	- Vol.II, p. 795.
On the proposed branch railway from Oakey to Cooyar.	1909	- Vol.II, p. 823.
On the proposed branch line from Port Alma to a point on the main line of railway from Rockhampton to Gladstone.	1909	- Vol.II, p. 833.
On the proposed extension from Talwood to the Moonie River.	1909	- Vol.II, p. 879.
On the proposed extension of the Boyne Valley Railway from Nevertire to Many Peaks.	1909	- Vol.II, p. 889.
On the proposed extension of the Isis branch from Cordalba to Dallarnil	1909	- Vol.II, p. 899.
On the proposed branch railway from Rosewood to Marburg.	1909	- Vol.II, p. 911.
On the proposed branch railway from Keefton to Imbil.	1910	- Vol.III, p. 503.
On the proposed extension from Woodford to Kilcoy.	1910	- Vol.III, p. 515.
On the proposed branch railway from Allora to Goomburra.	1910	- Vol.III, p. 527.
On the proposed railway extension from Gayndah to Mundubbera.	1910	- Vol.III, p. 539.

Q'ld. Parl. Papers

On the proposed railway extension from Blackbutt to Yarraman	1910	- Vol.III, p. 561.
On the proposed railway extension from Bullamon to Dirranbandi	1910	- Vol.III, p. 573.
On the proposed railway from Miles to Taroom (First section) to Jundah Railway.	1910	- Vol. III, p. 985.
On the proposed railways from Munbilla to Mt. Edwards, Kingaroy to Tarong, Pialba to Urangan, Roma to Orallo.	1911-12	- Vol.III, p. 155.
On the proposed railway extension from Malanda towards Millaa Millaa.	1911-12	- Vol.III, p. 185.
Further report on the proposed railway from Pialba to Urangan.	1911-12	- Vol.III, p. 173.
On the proposed branch railway from Cloncurry to Mt. Cuthbert (First section).	1911-12	- Vol.III, p. 1345.
On the proposed branch railway from Chillagoe Co's. Railway to Mt. Mulligan.	1912	- Vol.III, p. 555.
Upon the Great Western Railway Act, Amendment Bill (Progress Report).	1913	- Vol.III, p. 487.
On the proposed railway extension from Cloncurry to Mt. Cuthbert (Second section).	1914	- Vol.III, p. 363.
On the proposed railway extension from Enoggera to Terror's Creek.	1914	- Vol.III, p. 375.
On the proposed extension from Inglewood to Texas and Silverspur.	1914	- Vol.III, p. 387.
On the proposed railway extension from Rockhampton to Alton Downs.	1914	- Vol.III, p. 399.
On the proposed extension from Mt. Edwards to Maryvale.	1914	- Vol.III, p. 415.
On the proposed railway extension from Miles to Taroom (Second section).	1914	- Vol.III, p. 451.
On the proposed branch railway from Lanefield to Rosevale.	1914	- Vol.III, p. 463.

Q'ld. Parl. Papers

On the proposed railway extension from Murgon to Proston, also the proposed branch railway to Windera.	1914 - Vol.III, p. 475.
On the proposed branch railway from Gatton to Mt. Sylvia	1914 - Vol.III, p. 487.
On the proposed branch railway from Goondoon towards Kallliwa Creek	1914 - Vol.III, p. 499.
On the proposed extension from Dirranbandi	1914 - Vol.III, p. 511.
On the proposed railway extension from Mundubbera to the Northern Burnett.	1914 - Vol.III, p. 523.
On the proposed railway extension from Mt. Russell to Cecil Plains.	1914 - Vol.III, p. 535.
On the proposed railway extension from Malanda to Millaa Millaa.	1914 - Vol.III, p. 559.
On the proposed extension from Tara towards Surat.	1914 - Vol.III, p. 547.
To inquire into and Report upon the charges made against the Hon. W.T. Paget relative to the purchase of certain cement and any circumstances connected therewith.	1914 - Vol.III, p. 571.
On the proposed railway extension from Longreach to Winton.	1914-16 - Vol.III, p. 1219.
On the proposed railway extension from Many Peaks to New Cannindah (Report and further report).	1915-16 - Vol.III, p. 1231, p. 1239.
On the proposed branch railway from Merinda to Bowen coalfields (Report and further report).	1915-16 - Vol.III, p. 1255, p. 1265.
On the proposed railway extension from Orallo to Injune Creek (Report and further report).	1915-16 - Vol.III, p. 1283, p. 1291.

Q'ld. Parl. Papers

On the proposed railway extension from Many Peaks to New Cannindah.	1916-17 - Vol.III, p. 351.
On the proposed extension from Orallo to Injune Creek.	1916-17 - Vol.III, p. 379.
On the Chillagoe and Etheridge Railways Purchase Bill	1916-17 - Vol.III, p. 387.
On the Mt. Molloy Railway Bill	1916-17 - Vol.III, p. 489.
On the proposed extension from Many Peaks to New Cannindah.	1917 - Vol.III, p. 159.
On the proposed Mt. Molloy Railway	1917 - Vol.III, p. 325.
On the proposed railway extension from Many Peaks to New Cannindah	1918 - Vol.II, p. 1337.
On the proposed Haughton River Loop Line	1918 - Vol.II, p. 1343.
On the proposed railway extension from Yarraman to Nanango.	1918 - Vol.II, p. 1355.
On the Chillagoe and Etheridge Railways Bill (Report and further report).	1918 - Vol.II, p. 1363, p. 1467.
On the proposed extension of the Mary Valley Railway from Brooloo to Kenilworth.	1919-20 - Vol.III, p. 499.
On the proposed Boyne Valley Extension from Many Peaks to the Northern end of the approved line from Mundubbera to the Northern Burnett; and the proposed railway from Monto to Rannes to open up the Callide Valley and Prairie Lands.	1919-20 - Vol.III, p. 519.
On the proposed branch railway from Gargett to Owen's Creek.	1919-20 - Vol.III, p. 547.
On the proposed line towards Burketown from Dobbyn to Myally Creek.	1919-20 - Vol.III, p. 573.
On the proposed branch railway from Peeramun towards Boonjee.	1919-20 - Vol.III, p. 595.

Extracted from: Queensland Parliamentary Papers.

APPENDIX E"The Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916"

CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION OF AN INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION
OR TRADE UNION OF EMPLOYEES AS AN INDUSTRIAL UNION

I, JOHN JAMES McGEE, Industrial Registrar, hereby certify that on the seventeenth day of February, one thousand, nine hundred and seventeen, an Industrial Association (or Trade Union) of Employees, called The Queensland Railway Union of Employees, was, at Brisbane, in the State of Queensland, registered by that name under "The Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916" as an Industrial Union of Employees.

Dated at Brisbane, in the State of Queensland, this seventeenth day of February, 1917.

(sgd) JOHN J. McGEE

Industrial Registrar.

I, ALEC CHARLES MARSHALL, Industrial Registrar HEREBY CERTIFY that the above is a true and correct copy of the certificate of Registration of the "Australian Railways Union of Employees, Queensland Branch", which was registered as an Industrial Union of Employees under "The Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916" under the title of "The Queensland Railway Union of Employees" on the seventeenth day of February, 1917, and that the title was altered to "Australian Railways Union of Employees, Queensland Branch" on the nineteenth day of November, 1921.

Dated this thirtyfirst day of October, 1967.

Industrial Registrar.

APPENDIX FREGISTRATION UNDER THE INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION
AND ARBITRATION ACTRailway Unions1. Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen's Association of Australasia

(File No. 16)

Notice of Intention: Courier Mail, 16/2/17

Registration Certificate: 2/3/17.

Callings covered: Engine Drivers (all classes)
Firemen
Crane Drivers
Dynamo and Motor Attendants
Greasers
Boiler and Engine Cleaners
Trimmers
(and similar occupations on land,
harbours and rivers).

Membership at Registration: 2,000 approx.

. . .

2. Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen, Queensland

(File No. 93)

Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, 12/7/21

Registration Certificate: 11/8/1921

Callings Covered: Loco Drivers
Loco Firemen and Cleaners
Assistants to above.

Membership at Registration: 876.

NOTE: The A.R.U. apparently did not lodge a formal objection to the
registration of this union.

3. The Queensland Railway Union of Employees

(File No. 3)

Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, 3/2/17

Registration Certificate: 17/2/17

Callings Covered: 96 separate callings, including clerks, typists, guards, stationmasters, engine drivers, and tradesmen of various kinds. Also included blanket coverage of "generally all those trades and occupations necessary in the conduction of the Queensland Railway system". The members of the Queensland Railway Union exercise their callings in all localities or Districts in the State of Queensland where the Queensland Government Railways are operating.

Membership at Registration:

Brisbane and Ipswich	1084
Toowoomba	325
Maryborough	371
Dalby	89
Kingaroy	47
Signalmen's Branch	26
	<u>1942</u>

Office-bearers at Registration:

President: Robert McGregor
 Vice-President: Thomas Villiers
 Vice-President: Timothy Moroney
 Treasurer: William B. Stanley
 Councillors: Alex F. McDonald et al.

Salaried Officers:

General Secretary: Frank A. Cooper
 Assistant Secretary: Charles A. King.

Objection to Registration:

A.S.E. objected to coverage by Q.R.U. of blacksmiths and other metal workers. Argued that: the Q.R.U. has been operating as a trade union within the Queensland Government Railways service since 1912 but has, as members, very few employees in the callings referred to above.

The A.S.E. also argued that coverage of these callings by the Q.R.U. would not only be detrimental to the A.S.E. but "may lead to industrial dissension between the members of the two unions as well as overlapping of jurisdiction".

NOTE: This objection was overruled by the Industrial Commission because the A.S.E. was not an Industrial Union.

Amalgamation and Change of Name:

Statutory Declaration presented to Court of Industrial Arbitration of Queensland, 21/2/1921 (Signed Moroney, witnessed Villiers).

- "1. I am the General Secretary of the Q.R.U.
2. The Q.R.U. amalgamated with the N.S.W. Railway and Tramway Association, Victorian Railways Union, South Australian Railway and Tramways Association, and Tasmanian Railways Union on the 22nd of September, 1920.
3. By this amalgamation a Union was formed bearing the name of Australian Railways Union.
4. The Q.R.U. and the other organisations mentioned have now ceased to exist as separate State organisations and have become Branches of the A.R.U. in the several States mentioned.
5. The A.R.U. was granted registration as an Organisation of Employees under the Commonwealth Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1906, on the 8th of February, 1921, with branches in the States mentioned.
6."

NOTE: Abbreviations are spelled out in full in the original.
Registration of the new organisation, i.e. A.R.U. was apparently approved on 19/11/1921.

4. Queensland Railway Guards and Shunters Association

(File No. 18)

Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, 20/2/17

Registration Certificate: 6/3/17

Callings Covered: Guards and shunters.

Change of Name: Queensland Railway Guards, Shunters and Conductors Association - approved 22/8/1934.

Extension of Callings Covered: Now includes Conductors, Foremen Shunters, Number Takers, Ticket Inspectors, and Porters.

Membership at Registration: 454.

. . .

5. Railway Maintenance Union of Employees, Southern Queensland

(File No. 17)

Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, 19/2/17

Registration Certificate: 4/3/17

Callings Covered: Bridge and Station Carpenters and Labourers; Painters; Tarrers; Plumbers; Fencers; Gangers; Lengthsmen; Flying Gangmen; Gardeners.

Area Covered: South of Gladstone.

Change of Name: Queensland Railway Maintenance Union of Employees - approved 9/2/31

Extension of Callings Covered: Now includes Bricklayers; Concretors; Signal Light and Store Men.

Extension of Area Covered: Now covers whole State.

Membership at Registration: 710 approx.

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6. Railway Officers Union, Queensland

(File No. 41)

Notice of Intention: Courier Mail

Registration Certificate: 19/4/17

Callings Covered: Senior officers and other "white collar" groups; Foremen and equivalents; Inspectors; Station Masters. (In effect, all salaried staff.)

Change of Name: Railway Salaried Officers Union - approved 20/10/27

Membership at Registration: 265.

NOTE: File doesn't indicate whether objections were lodged, though it is likely that many unions would have objected.

. . .

7. Queensland Railway Signalmen

(File No. 9)

Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, 9/2/17

Registration Certificate: 23/2/17

Callings Covered: Signalmen

Change of Name: Queensland Railway Signalmen's Union - approved 3/10/44

Membership at Registration: 75.

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8. Queensland Railway Station Masters, Assistant Station Masters
and Night Officers Union

(File No. 21)

<i>Notice of Intention:</i>	Courier Mail, 27/2/17
<i>Registration Certificate:</i>	13/3/17
<i>Callings Covered:</i>	Station Masters; Assistant S.M.'s; Night Officers.
<i>Change of Name:</i>	<u>The Queensland Railway Station Masters Union</u> - approved 28/11/61
<i>Membership at Registration:</i>	262.

. . .

9. Queensland Railway Traffic Employees Union

(File No. 57)

<i>Notice of Intention:</i>	The Daily Standard, 29/8/17
<i>Registration Certificate:</i>	20/9/17
<i>Callings Covered:</i>	Guards; Shunters; Goods Shed Employees; Signalmen; Porters; Clerks; Storemen; Carriage Shed Employees; Labourers.
<i>Extension of Callings Covered:</i>	In 1933 coverage was extended to groups of salaried officers, and Station Masters.
<i>Membership at Registration:</i>	69.

. . .

Associated Unions

1. The Federated Electrical Trades Union

Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, 26/3/17

Registration Certificate: 14/5/17

Change of Name: The Electrical Trades Union of
Employees of Australia, Queensland
Branch - approved 3/10/21

. . .

2. The Amalgamated Society of Engineers and Metalworkers, Queensland
(File No. 7)

Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, 7/2/17

Registration Certificate: 21/2/17

Change of Name: The Amalgamated Engineering Union,
Queensland - approved 31/10/22

. . .

3. Federated Ironworkers Association of Australia (Queensland
Branch)

(File No. 72)

Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, 4/11/18

Registration Certificate: 5/12/18

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4. The Federated Moulders (Metals) Union of Employees of
Australasia, Queensland Branch

(File No. 30)

Notice of Intention: 16/3/17

Registration Certificate: 30/3/17

. . .

5. Operative Painters and Decorators of Australia, Queensland Branch

(File No. 22)

Registration Certificate: 29/5/28 (After Case No. 107 of 1928).*Change of Name:* Operative Painters and Decorators of
Queensland - approved 23/12/37
Operative Painters and Decorators Union
of Australia, Queensland Branch -
approved 4/10/46.

. . .

6. The Queensland Branch of the Australian Coachmakers Federation

(File No. 24)

Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, 6/3/17*Registration Certificate:* 17/3/17*Change of Name:* Australian Coachmakers Employees
Federation, Queensland Branch -
approved 31/5/18
The Vehicle Builders Employees
Federation of Australia, Queensland
Branch - approved 7/12/38.

. . .

7. Sheet Metal Working Industrial Union of Employees, Queensland Branch

(File No. 28)

Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, 10/3/17*Registration Certificate:* 23/3/17*Change of Name:* The Sheet Metal Working, Agricultural
Implement and Stove Making Industrial
Union of Employees of Australia,
Queensland Branch - approved 10/7/46.

. . .

Peripheral Unions1. Australian Workers' Union

Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, 13/3/17

Registration Certificate: 23/3/17

. . .

2. The Boilermakers and Blacksmiths Society of Australia,
Queensland Branch

Notice of Intention: Courier Mail, 4/3/66

Registration Certificate: 28/4/66

. . .

3. The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners of Australasia

Registration Certificate: 9/5/27 (After Case No. 114 of 1927)

. . .

4. Federated Clerks Union of Australia (Central and Southern
Queensland Branch)

Notice of Intention: Courier Mail & Telegraph, 17/5/46

Registration Certificate: 3/6/46

North Queensland Branch

Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, 17/3/25

Registration Certificate: 10/7/25

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5. Australasian Meat Industry Union of Employees (Queensland Branch)

(File No. 25)

Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, 3/3/17*Registration Certificate:* 19/3/17NOTE: Registration cancelled 24/5/46 (Cases 106 and 107 of 1946)

Registration restored 16/9/46 (Case 170 of 1946)

. . .

6. Federated Society of Boilermakers and Iron Ship Builders of Australia (Queensland Branch)*Notice of Intention:* The Daily Standard, 17/3/17*Registration Certificate:* 31/3/17*Change of Name:* The Boilermakers Society of Australia (Queensland Branch) - approved 25/8/37.

. . .

Unsuccessful Attempts to Register Unions
or Unions Registered but now Defunct1. Federated Locomotive Engine Drivers, Firemen and Cleaners Association, Queensland Division*Notice of Intention:* The Daily Standard, 17/2/17*Registration Cancelled:* 6/7/21 (Case No. 277 of 1921)NOTE: Note similarity of name to that of F.E.D.F.A.

. . .

2. Queensland Railway Leading Hands and Mechanics Union

Notice of Intention: Courier Mail, 22/4/18

Objections: Q.R.U., A.S.E., and Federation of Boilermakers and Iron Ship Builders.

Registration Refused: 15/5/18.

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3. Australasian Society of Engineers

Notice of Intention: The Daily Standard, 11/8/22

Objections: 16 Unions objected.

Application Refused: 8/9/22 after hearing.

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NOTE:

Q.R.U. lodged objection to registration of each of the following unions:

F.E.D.F.A.
 Railway Guards and Shunters
 Railway Maintenance Union
 Queensland Railway Signalmen
 Queensland Railway Station Masters etc.

In each instance the objection contained the following clause:

"That the Registration of Sectional Associations of callings for which one general union of railway employees (the Queensland Railway Union) is registered is against the interests of the employer, the employees and the public and contrary to the intention of the Act."

An objection making a similar point, though worded differently

was also lodged against registration of the Queensland Railway Traffic Employees Union.

Compiled from the files of the Industrial Commission, Brisbane.

APPENDIX GLIST OF INDUSTRIAL UNIONS BRACKETED WITH THE
QUEENSLAND RAILWAY UNION OF EMPLOYEES

<u>Title</u>	<u>Date of Bracketing</u>
Queensland Railway Signalmen's Union of Employees, Brisbane, Ipswich, Toowoomba, Killarney Junction and Warwick.	27. 3.1917
Australasian Institute of Marine Engineers Union of Employees, Queensland District.	27. 3.1917
Federated Locomotive Engine Drivers', Firemen's and Cleaners' Union of Employees, Queensland Division.	27. 3.1917
Railway Maintenance Union of Employees, Southern Queensland.	27. 3.1917
Queensland Railway Guards & Shunters' Association	27. 3.1917
The Australasian Building Industry Union, Queensland	27. 3.1917
Queensland Railway Station Masters', Assistant Station Masters' and Night Officers' Union.	27. 3.1917
Operative Painters and Decorators of Australasia, Queensland Branch	27. 3.1917
The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners.	16. 5.1917
Queensland Branch of the Australian Coach Makers' Union, Brisbane and Ipswich.	16. 5.1917
Federated Society of Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders' of Australia, Queensland Branch.	16. 5.1917
Federated Moulders' (Metals) Union.	16. 5.1917
Federated Electrical Trades Union.	16. 5.1917
The Australian Workers' Union.	16. 5.1917
Federated Clerks' Union	16. 5.1917
The Australian Plumbers and Gasfitters Union	13. 7.1917

<u>Title</u>	<u>Date of Bracketing</u>
Queensland Government Professional Officers Association.	26. 7.1917
The Steam Engine Makers' Society	26. 7.1917
Australasian Association of Operative Plasterers.	12.12.1917
Blacksmith Society of Australasia	12.12.1917
United Operative Stonemasons Society	12.12.1917
Queensland Railway Traffic Employees' Union.	12.12.1917
Australian Builders' Labourers Federation.	22.12.1917
Federated Ironworkers.	18. 2.1919

NOTE: The Q.R.U. was not bracketed with the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and Metal Workers Union, as both this union and the Q.R.U. objected to bracketing.

Compiled from the files of the Industrial Commission, Brisbane.

APPENDIX H

THE COMPOSITION OF THE QUEENSLAND RAILWAY UNION, SOUTHERN
DIVISION AS STATED IN ITS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION
UNDER "THE INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION ACT OF 1916"

	<i>Bris- bane & Ipswich</i>	<i>Too- woomba</i>	<i>Mary- borough</i>	<i>Dalby</i>	<i>Kinga- roy</i>	<i>Total</i>
Accountant	1					1
Battery Man	1					1
Blacksmith	1		4			5
Boilermaker (& Asst.)	6		6			12
Bricklayer	1	1				2
Bridge Carpenter	23		1	2		26
Carpenter	48	14	20			82
Checker	16	16	4	2		38
Cleaner	29	1	3			33
Clerk	141	52	60	3	3	259
Coach Builder	5	4	1			10
Coalman			8		1	9
Concrete Worker	1					1
Conductor	3					3
Craneman			1			1
Draftsman	1					1
Driller			2			2
Driver			2			2
Electrician	1					1
Engine Driver	21	5				26
Engineman	1		1			2
Examiner	12	4	5	1		22
Fencer	4					4
Fireman	35		1			36
Fitter & Turner	2		13			15
Ganger	37	7	12	6	6	68
Gatekeeper	5	11			1	17
Goods Agent	1					1
Guard	23		4	1	1	29
Inspector	6					6
Labourer	111	73	52	1		237
Labourer (skilled)	24		2			26
Lengthsman	143	64	33	50	15	305
Lifter	3		5			8
Loco Foreman	1					1
Mechanic	2					2
Oiler	1		1			2
Operator	10			1		11

	<i>Bris- bane & Ipswich</i>	<i>Too- woomba</i>	<i>Mary- borough</i>	<i>Dalby</i>	<i>Kinga- roy</i>	<i>Total</i>
Packer			1			1
Painter	12	1	2			15
Plumber	4	1	1			6
Porter	88	49	44	5	12	198
Pumper	9	5	5	2	2	23
Quarryman				6		6
Sailmaker	1					1
Sawyer			1			1
Shed Foreman	2					2
Shedman	5		4			9
Shunter	39	8	16			63
Signalman	13		4			17
Station Master etc.	51	3	28	5	6	93
Storeman	22	6	3			31
Striker	6		7			13
Surveyor	1					1
Telegraphist	1		12			13
Timber Inspector	6					6
Timekeeper	6					6
Tinsmith			1			1
Washout Man	1					1
Watchman	1		1			2
Wood Machinist	1					1

Signalmen's Branch of the Q.R.U. - 26 members.

Trade Categories include assistants and apprentices, as do other groups such as clerks and porters.

Night Officers and Relieving Officers have been included with Station Masters.

Compiled from files of the Industrial Commission, Brisbane.

NOTE:

At the time of its application for registration (which was granted February 17th, 1917) the union lodged a list comprising names of members, their calling and the branch of which they were members. It is

from these lists that the above statistics have been compiled. It is clear that the list was incomplete even for the Southern Division, and must have been lodged just prior to the amalgamation of this Division with the Central and Northern Divisions. It does, however, provide a useful picture of the spread of callings represented within the all-grades union, and the high percentage of semi and unskilled workers out of the total membership.

APPENDIX IDEVELOPMENTAL AND RURAL SUBSIDIES

On the non-competitive routes, the airlines rely to some extent on subsidy. In the case of the purely "developmental" air carriers, MacRobertson Miller Airlines Ltd. and Connellan Airways Ltd., this subsidy support is geared to provide a reasonable return on capital, for without the services provided by these airlines, the more remote areas of West Australia and the Northern Territory would be very poorly served by communications and isolated altogether for some months in each year.

The two major carriers - Ansett-A.N.A. and T.A.A. provide some of the "developmental" type air services to other areas¹ for which they receive subsidy payments, while feeder airlines, several of which are subsidiaries of Ansett Transport Industries, operate subsidized "essential" rural services in New South Wales and Queensland. The losses incurred by the major operators on their feeder type services make serious inroads into the profits accruing from trunk route services.

1. E.g. the Bass Strait-Tasmania Island services and Cape York services operated by Ansett-A.N.A. and the Queensland Channel and Gulf services operated by T.A.A.

SUBSIDY PAYMENTS

Operator	1961/62 \$	1962/63 \$	1963/64 \$	1964/65 \$	1965/66 \$	1966/67 \$	1967/68 \$	1968/69 \$
Trans Australia Airlines: developmental services essential rural services	117,000 52,000	128,000 90,850	121,200 106,200	161,200 129,200	197,200 34,499	208,500 22,500	306,300 41,000	366,600 211,000
Ansett A. N. A. : developmental services essential rural services	151,200 4,338	94,100 77,800	78,200 90,600	56,000 80,200	112,800 37,220	70,600 74,880	250,400 171,920	146,300 144,500
MacRobertson-Miller Airlines	292,392	194,860	256,678	180,000	356,320	356,320	357,000	152,300
Connellan Airways	215,092	229,890	236,422	281,200	386,008	400,000	483,981	449,025
Queensland Airlines	69,000	97,000	63,400	40,800	29,599	#	#	#
Airlines of N. S. W.	88,000	83,000	59,000	67,400	28,454	40,000	65,000	60,000
Ansett Flying Boat Services	25,000	25,000	49,000	70,000	111,900	101,200	125,000	147,150
East-West Airlines	52,600	52,000	54,800	52,000	24,000	26,000	50,000	46,500
Bush Pilots							33,290	66,810
Brain and Brown Air Freighters							17,109	25,613
Airlines of South Australia								37,000
Trans West Air Charter (Noeska Aviation)								2,600
Murchison Air Services								5,045
Hicks Airlines								29,710

hereafter included in Ansett-A.N.A. essential rural services.

Compiled from: *Annual Reports of the Minister for Civil Aviation, 1960-69*, Commonwealth Govt. Printer, Canberra.

APPENDIX JRATIONALISATION COMMITTEE

The Rationalization Committee established under Clause 3 of the Civil Aviation Agreement 1957 is concerned with deployment under controlled competition of the respective airline fleets. The airlines are required to review and keep under review air routes, timetables, fares and freights and other related matters, and, if unable to agree on any such matter, may refer it to the Rationalisation Committee. This Committee is constituted by a person nominated by the Minister, known as the Co-ordinator, and two members nominated by the Company and the Commission respectively. As originally constituted Mr. D.G. Anderson, the Director-General of Civil Aviation was nominated as Co-ordinator by the Minister, and Mr. R.M. Ansett and Sir Giles Chippindale were the airline members.

At June 30th, 1961, 23 references had been made to the Committee, of which 21 had been resolved. Thirteen had been initiated by the Company, 3 by the Commission and 5 jointly; of these, 15 were decided by the Co-ordinator, and 6 by mutual agreement or withdrawal. As at June 30th, 1969, 56 references had been made to the Committee. In recent years, the number of appeals to the Committee would appear to have declined, the yearly average for the five years, 1965-69, being two. In the event of dissatisfaction continuing over a decision of the Co-ordinator, provision is made, in Clause 13 of the Civil Aviation Agreements - 1961, for the matter to be dealt with by an Arbitrator and there are several instances where this has been done.

Experience indicates that three main types of problem gravitate to the Committee:

- (i) the development of route patterns by extending competition or adding new points,
- (ii)* changes in fares and freight rates,
- (iii) the rationalization of capacity to be provided on competitive routes by fixing profitable load factors and in some cases, determining the respective shares of the capacity to be provided by each operator.

In the Minister's opinion, the effect of the more important decisions of the Committee has been to maintain rather than suppress the keen competitive element which is a primary justification for the two airline policy. The work of the Committee has been a major factor in improving the stability and economic returns of the industry.

Compiled from: Reports on Civil Aviation in Australia & Papua-New Guinea, the Department of Civil Aviation, Melbourne, 1945-1959, and Annual Reports of the Minister for Civil Aviation, 1960-69. Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra.

* While under Regulation 106, the Minister approves fares and freight rates, the Rationalization Committee also gives consideration to variations in the fares and freight rates charged by the Company and the Commission on competitive routes.

APPENDIX KLICENSING OF FLIGHT CREW

A flight crew licence is granted by the Department of Civil Aviation to an applicant following medical, theoretical and practical flight tests. A person who is to command a heavy aircraft engaged in airline operations must hold a first class Airline Transport Pilot Licence and to qualify for this licence he must pass the most exacting tests. His privileges are extensive and include the right to fly aircraft carrying large numbers of fare paying passengers.

Air Navigation Orders specify in detail the standards that are to be met by applicants for flight crew licences. For the period 1945-46, exemption from normal flying tests for the issue of a civil pilot's licence was given in all instances to R.A.A.F., R.A.F. or equivalent Service personnel where:-

- (a) the applicant for an "A" licence has satisfactorily completed an E.F.T.S. course of flying training;
- (b) the applicant for a "B" licence has satisfactorily completed a full course of flying training (S.F.T.S.) and has graduated and received a flying badge.

Under these exemptions, the Department issued 112 "A" licences and 664 "B" licences in the twelve months ended 30/6/46. Of the total number of 1,019 "B" licences in force at 30/6/46, 478 were held by pilots engaged in airline transport operations.


Under new licensing procedures covered by Air Navigation Orders, Part 40, a new class of licence was introduced on April 1st, 1947 viz.

the Airline Transport Pilot Licence which was issued in three classes. This involved higher and more detailed requirements to be possessed by pilots.

The Senior Commercial Pilot Licence was introduced in January, 1949, and authorised the holder to act as pilot in command of aircraft of more than 12,500 pounds gross weight on international operations but not on regular public transport services. For the years, 1951-1952, the issuing of Airline Transport Pilot licences in three classes was dropped, to be replaced ultimately by the system subsequently in use viz. the Airline Transport Pilot Licence, 1st and 2nd Class.

Since 1959 airline pilots and senior commercial pilots have been required to have electrocardiograms at initial examinations and at intervals thereafter.

The disqualification rate of flight crew seeking renewal of licence was low for the period under review, though rising. The rate was 1.7 per 1,000 per annum for the years 1953-1959, for 1960-62 it was 4.2 per 1,000 and it was expected that the rate would become higher due to the increased number and proportion of older pilots.



However, it would appear that a levelling off process has taken place as the failure rate for renewal of licence for Senior Commercial Pilots and Airline Transport Pilots, taken together, was 3.6 per 1,000 for the period 1963-65 and 3.2 per 1,000 per annum for 1968.

Licences Current as at:								30/6/48	30/6/49	30/6/50	30/6/51	30/6/52	1953-1958	30/6/59	30/6/60	19/6/61	30/6/62	30/6/63	30/6/64	30/6/65	30/6/66	30/6/67	30/6/68	30/6/69
	1st Class Airline Transport	2nd Class Airline Transport	3rd Class Airline Transport	Airline Transport Pilot	Airline Transport Pilot, 1st Class	Airline Transport Pilot, 2nd Class	Senior Commercial Pilot	361	397	417	N/A	N/A	-	652	389	659	690	684	670	750	808	819	826	803
		35	360	N/A	27	326	N/A	35	363	30	N/A	N/A	-	418	471	432	464	464	603	725	771	838	887	893
														130	132	147	154	176	189	192	192	224	244	438

N/A = not applicable

- = not available

Compiled from: Reports on Civil Aviation in Australia and New Guinea, 1945-1959, and
Annual Reports of Minister for Civil Aviation, 1960-69.


APPENDIX LSAFETY IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

Safety is the most important consideration in the airline industry, and Australia has been fortunate in achieving an enviable record in this field. Climatically, the country provides some of the best conditions for flying in the world, and the Department of Civil Aviation, through the imposition of rigorous standards for pilot licensing, the provision of navigational aids, the maintenance of airports etc. has set high standards for operational procedure in accordance with those laid down by international agreements.

Within the Department of Civil Aviation, an Accident Investigation Branch was formed in May, 1946. Its activities were complementary to those of the Accident Studies Branch, within the Directorate of Air Navigation and Safety. In order to disassociate Accident Investigation from any part of the Department which was charged with the responsibility of promoting safety or policing safety standards, it was decided that the Accident Investigation Branch should be part of the Directorate of Air Transport and External Relations. It would appear that there must have been considerable overlapping of functions between the Accident Investigation Branch and the Accident Studies Branch. With the reorganisation of the Department after 1952, under four Assistant Directors-General, responsibility for the investigation and analysis of accidents and incidents and the preparation of appropriate recommendations for the improvement of safety in aircraft operations was located in the Division of Air Safety Investigation, headed by an

Assistant Director-General.

From the graph below the steady improvement in world airline safety can be noted and the pleasing relationship of the Australian figures with those for world wide operation, and, particularly, with those for the two countries acknowledged as leaders in civil aviation development. The figures support the claim that Australia has achieved a level of airline safety second to none. To date, the introduction of turbo-jet airliners on to domestic services in Australia in November, 1964 has not altered this situation.



PASSENGER FATALITY RATES. SCHEDULED AIRLINES SERVICES
FIVE YEAR PERIODS 1954-1965

What needs to be remembered is the impact that a single airline accident can produce, especially that of a pure jet. Not only is the number of fatalities likely to be high, but the confidence of the travelling public in the safety of airline travel would be undermined.

For this and other reasons, safety will remain of paramount importance to all connected with the industry - in particular, the Department of Civil Aviation, the airline operators and the flight crews.

ACCIDENT AND FATALITY RATES - REGULAR
PUBLIC TRANSPORT SERVICES, 1954-1968

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type of Service</i>	<i>Accidents per 10,000 hours flown</i>	<i>Passenger Fatalities per 100 million passenger miles</i>
1954	Domestic & International combined	.06	Nil
1955	" " "	.03	Nil
1956	" " "	.06	Nil
1957	" " "	.13	Nil
1958	" " "	.19	Nil
1959	Domestic	Nil	Nil
	International	Nil	Nil
1960	Domestic	.084	2.12
	International	.24	Nil
1961	Domestic	.22	.92
	International	Nil	Nil
1962	Domestic	.09	Nil
	International	Nil	Nil
1963	Domestic	Nil	Nil
	International	Nil	Nil
		<i>Accidents per 100,000 hours flown</i>	
1964	Domestic	.35	Nil
	International	1.99	Nil
1965	Domestic	1.03	Nil
	International	Nil	Nil
1966	Domestic	1.38	.98
	International	Nil	Nil
1967	Domestic	.39	Nil
	International	1.54	Nil
1968	Domestic	1.60	.92
	International	Nil	Nil

Compiled from: Reports on Civil Aviation in Australia and New Guinea, 1945-59 and Annual Reports of Minister for Civil Aviation, 1960-69.